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The disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and reinsertion of ex-combatants generally 
and female ex-combatants specifically constitute one of the most fundamental activities in 
the 1994 post-genocide and war period in Rwanda. Initiated in 1997, the Rwanda 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) had the task of supporting the 
effective social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life so as to 
realise national security, reconciliation, development, and sustainable peace.  
 
The findings of this study show that there is a tendency to regard former combatants as a 
homogenous group, overlooking significant variations based on gender, age, disability, 
military ranking, education and vocational skills, which are found in even small groupings. 
This study found that the needs, capacities and expectations of former combatants tend to 
be wide ranging, depending on these specificities/characteristics. On the whole, the 
transition from reinsertion to reintegration is often marked by drawn-out processes, and 
considerable difficulty in catering to all beneficiaries and developing comprehensive 
programmes. 
 
The findings revealed that, as they re-join their former communities, female ex-combatants 
are often affected differently in terms of identity crises, stigma, stereotypes, trauma, 
vulnerability, and power relations within society through intra-house and social relations.  
Even though the RDRC has made some progress, it has become clear that more needs to be 
done to help female ex-combatants through the reintegration programme. From the 
viewpoints expressed by the respondents during focus group discussions, one can conclude 
that in the planning of reinsertion assistance, it is imperative that the overall socio-
economic dynamics and the challenge of poverty are factored in as key variables to 
minimize resentment and marginalisation of broader war-affected communities. This would 
ensure a better linkage between reinsertion and reintegration, contributing to the 
sustainability of the identity transformation of female ex-combatants. 
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  Chapter One 
Introduction and Orientation 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief history of Rwanda. It covers the background to the study, the 
problem statement, the aims of the study, the hypothesis, the research questions and finally 
the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.2 A brief history of Rwanda  
The Republic of Rwanda is a land-locked country nestled within the Great Lakes area and 
located in the central Africa. It is bordered on the east by the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, with which it shares the shores of Lake Kivu; on the north by Uganda; on the west 
by Tanzania; and on the south by Burundi as shown in Figure 1.1. Rwanda covers an area 
of 26,338 square kilometres or 10,169 square miles (Encyclopaedia of the Nations, 2010). 
All of Rwanda is at high elevation, with a geography dominated by mountains in the west, 
savannah in the east, and numerous lakes throughout the country, this why Rwanda is 
entitled the name- “Land of a Thousand Hills”. The climate is temperate to subtropical, 
with two rainy seasons (February to April, November to January)and two dry seasons every 



















Figure 1.1 A map of Rwanda. 
 
 
Source: The World Factbook 2007. From the Library of Congress Country Studies of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.  
 
The capital city is Kigali located in the centre of the country while some other cities are 
Gitarama, Butare, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi etcetera. The population is about 10.7 million 
(United Nations, 2011).  There are three ethnic groups in Rwanda namely; Hutu which 
makes up 85% of the population , Tutsi 14% of the entire population and  Twa 1% of the 
population (United Nations, 2011). The three official languages are English, French and 
Kinyarwanda (which is spoken by most Rwandans).  Christianity is the largest religion in 
the country (93.5% which consists of religion like Roman Catholic, Protestant, and 
Adventist), Muslims are 4.6%, 1.7% claim no religious beliefs while traditional African 
consists of 0.1%.  According to United Nations (2011), Rwanda gained independence on 
the 1st of July 1962 from Belgium. Currently, it has a presidential system of government. 
The economy is based mostly on subsistence agriculture. The cash crops are mostly tea, 
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coffee, sorghum, beans, bananas and potatoes. Tourism is also a fast-growing sector and is 
now the country's leading foreign exchange earner.  
 
1.3 Background 
The war that started in Rwanda in 1990 and which ended with genocide in 1994 confirmed 
that women can join the ranks of warriors. During the war in Rwanda, women took on tasks 
habitually performed by men in addition to supporting the war effort more directly. This 
study examines the unique situation in which such women find themselves in the post-1994 
period in Rwanda. The study focuses broadly on the re-integration experiences of Rwandan 
female ex-combatants with a view to assess how effectively they have been integrated 
within broader Rwandan society. In general, the post-conflict environment is difficult for 
ex-combatants as government at all levels looks to harness productive resources for the 
reconstruction of their communities.  Typically, such reconstruction involves a range of 
crucial but competing areas and issues: the restoration of social services; the development 
of human capacity; the revitalisation or improvement of devastated infrastructure; and the 
resurrection of economic activities and productivity.   
 
According to the Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (1992:46), post-conflict peace building is defined 
as: “Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”.  In Resolution 1325 of October 2000 on 
Women, Peace and Security, the United Nations (UN) Security Council recognises that 
achieving gender justice is as central to social transformation as any other form of 
reparation after war.  Resolution 1325 draws from a growing body of feminist scholarship 
and proposes that once starts after violent conflict ends, understanding the effects and 
implications of gender dynamics is essential to successful peace building (Farr, 2002: 4).In 
this resolution, the Security Council acknowledged that women and men ex-combatants 
and their dependants have different needs in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) programme.  To leave women and girls out of the process of 
reconstruction and rebuilding the country after war is not only to violate their right to 
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participate but also to undermine the aims of DDR, namely sustainable and equitable 
development. Dealing with the needs of women ex-combatants is a crucial challenge that 
calls for an effective solution in post-conflict reconstruction, peace building, and the 
general development of the country. Their full involvement in all efforts towards the 
sustainable resolution of a country’s conflicts and its reconstruction is essential, even when 
they are small in number.  This study seeks to assess the effectiveness of the reintegration 
process using Rwandan women ex-combatants as a case study. It assesses key variables to 
determine how well they are re-adjusting and reintegrating into the mainstream of Rwandan 
society by putting into context their social and economic experiences and perceptions. 
 
1.4 Problem statement  
In most societies generally, and in the post-1994 genocide and war in Rwanda specifically, 
women constitute a highly vulnerable class of citizens.  This translates into poor access to 
economic opportunities and social welfare facilities such as education and healthcare.  Not 
surprisingly, women are often among the least educated and poorest people in their 
communities. This is also true of female ex-combatants in the post-1994 genocide and war 
in Rwanda. While women were called upon to contribute to wartime efforts, they were 
marginalised in the post-war period. When they returned to their civilian communities, they 
remained oppressed and poor. Baden and Oxaal (1997) highlights that this is “despite 
demobilisation programmes aimed not only at enabling ex-combatants to improve their 
well-being and stability but also to make a positive impact within their communities”. 
 
The Rwandan experience and that of many other post-conflict societies, reveals that 
atrocities committed during war against civilians, including their own communities, create 
suspicion and fear about the prospect of ex-combatants returning to their communities. 
Other factors also impeded the reintegration of female ex-combatants in Rwanda.  For 
instance, despite external aid, it was difficult for women ex-combatants to secure 
employment. This raises the danger of disgruntled ex-combatants drifting into criminality 
or even renewed conflict. Gender relations are another critical issue. When the war and 
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genocide in Rwanda were over, the contribution made by women ex-combatants received 
minimal recognition; one reason for that was that the needs and priorities of a post-conflict 
society were very different from those of a society at war where men and women are 
encouraged to act out similar roles as fellow soldiers in an army or guerrilla movement. 
Enloe (2000:21) observes that female ex-combatants in many post-conflict societies, who 
have broken rules of traditional behaviour and gender roles, are marginalised during the 
rebuilding process. In Rwanda, some female ex-soldiers preferred to mask their military 
past rather than face social disapproval.  
 
The changes experienced by women ex-combatants in the post-1994 war and genocide in 
Rwanda are manifold, and they need assistance to build a civilian existence where they can 
care for themselves, and their children and dependents. While men and women perform 
similar roles during periods of war, they have different roles during peacetime. While men 
do not experience a break in their gender socialisation, women do. Even though the vast 
majority of women and girls in Rwanda were mobilised to join the war, they faced 
persistent stigma from their own families and communities once demobilised. Baden and 
Oxaal (1997) notes that some of the specific prejudices include the assumption that the 
women had been sexually abused and hence have lost their ‘purity’, the fear that they 
would return with sexually-transmitted diseases, the fear that their military commander or 
‘husband’ would pursue them and threaten their families, neighbours and community, and a 
presumption that these women would incite bad or ‘promiscuous behaviour’ in other girls. 
Host communities are sometimes fearful of the aggressive behaviour they believe the 
women may have acquired through their association with the armed forces. They also think 
that the female ex-combatants will be out of synchronisation with culturally accepted 
gender norms. Women’s own assumptions about how they will be perceived when they 
return to their community can reinforce the above perceptions. Aware of the stigma and 
barriers they may face, some women ex-combatants choose to marginalise themselves from 
the community, thereby forming a group of particularly vulnerable ex-combatants who are 




1.5 Aims of the study 
The aims of the study cover overall objective and the specific aims. 
1.5.1 Overall objective 
The study seeks to investigate how effectively female ex-combatants are reintegrated into 
the mainstream of Rwandan society.    
1.5.2 Specific aims 
The specific aims of the study are as follows:  
• To assess female ex-combatants’ views on gender relations generally. 
• To assess the post-military experiences of female ex-combatants. 
• To assess female ex-combatants’ views on the overall effectiveness of the Rwanda 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRC). 
• To assess the impact of RDRC on female ex-combatants. 
• To determine the socio-economic problems facing female ex-combatants. 
• To analyse how a sample of female ex-combatants views their reintegration.  
• To assess female ex-combatants’ new skills and employability.  
• To assess the role of female ex-combatants in the post-conflict environment. 
 
1.6 Hypothesis 
Female ex-combatants will not re-adjust successfully into civilian life if their 
demobilisation and re-integration programme is ineffective.   
 
1.7 Research questions 
Drawing directly from the objectives, the investigation will focus questions on three major 
sets of issues:  
1. Major challenges faced by female ex-combatants seeking to re-integrate into civilian life. 
• Are female ex-combatants properly trained in new skills suitable for employment in 
a civilian environment before and after demobilisation? 
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• What is the role of female ex-combatants in both the design and implementation of 
RDRP? 
• How accessible and appropriate are RDRP benefits to female ex-combatants?  
2.  Comparative assessments of female ex-combattants and male ex-combattants. 
• How are the Rwandan female ex-combatants faring after demobilisation in 
comparison with male ex-combatants? 
3. The existence of societal barriers to the re-integration of ex-combatants (such as   
stigmatization, stereotypes, identity crises, vulnerability, a society which does not 
understand them, and training which is not adapted to female needs). 
• How is female ex-combatants’ newly acquired role in the military impacting on 
traditional gender relations in society?  
• To what extent are efforts to reintegrate female ex-combatants (after 
demobilisation) affected by their military experiences and training? 
 
As will be seen in the literature review, concepts relevant to this study include: combatant, 
child soldiers, peace building, demilitarization, disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration. 
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This study is comprised of seven chapters.  
Chapter one: Introduction and orientation 
The first chapter introduces the study by providing a general background. The chapter 
discusses the problem statement. It describes the aim of the study (overall objective and 
specific aims), the hypothesis and the research questions. The chapter also explicates the 
research design. 
 
Chapter two: Research methodology and theories  
The second chapter explicates the methodology used in this study and the principal theories 
upon which it is based. A case study approach has been adopted and feminist development 
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theory was used as a tool to identify and explain the extent and nature of the state policy 
regime, which highlights the Rwandan government efforts to demobilise and reintegrate 
female ex-combatants.   
 
Chapter three: Women, war and the historical context of the Rwandan conflict 
The third chapter explores the context and problem of the study. It presents background 
information on the Rwandan conflict, and assesses the way in which the colonial powers 
succeeded in politicising ethnic differences in Rwanda. It discusses pre-colonial and 
colonial Rwanda, post-independence and pre-Arusha agreement. It shows not only how the 
ethnic identity crisis created tension among the Rwandan population but also how it led to 
deadly civil war and genocide. It explicates the comparative role of women in war and 
peace, with particular attention to the Rwandan experience as a case study. 
 
Chapter four: Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes 
The fourth chapter contains a review of the relevant literature on Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes, by means of an overview of DDR 
Programmes in general and in Africa in particular. It presents the definitions of key 
concepts such as combatant, demilitarization, disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration. The chapter focuses on the context of DDR Programmes with particular 
emphasis on female ex-combatants in some African countries. 
 
Chapter five: Data presentation and analysis: Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Commission. The fifth chapter examines the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration 
Commission.  It explicates the mission, objectives, and the activities of the Rwanda 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission.  It focuses on the reintegration of female 
ex-combatants in post-conflict society and presents the study findings and analyse the 
views of key informants on the reintegration of female ex-combatants as well as the 




Chapter six: Statistical analysis of findings and discussions of results 
The sixth chapter discusses the statistical analysis of the findings of the study and presents 
the results. It addresses the major findings of the study and important themes in the 
literature on the reintegration of Rwandan female ex-combatants.  
 
Chapter seven: Conclusion and recommendations 




Research Methodology and Theories 
 
2.1 Research methodology 
For this study, a mixed methods research has been adopted; as both qualitative and 
quantitative research are important and useful. Burke and Onwuegbuzie (2004:15) state that 
if you foresee a continuum with qualitative research anchored at one pole and quantitative 
research anchored at the other, mixed methods covers the large set of points in the middle 
area. They point out that mixed methods can also help connexion the break-up between 
qualitative and quantitative research. The study adopted a qualitative method as the nature 
of research questions required the use of qualitative data from both secondary and primary 
sources. A number of qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques were used to 
analyse the secondary data and primary data respectively.  
 
For this research, a case study approach has been adopted.  As Cresswell (1994:16) notes, a 
case study may be viewed as an investigation through the analysis of a bounded system.  
Actual cases, which often take a wide variety of forms, may be represented as a process, 
activity, event, programme or individuals (see De Vos, 2005:269). According to Feagin, 
Orum and Sjoberg (1991:6), a case study is an “ideal methodology when a holistic, in-
depth investigation is needed”. For Yin (1989), a single case may be utilised to confirm or 
challenge a theory, or to represent a unique or extreme case. He continues: A case study 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1989:23). Hammersly, Gomm and Foster (2000:4) note 
that “the main concern may be with understanding the case studied in itself, with no interest 
in theoretical inference or empirical generalisation”. They conclude that there may also be 




For the purposes of this study, one case was used: Rwanda.  As a Rwandan citizen, the 
researcher has developed a long-term scholarly interest in the country. More importantly, 
however, Rwanda ─ with its reputedly progressive social policies ─ will provide a crucial 
opportunity to assess the degree to which a formal policy framework is linked to desirable 
policy outcomes. Data collection was designed to be participatory as much as possible and 
involved a mixture of primary data collection techniques such as interviews, discussions 
and observations.  A structured questionnaire was administered and interviews were 
conducted with key informants and individuals from different walks of life.   Focus group 
discussions, as a research tool, were used to triangulate and validate the findings of the 
structured questionnaire and the researcher used a tape recorder to ensure accuracy.
 
The key concern of this study was to assess the effectiveness of the reintegration of female 
ex-combatants into Rwandan society.  The concept ‘effectiveness’ is subjective as its 
understanding varies from person to person in such a way that it may not be measurable 
with any degree of absolute precision.  However, by examining policy objectives and 
assessing the degree to which they were achieved, one can still deduce policy effectiveness.  
Kumar (1999:48) observes that: “there are some who believe that scientific methods are 
incapable of measuring feelings, preferences, values and sentiments”.  He notes that most 
things can be measured, although there are situations where feelings or judgment are not 
adaptable to direct measurement “but can be measured indirectly”.  He concludes that these 
feelings and judgments are based upon observable behaviours in real life, though “the 
extent to which the behaviours reflect their judgments may vary from person to person” 
(Kumar, 1999:48).  This can be accomplished by not only finding documents and collecting 
data but also by specifying relevant criteria or patterns that would suggest particular 
outcomes, and conducting analysis of collected documents and data to reveal the patterns 
and note the number of occurrences of the expected or unanticipated indicators.   
 
With respect to this study, the researcher applies the concept of ‘effectiveness’ in relation to 
‘reintegration’ of female ex-combatants into Rwandan society.  The study examines 
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whether the re-integration programme has been effective or not.  As effectiveness measures 
the extent to which the programme has been successful in achieving its key objectives, this 
study assessed the success of the RDRP (if any) in demobilising and re-integrating female 
ex-combatants. Relevant major indicators for measuring ‘effectiveness’ would include 
employment, ‘good’ social behaviour (for example, the interaction between ex-combatants 
and the societies that receive them), personal development, degree of societal acceptance 
(such as how they are welcomed: very warmly, with suspicion, or not welcomed; if they are 
encountering adjustment problems with their families, and whether they are treated as 
inferior or the same as male ex-combatant returnees), participation in community activities, 
and their decision-making role in the community.  For this study, the findings were 
analysed according to the frequency of open-ended and close-ended responses, taking into 
consideration the respondents’ views and perceptions around the themes of the study as 
discussed. The information was collected, tabulated and classified according to variables 
(see Table 2.1 below) and relevant data on indicators. Thereafter, the information collected 
were analysed. The findings were summarised by showing the extent to which the RDRP 
has been effective (or not) in achieving its key objectives.  As a certified counsellor, the 
researcher was able to assist interviewees in a relevant manner to cope with any stress 














A sample of the relevant questions and indicators used for data gathering is presented as 
follows: 
Table 2.1: Sample of questions and indicators 










Economic re-integration (income, 
employment) 
Psychosocial re-integration (acceptance by 












Quality of reception 
Organization into the  



















Degree of acceptance  Q12.1 to 
Q12.13; 
Q10, Q11 
Source: Researcher, 2010 
 
Thus the following methods were used to collect data:  
1) Literature review: A review of appropriate literature was undertaken to develop an 
understanding of the subject matter by focusing on past and present thinking.  This helped 
in providing a conceptualisation of the role of female ex-combatants in the post-conflict 
period generally and in the Rwandan case, specifically.  The Rwandan Commission of 
Demobilisation’s reports and the Ndabaga Association’s reports as well as various other 
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publications were closely examined.  The literature review also helped to direct and inform 
the other steps of the study, including the formulation of the questionnaire as well as data 
collection and analysis.   
 
2) Structured questionnaire: The structured questionnaire format is a standardised technique 
where the researcher presents questions in exactly the same way ─ in terms of the actual 
wording and the ordering of the questions ─ to all respondents.  The technique also has the 
potential of being used to gather data from a larger pool of respondents than would be 
normally possible through personal interviews.  The idea is to allow the researcher to 
conveniently compare the responses against one another, to facilitate the interpretation of 
the responses, to analyse and present the results in statistical formats, and make generalised 
statements about the study population.  For the purposes of this study, the intention was to 
use the fixed alternative questions structure, which asked the respondent to choose one of a 
set of specified alternatives.  The questions were designed in such a manner that they 
solicited responses that could present respondents’ views and perceptions around the 
themes of this study. 
 
3) Focus group discussion: The researcher also used focus group discussions (FGDs) to 
generate data and complement the quantitative data. This technique enables a researcher to 
obtain detailed information on issues, concepts, perceptions, and ideas from a group of 
people over a short period of time.   According to Fontana and Frey (1994:364), the 
purpose of group interviews is the collection of qualitative data.  This method gives the 
respondents the freedom to formulate their own responses, and hence can unveil new and 
important aspects that had not been anticipated by the researcher.  The aim of using group 
interviews is not to replace individual interviews but to gather information that perhaps, 
cannot be easily collected by means of individual interviews.  A small number of such 
individuals (from different fields of work), brought together as a discussion and resource 
group, is much more valuable than any representative group (Blumer 1961:41 highlighted 
in Fontana and Frey, 1994:365). For this study, these discussions were conducted in the 
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local language.  The researcher used a tape recorder and was assisted by a moderator, an 
observer (not a participant), and a trainer.  Nine separate focus group discussions were 
conducted in three provincial centres:  
Kigali ─3 FGDs (three separate groups of about five persons each) 
Southern Province ─ 3 FGDs (three separate groups of about five persons each) 
Northern Province –3 FGDs (three separate groups of about five persons each)  
The researcher conducted discussions with four groups of female ex-combatants, one group 
of male ex-combatants, and one mixed group of male and female ex-combatants.  
 
4) Direct observation: The researcher spent six months in Rwanda, observing female ex-
combatants’ activities.  This provided the opportunity to verify and supplement the data 
contained in the official reports of their activities.  It was also an opportunity for the 
researcher to engage some female ex-combatants on their views, experiences and 
perceptions regarding the opportunities and constraints facing them during the post-conflict 
period in Rwanda.  This data not only supplemented information collected from the 
questionnaire and other techniques but also helped to verify it.  The researcher closely 
examined the fit between the information provided by ex-combatants and those contained 
in official sources and documents of their activities.  The direct observation technique 
helped to identify whether the process of re-integrating female ex-combatants is poorly 
implemented, or effectively implemented, and if additional inputs are needed. 
 
5) Interviews: The researcher conducted interviews in 2008 with four academics from the 
National University of Rwanda (NUR); two historians, one educationist, and an 
anthropologist. Two are Hutu while the other two are from the Tutsi ethnic group.  Two 
had witnessed and survived the different conflicts in Rwanda since 1950. 
 
Data analysis: After the fieldwork, the researcher collated and analysed the collected data 
within the framework of each stipulated objective.  For instance, the relevant responses of 
key informants were outlined as they were provided.  The data were read carefully, 
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analysed, related to the questions asked, and transposed into a computer after editing 
(which was done at the end of each day) to ensure consistency.  The answers that seemed to 
belong together were categorised and coded with a key word.  All responses were coded for 
analysis; this was followed by the interpretation of results.  Data from the questionnaire and 
focus group discussions were carefully examined and analysed as well.  The researcher 
ordered and reduced the data by relating it to the objectives of this study.  The collated data 
were subjected to rigorous analysis and statistical calculations using the Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows. During the analysis and interpretation of the 
quantitative data, inferential statistics - namely the chi-square test - was used to test the 
independence of variables. This helped the researcher to measure if a characteristic is 
differently distributed among female and male respondents. Assuming that the variable 
being measured is not differently distributed among female and male ex-combatants (null 
hypothesis-denoted as Ho), this hypothesis will be rejected if the value of p is less than 
0.05. The researcher was able to conclude that there is a relationship between the two 
variables at a “significance level of 0.05”. In the tables produced by SPSS, this value will 
be displayed in the column of asymptotic significance (Asymp. Sign.) of a test statistic. If 
the value of p is higher (>0.05), the apparent relationship between variables might be a 
fluke or the result of a sampling error. Such significance tests are used in the study 
whenever there is a need to adopt a comparative point of view between female and male ex-
combatants. 
 
In essence, the researcher collated and summarised all collected data for analysis and 
interpretation before integrating the results into the report and confirming (refuting) the 
hypothesis of the study.  At the end, the researcher’s recommendations are informed by the 
evidence accumulated from the data. 
 
2.2 Principal theories upon which the research is based 
Research on women- and- development subjects involves in-depth understanding of both 
development and feminist theoretical frameworks. The experiences of policymakers and 
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activists gave rise to revised theoretical formulations of development and feminist 
apprehensions. Some researchers have worked on feminist and development theories and 
have contributed to the additional development and, most of the times, the integration of 
these theories. The researcher adopted the integration of these theories.   For the purposes 
of this study, feminist development theory was used to assess the reintegration of Rwandan 
female ex-combatants.  Clearly, for a country that is coming out of a major conflict, such a 
reintegration exercise is a fundamental part of nation-building. Traditional development 
theories do not adequately capture the nuances vital for studying and understanding the 
special case of women ex-combatants.  The feminist development theoretical foundation of 
this study emanates from the available literature on demobilisation and reintegration of 
female ex-combatants.  As noted by Ferris (2004), despite its diversity in constitution and 
objectives, the feminist movement has profoundly influenced our understanding of the 
nature and extent of gender dynamics in nearly every aspect of human endeavour, 
particularly in western societies.  Indeed, as feminist principles have become deeply 
ingrained throughout the world, many of these ideas have come to be seen not so much as 
specifically feminist but as routine parts of societal values.  This is due in part to the efforts 
of feminist scholars who have sought to widen the theoretical foundations of a wide variety 
of scholarships.  For instance, feminist authors such as Tickner (1992:86) have challenged 
Marxism by observing that Marxist theory is flawed by its claim that autonomous 
development, which meets the economic security needs of all people, can be achieved only 
through a socialist revolution. On the one hand, some feminists maintain that the Marxist 
understanding of knowledge is (unintentionally) helpful because it supports their claim that 
knowledge has been constructed in such a way that it denies a voice to women.  On the 
other hand, feminists criticize Marxist theories for ignoring women’s reproductive and 
domestic roles.  Marxist theory focuses on class as the basic unit of analysis.  Rather than 
being discussed as a group with particular needs, women have been subsumed under this 
class analysis. In fact, Marx provided many of the concepts and analytical tools commonly 
used to discuss inequitable social relations. He alleged that conflicting material interests, 
based on one’s economic position and the way one earned a living, resulted in conflicting 
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perceptions of social reality and transferred individuals and families to social classes. Some 
Marxists such as Bill Warren (1980) established the prospects for capitalist development 
relatively good in many underdeveloped countries.  He observed that capitalism did not 
cause underdevelopment. Classes and contradictions within Third World nations and their 
impact on relations with the North must be understood if one is to properly evaluate Third 
World development (Warren, 1980).  Feminists argue that class-based capitalist oppression 
is not synonymous with the oppression of women (Tickner, 1992:86).  They also argue that 
class-based analysis ignores two important facts: a woman is oppressed in specific ways 
attributable to patriarchy rather than to capitalism; and classical Marxism has ignored or 
omitted women’s roles in the family from its analyses.  By leaving the unpaid labour that 
women perform in the family out of the analysis, certain issues that are peculiar to women 
(regardless of class position) are neglected (Tickner, 1992:87).  Feminists fight for the 
equality of women and claim that women should share equally in society’s opportunities 
and scare resources as men. 
 
Indeed, the close connection between revolutionary movements and women’s participation 
demands an analysis of this phenomenon.  Some authors such as Farr (2002: 10) observe 
that with ideologies and stereotypes firmly in place, it seems natural that it will be men and 
not women who predominate in peace agreements and reconstruction processes that are set 
in motion when wars end.  She noted that a careful deconstruction of ideas about space in 
wartime shows that gender stereotypes naturalise ideas of how people behave. Feminist 
scholars have worked to nuance our understanding that women’s roles and the identities 
they assume to fulfil these roles during the build-up to war, during wartime, and afterwards, 
are strategic and shifting. Gender is an important factor explaining men and women’s 
experiences and roles as both victims and perpetrators of violence in conflict and post-
conflict settings.  Gender refers to masculinities and femininities, women and men, the 
relations between them, the power inequalities between men and women and the way that 
boys and girls are socialized to adhere to specific roles and norms.  For example, gender 
patterns in many settings reinforce the idea that women and girls should do caregiving and 
19 
 
care for the home, while men and boys may be expected to work and produce outside the 
home. Other norms reinforce the idea that men must use or be willing to use violence to 
defend themselves and those around them. Arguing against the predominant stereotypes of 
women as innately peaceful and men as inevitably warlike, feminists insist on the need to 
recognise the complexity of gender ideologies and the multiple roles they play in drawing 
different social actors into war (Fukuyama, 1998; Goldstein, 2001).  In peacetime as well in 
wartime, females display a wide variety of responses to organised and/or state-sanctioned 
forms of violence (Farr, 2002: 6).    
 
There is a long and much celebrated history of feminist pacifism, and some females - as 
peace activists - play essential roles in maintaining social connections and building 
coalitions across communities divided by violence and are therefore well positioned to play 
important roles in rehabilitation, reconciliation, reintegration support, and peace building 
roles in the aftermath of conflict (Anderlini, 2000).  Although many feminists have noted 
that women’s peace building activities receive too little recognition in the period of 
reconstruction (Anderlini, 2000; Enloe, 2000), it is also true that women who saw active 
combat are not allowed to participate as leaders in the development of transition and 
reconstruction processes.  They are often acknowledged only as mothers, sisters, wives or 
daughters (Farr, 2002).  Even if their levels of participation in the business of war are 
varied, females remain at the margins of political, economic, and social power, and their 
voices and experiences tend to disappear when peace processes begin (Goldblatt and 
Meintjes, 1996).  Despite the problem of the invisibility of women, countries that have 
emerged from conflict and war situations are often seen as potential sites of positive 
change.  Some theorists observe that war and the aftermath of war can present opportunities 
to influence social and political structures that in peacetime were beyond women’s 
expectations (Farr, 2002: 11). 
 
As already noted, the focus of this study is to assess the reintegration of female ex-
combatants by using feminist development theory.  According to Barbanti (2004), 
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development should be understood as a process, not a product.  Societies are always 
changing: some improve while others fail to do so.  For Barbanti, development theory aims 
to explain both processes, and he argues that development practice intends to provide tools 
that can be applied to entire societies or specific communities such as female ex-
combatants.  Such interventions are intended to move communities or societies from a 
situation in which they are believed to be worse off to a situation in which they are assumed 
to be better off.  Clearly, traditional development theories – including Dependency Theory, 
International Trade Theory, Modernization Theory, Capability Theory, and Import 
Substitution Theory – can provide vital insights into the nature, thrust, and relational 
dynamics of development. For instance, Modernization theory emerged in the 1930s, with 
the early development initiatives of colonial rulers and economists, and gained momentum 
in the postwar and postcolonial periods. Western economists and sociologists began to 
theorize in the 1950s about how to promote “development” in the newly independent 
countries, and development planners designed projects to modernize “less-developed” 
countries all over the globe. Modernization was the dominant approach underlying 
development research and policy in the postwar period and continues to guide development 
efforts today. As stated by Rostow (1960:4), the basic idea of modernization is that 
development is a natural, linear process away from traditional social and economic 
practices toward a Western-style economy. He identified societies, in their economic 
dimensions, as lying within one of the five categories which are the traditional society, the 
preconditions for take-off, take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass 
consumption. The measures of success include gross national product, income levels, 
employment rates, education levels, and industrial structure, and all of which emphasize the 
adoption of Western economic institutions, technologies, and values. The challenge is to 
identify barriers to self-sustaining growth. These barriers may be technological, 
educational, or cultural (Rostow, 1960:4). Modernization theory has been the dominant 
guide to the policies of the main international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the 




With regards to the traditional development theories, one can observe that their relative 
gender-insensitivity and inadequate attention to micro level units within society render 
them less useful for understanding the special challenges and circumstances of groups such 
as female ex-combatants. Though diverse and with origins in different social science fields, 
development theories are often heavily skewed in the direction of economics.  This has 
serious implications not only in terms of the way that ideas around development are 
perceived but also in terms of the consequences that policy frameworks have for societal 
peace and security.   
 
This study aims to capture the broad scope of the impact of war on the socio-economic, 
political, and emotional domains.   Impacts may be assessed and analysed at different 
levels, including the personal, household/community, national and international levels. 
Articulating the links between these levels is vital if the complete range of explanations for 
individual and group behaviour is to be understood.  For instance, the impact of armed 
conflict is enormous and the effects are different for men and women. Poverty and 
dispossession are increased in a society at war. Feminist theorists have shown that women 
and femininity form an important part of the process of constructing a male identity that is 
regarded as necessary for a warring society (Farr, 2002:11).  The feminist movement, 
sometimes known as the ‘women’s movement’ or ‘women’s liberation’ is made up of 
diverse groups of people in different countries with an equally varied set of objectives.  
Despite this diversity in constitution and objectives, the feminist movement has profoundly 
influenced the nature and extent of gender dynamics in nearly every aspect of human 
endeavours, particularly in western countries.  Indeed, as feminist principles have become 
deeply ingrained throughout the world, many of these ideas have come to be seen not so 
much as specifically feminist but as part of societal values.  Feminist development theory is 
a potentially useful tool for understanding the power dynamics in society that determine the 
role of gender in shaping the actual distribution of power and opportunities (Cagan, 
1983:93).    While there are quite a few ideas about what it seeks to accomplish, very little 
is available in terms of conceptual precision.  This is because feminism means different 
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things to different people.  Nevertheless, it is clear that it provides a framework for 
wrestling with the intersections between feminism and development by concerning itself 
with the broad areas of power relations that shape gender opportunities and interactions in 
society (Cagan, 1983:94).    
 
According to feminist literature, there are two variants relevant to war: peace and culture.  
Cagan (1983:94), an American feminist and social activist, offers the following definition 
of feminism: Feminism is a political perspective that demands an end to the oppression of 
people because of their gender, and an end to the institutional and individual structures that 
define men as more valuable than women.   Feminism rests on a belief that we can live in a 
world without hierarchies of control and domination, that people can exercise control over 
their own lives and live in harmony with others, and that women can share equality of 
opportunity and freedom. There is a very active body of work by feminist peace researchers 
whose writings are directly linked to the study of war and peace.  A small selection of these 
writers includes: Elise Boulding (1987); Betty Reardon (1985), Riane Eisler (1987) and 
Birgit Brock-Utne (1985).  Many others (such as Leslie Cagan) have written extensively on 
women and peace.  There is also a body of feminist literature not directly linked to peace 
but which has been used by women peace researchers because of the relevance of such 
studies to their work.  For example, Carol Gilligan, the Harvard educator’s book In a 
Different Voice (Gilligan, 1982) became a touchstone for many peace researchers who 
argued that the different moral development of women makes them more prone to peace 
than men.  Other works by feminist theoreticians of language such as Thorne, Kramarae, 
and Henley (1983), have also “fed into feminist critiques of the dominant male discourse of 
the military establishment”. The last example reflects an increasing number of feminist 
peace researchers who feel that deciphering the forces of militarism must ultimately lead to 
a critique of Western scientific rationality and, in particular, technology.  Here, the works 
of feminist scientists and science philosophers such as Sandra Harding (1986) and Evelyn 
Fox-Keller (1985) have been of great value. It should also be noted that although much of it 
does not have an explicitly ‘feminist’ orientation, “the work being done on women’s 
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representation and role in the media and popular culture can offer support for a feminist 
approach to peace” (Roach, 1991). For most feminist writers on peace, the violence of war 
is profoundly linked to violence against women. Many feminists such as Reardon (1985:71) 
noted that the main link between sexism and war is that both rely on the prevalence of 
violence. They argue that “since widespread violence towards women is socially sanctioned 
by prevailing cultural norms - with the mass media and mass culture playing a very 
important role - it serves as a sort of ‘primal’ paradigm for violent warfare against other 
peoples”. Furthermore, Cagan (1983:95) observes that: the ever-present possibility of rape 
parallels the threat of military intervention strong nations use against weaker ones.   Stay in 
line or you will get hurt.   Play by the rules or the most brutal force will bear down upon 
you. In both cases a broader and more subtle system of ever-present inequality lies behind 
and is defended by the more overt form of coercion. Reardon (1985:71) concludes, as do 
many other feminists, that women are not just victims of physical violence but are also 
much more oppressed by the structural violence perpetrated in highly militarised societies 
than any other social group.  Historically, the world has been silent about the situation of 
women in war; almost as silent as the women who stay on the side lines during war or who 
are excluded from peace negotiations. Women often lack the confidence and knowledge 
needed to participate in peace building and re-construction (Ferris, 2004:12). 
 
In contrast with development theoretical formulations, feminist development theory is 
potentially a more useful tool for understanding the power dynamics in society that 
determine the role of gender in shaping the actual distribution of power and opportunities. 
In this study, the feminist development theory was used as a tool to identify and explain the 
extent and nature of the state policy regime, which underpins the Rwandan government’s 
efforts to demobilise and reintegrate female ex-combatants.  If the demobilisation and 
reintegration process is properly implemented, it can provide an opportunity for positive 
change.  For instance, it can increase rights for women who make up about 50 percent of 
the society and can enhance their participation in decision making as they take on greater 
responsibilities in the formal governance structures within society.  This raises the potential 
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for change at all levels of life and development.  The researcher’s analysis is inspired 
particularly by the work of Farr (2002), which shows how gender awareness in the earliest 
transition and post-conflict period impacts on the possibility of peaceful development in the 
long-term.  This study is anchored on the theoretical assumption that gender awareness and 
sensitivity are vital for long-term peace and development.   The Rwandan government’s 
ability to craft effective transformative policy will hinge directly on how well it can 
translate its officially gender-sensitive policies to reflect a broadly-accepted outlook for the 
nation.  The meaningful integration of women ex-combatants is a litmus test of the 
government’s policy framework. Using feminist development theory, the researcher seeks 
to analyse the effectiveness of the Rwandan reintegration experience to draw conclusions 
about how demobilisation processes can be improved to better address the needs of female 
ex-combatants.  She explains why plans for effective reintegration, through which female 
ex-combatants become productive social and economic players, must incorporate a careful 
analysis of the gender ideologies at work in the society under review.   The reintegration 
process must interact with other social reform activities after the war in order to improve 
the chances that this interaction will be peaceful and constructive; an awareness of long-
term goals such as promoting greater social equality as well as enabling political and 
economic practices are important for the successful implementation of demobilisation and 
reintegration strategies. 
 
2.3 Summary of the chapter 
The chapter discussed the methodology used in this study. A case study approach has been 
adopted and feminist development theory was used as a tool to identify and explain the 
extent and nature of the state policy regime, which highlights the Rwandan government’s 
efforts to demobilise and reintegrate female ex-combatants. The study adopted both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of research.  This study shows that demobilisation and 
reintegration can play a significant role in achieving the broader goal of social 
transformation and development. Using feminist development theory, development 
activities will be regarded as having many dimensions such as economic, cultural, and 
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religious and gender influences that affect and are affected by change.  Beyond economic 
growth and the expansion of social and economic infrastructure, effective development can 
facilitate the attainment of desirable objectives such as overcoming human rights abuses, 
social inequality, and gender-based discrimination while ensuring poverty eradication and 




Women, war and the Historical Contexts of the Rwandan Conflict 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses relevant literature to provide not only a historical background to the 
Rwandan conflict from the pre-colonial period to the post-genocide era (after 1994) but 
also a comparative historical assessment of the role of women in war and peace both 
generally and with specific reference to Rwanda. It shows how a long history of domination 
and inequality between the Hutu and Tutsi population has been methodically politicised 
and how this has been developed, consolidated and changed into a contemporary ideology 
of racism and ethnic discrimination among the Rwandan people.  This led to the 
recruitment of military personnel among refugees, especially those who fled the country in 
1959 (mostly Tutsi) and another portion of refugees who fled to the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) in 1994 (mostly Hutu). The post-genocide Rwanda experienced an influx 
of a large number of men and women ex-combatants and, thus, necessitated the reduction 
in the size of the armed forces through the DDR programme that started in 1997.   
 
This chapter also discusses how the regional political and social dynamics in Burundi, 
Uganda, and the DRC enabled Rwandese refugees (both Hutu and Tutsi) to create a 
coalition, identifying them as a population reclaiming their motherland. In terms of the 
historical background to the Rwandan conflict, the researcher conducted interviews in 2008 
with four academics from the National University of Rwanda (NUR); two historians, one 
educationist, and an anthropologist. Two are Hutu while the other two are from the Tutsi 
ethnic group.  Two had witnessed and survived the different conflicts in Rwanda since 
1950.As previously indicated, this chapter will also discuss women’s role in war and peace 




3.2 History of Rwanda leading to genocide 
3.2.1 From Colonialism to ethnic hatred and Independence 
Historians agree that pre-colonial Rwanda was highly organised and had a centralised 
system of administration. The kingdom was presided over by the Umwami (King), mainly 
from the Nyiginya clan, a Tutsi sub-group. The Umwami had almost absolute powers but 
was assisted by three main close collaborators. The first was a military head/general, who 
was like a modern day army commander/or Joint Chief of General Staff.  This collaborator 
was responsible for the army, ensuring territorial integrity and expansion.  The second 
collaborator oversaw all matters pertaining to cattle keeping, grazing and settling related 
disputes.  The third collaborator was the land chief who was responsible for agricultural 
land, produce and related affairs.  Behind the scenes, the queen mother also played a 
significant role in the administration of the kingdom.  
 
On the other hand, historians are divided on the origins of Rwanda’s three ethnic groups, 
Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa.  It seems that the people themselves identified one another 
according to clan affiliation rather than ethnicity.   David Newbury has shown that while 
the terms ‘Hutu and Tutsi’ existed in pre-colonial times, they were not as entrenched 
(Newbury, D. 1979; Newbury, C. 1980:88).  All in all, 19 clans made up the members of 
what are now the three ethnic groups. Some argue that up until about the middle of the 19th 
century, clan identities mattered more than the Tutsi, Hutu or Twa categorisations (Personal 
Interview, Butare, 21 May 2008).While the description of Rwandans in terms of ethnic 
groups was partly based on indigenous people on the one hand, and inferior and superior 
race anthropological theorisation on the other, the idea of ethnicity is believed to be a 
colonial concoction which gained currency in the latter part of the 20th century. Gourevitch 
(1998:47) states that before colonialism, ethnic differences in Rwanda were very fluid and 
subjective to the extent that the social mobility of Hutu and Tutsi was possible.  However,  
the Belgium and German colonial powers managed to create and institutionalise ethnic 
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differences in the country and consolidated political control in the hands of the Tutsi 
minority who were said to be more ‘civilised’ than the Hutu (Gourevitch, 1998:49). 
 
In 1899, Rwanda effectively became a German colony under German East Africa.  The 
Germans ruled indirectly through the Umwami and his close collaborators. While the 
German colonial presence was very limited, it started to transform relations between the 
Hutu and the Tutsi. Having discovered that the existing kingdom functioned as a fully-
fledged centralised administration even before the arrival of Europeans and also, 
undoubtedly, because of a shortage of colonial personnel, the Germans chose to administer 
the colony indirectly through the Umwami. The military hierarchy and the administrative 
chiefs answerable to the Umwami continued to be both Hutus and Tutsis. Thus, the 
relations between Hutu and Tutsi were forged through a shared loyalty to a common 
institution (Scherrer, 2002:26-35) 
 
With the defeat of the Germans in World War I, the League of Nations mandated Belgium 
to administer Rwanda. The Belgians were impressed by the highly ordered social structure 
they found in Rwanda and believed that continuing the German policy of indirect rule was 
the best way to administer the country (Lee, 2001:5). However, they were befuddled by the 
complexities of the Rwandan socio-economic and political relations and contexts.  Des 
Forges (1999:3) states that the administration within central Rwanda, including the least 
important representatives of the Umwami who sometimes governed only a few hundred 
people, necessitated a comparatively high quantity of labour and local goods for its support. 
Kimber (1996:1) is of the opinion that the Belgian ruling class was not willing to make the 
effort to deal with the “intertwined fingers” of Rwandan Tutsi-Hutu relations. It was much 
easier to divide the Hutus and Tutsis and pit one group against the other. The previous 
system of having three chiefs for each area, at least one of whom was normally a Hutu, was 
replaced with a single chief for every locality (Desforges, 1999:30).  The Belgians 
introduced a series of measures that radically transformed the social structure. Umwami 
Musinga was the last of Rwanda’s Mwami who openly adopted an anti-colonialist attitude. 
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He was deposed in 1931 by the Belgian governor Tilkens Auguste Constantin who replaced 
him with his son, Rudahigwa, who had been educated at a missionary school. The Umwami 
were described as Tutsi (personal Interview, Butare, 21 May 2008). 
 
Surprisingly, the colonial powers characterised the Tutsi as perfectly constituted – just like 
Europeans: “a European under black skin” and “a superb human”– and, consequently, 
civilised (Mamdani 2001:103).  Malkki (1995:25) notes that, in the eyes of the colonial 
administration, “the secret of Tutsi domination lay in their innate superiority of intelligence 
and smartness”. According to Mamdani (2001:112), social institutions like the schools and 
churches that were run by the missionaries under the colonial powers echoed ethnic 
differences and excluded the Hutu from having access to them.  With the Belgian policy of 
favouring the Tutsi to fill the administrative posts, the Catholic schools, which represented 
the dominant educational system throughout the colonial period, adjusted their educational 
policies and openly favoured Tutsi and discriminated against Hutu (Scherrer,2002:27).  
Prunier (1995:33) notes that the Catholic missionaries purposefully reinforced the Tutsi 
feeling of superiority since the missionaries believed that the Tutsi were the “natural-born 
chief”. Therefore, they were given priority in terms of education so that the Church would 
have an influence over the future ruling class. On the other hand, the majority Hutu people 
were left with no choice with respect to educational opportunities except to become 
theology students at the seminaries. They experienced difficulties in finding employment 
after graduation and this led to frustration and embitterment in the long run.  Prunier also 
argues that the policy that institutionalised Tutsi supremacy deeply enlarged the power of 
Tutsi chiefs at the local level. Hutu chiefs were summarily replaced with Tutsi by the 
colonial administration. These chiefs were now responsible for performing the duties of the 
colonial state, which included the collection of head taxes, providing men for free labour to 
build roads, and other public works projects (Prunier, 1995:35). 
 
According to Desforges (1999:4), after the Belgian colonial authorities decided to limit 
opportunities for higher education and selection for administration posts to Tutsis, they 
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were faced with the problem of distinguishing between the local ethnic population groups – 
the Tutsis, the Hutus and the Twas. Finally they created a procedure of registering everyone 
according to their affiliated group. The information obtained was recorded at the offices of 
the local government and each Rwandan was issued with an identity card that indicated his 
or her ethnicity. The distinction between the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa was definitely fixed with 
the introduction of the ethnic identity card in 1933. This identity card resembled a solid 
fence between the three groups that could no longer be crossed or reversed. This eliminated 
the “fluid movement between castes and permanently fixing the identity of each individual, 
and his or her children, as either Hutu or Tutsi” (Scherrer, 2002:27).  This segregation 
policy sowed the seeds of hatred of the Tutsi by the Hutu.  The net effect was a 
fundamental shift in the nature and tenor of the relationship between these people both as 
individuals and as separate groups.  The Hutu and the Tutsi started to look at each other as 
the enemy. Although  some authors like Destexhe (1995) deny the existence of ethnic 
groups in Rwanda, arguing that it was merely ‘certain distinguishable social categories’, it 
was (in the end) the ethnic classification system of identity cards introduced by the 
Belgians that enabled the Hutu regime to carry out the genocide of Tutsis (Destexhe, 1995: 
iii and 34).  In other words, the political demands in Rwanda were formulated in ethnic 
terms and the colonial policies were merely grafted onto a foundation that already 
contained potential for conflict. 
 
In the mid-1950s, the tide of decolonization swept through Africa. In Rwanda, the Tutsi 
elites asked for independence. One interpretation was that the Tutsi elites saw this as a way 
of consolidating their seemingly hegemonic position, which was being threatened by Hutu 
awakening -- ostensibly encouraged by the Belgians.  Another interpretation was that Tutsi 
demands had irritated the Belgians who concluded that their interests were no longer being 
served by the Tutsi (Personal Interview, Butare, 21 May 2008). Officially, the Belgian 
position regarding the switch was motivated by the fact that the colonial authorities realized 
that the long term security of Rwanda could not rest on minority domination. Perhaps, 
those (singularly or collectively) were some of the factors that may have pushed Belgium to 
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switch its alliance preference from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu. However, no 
one can ignore that during that period, many other African countries were struggling 
politically and /or militarily for the decolonization of their countries. Given that context and 
the need to ensure efficient and beneficial post-independence relationship, the shift of 
support toward the majority Hutu by Belgium seems to have been a calculated and rational 
exit strategy as the pressure for independence increased.   
 
On the other hand, given the post-World War II environment that not only encouraged and 
valued national autonomy and freedom but also social justice, it is also plausible that the 
colonial authorities may have realized that the long term security and stability of Rwanda 
could only rest on principles of broad political participation and socio-economic justice 
rather than minority domination.  Rwanda underwent another social revolution that resulted 
in the ousting of not only the Belgians but also the minority Tutsi elites in what the Hutu 
claimed to be “double liberation” (Mamdani, 2001:103). This dislodged the Tutsi from 
power.  According to Prunier (1995:44), the international community through the United 
Nations had criticized Belgium for their discriminatory activities. By giving the political 
field to the Hutu, the Belgians managed to address both problems together. The Catholic 
Church, which was working closely with the Rwandan government, started to sponsor the 
formal education of Hutus to generate educated Hutus. The increased calls for the 
emancipation of the working class and the growth of trade unionism in Europe also 
influenced the missionaries to revise their policy towards the Hutus. Van Hoyweghen 
(1996:381) is of the opinion that the missionaries felt they had a moral obligation to protest 
against the social injustices suffered by the Hutus. Given the fact that the colonial 
authorities were working closely with Roman Catholic Church missionaries and based on 
the view of Prunier, the Belgians could have been influenced by the position of the 
missionaries to change their support to Tutsi leadership.  The educated Hutu, supported by 
the Catholic Church and the Belgian colonial authorities, organized pro-colonial interest 
groups that were quickly transformed into the first ethno-political movements (Scherrer, 
2002:28).  It could be argued that there were also more complex issues at play. It might be 
32 
 
a strategic move given that, as a group, the Hutu were not ready to join the independence 
movement as it was likely to be dominated by the Tutsi who, rather than the Belgians, were 
their main rivals for the control of postcolonial Rwanda.  On 24 March 1957, Grégoire 
Kayibanda (a Hutu leader), the then Chief Editor of the Catholic newspaper Kinyamateka, 
and one of the first graduates of the renowned Nyakibanda Roman Catholic seminary, 
penned the famous Bahutu manifesto in which, for the first time, the racial and political 
problem was explained, demanding the emancipation of Bahutu and a racial quota system 
in education and employment. He created the Hutu Social Movement (MSM) in June 1957 
and Joseph Gitera formed the “Association for the Social Promotion of the Masses” 
(APROSOMA) in November 1957 (Prunier, 1995:47-48). In response, the Tutsi elites 
organized themselves into the Rwandese National Union (UNAR) movement.  As noted 
earlier, this movement was hostile to Belgian colonialists. Realizing that the Tutsi chiefs 
and sub-chiefs with whom the Belgians had worked for many years were starting to show 
hostility towards Belgium, Jean-Paul Harroy -- who was the last Belgian Governor General 
-- embarked on reforms that replaced many Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs with Hutu on the 
grounds of advancing democracy and acting in the welfare of the oppressed majority 
(Taylor, 1999:44). To counter the demands of the UNAR, Belgium sponsored a liberal and 
multi-ethnic political party known as the Rwandese Democratic Union (RADER) (Taylor, 
1999); however, it attracted very few followers because of the extreme polarization 
between the Hutu and Tutsi groups. On 1 November 1959, a group of UNAR’s members 
attacked a sub-chief who was a member of the Movement Party for Hutu Emancipation 
(Parti du Mouvement pour l’Emancipation des Hutu [PARMEHUTU]). The false news of 
his death provoked reprisals against the Tutsis, particularly against UNAR members. Hutu 
activists gathered their troops and attacked the Tutsis, burned their houses, and stole their 
cattle. These attacks occurred throughout Rwanda, particularly in the northern part where 
Tutsi domination was deeply resented (Taylor, 1999:44). According to Taylor (1999), the 
violence claimed thousands of Tutsi lives and tens of thousands of Tutsi took refuge in 
neighboring countries. Prunier (1995:49) observes that from the outbreak of the violence, 
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the Belgian authorities showed extreme partiality towards the Hutus and did not intervene 
vigorously to stop the Hutus from burning Tutsi-owned houses.   
 
Historians have dubbed the era from 1959 to 1961 that led to the abolition of the monarchy 
and the removal of all Tutsi political administrative structures ‘the Hutu revolution’. This 
revolution definitely placed Rwanda on the road to a range of social and political conflicts.  
The immediate net result was that a large number of Tutsi people were either killed or fled 
the country. An election was held on 25 September 1961, which resulted in a victory for the 
main Hutu party. PARMEHUTU gained 35 seats out of 44, while UNAR only won seven 
seats. Gregoire Kayibanda was elected as President and Rwanda gained formal 
independence on 1 July 1962 (Personal Interview, Butare, May 21, 2008).  However, this 
political situation was followed by a crisis. According to Cherry (2000), the Hutu, who felt 
oppressed and aspired to liberation, played the ethnic card on gaining political power. 
Rather than revering in their victory and using it as a prop for ensuring long term national 
reconciliation and stability, the new government pursued a policy that effectively nurtured a 
brand of retributive justice that forced tens of thousands of Tutsis into exile as refugees. As 
underscored by Cherry (2000:9-26), both those who fight in the defense of unjust causes 
and those who fight for just causes must respect and take into consideration human rights, 
otherwise the two could be considered one and the same according to the acts of violence 
perpetrated. Because this situation was not questioned by the leaders of the first republic, 
which was born in 1962, the situation became worse (Nkunzumwami, 1996: 88-90) 
 
3.2.2 From Post-Independence to Genocide and Post-conflict 
President Kayibanda led the country in an authoritarian manner until 1973. During his 
reign, armed Tutsi refugee groups organized raids into Rwanda from the borders of 
Burundi, Zaire (DRC) and Tanzania. The raids created a fragile humanitarian situation; in 
turn, they resulted in reprisals against Tutsi still living in Rwanda, which were so severe 
that many thousands of Tutsi were either killed or fled into exile (Taylor, 1999:44). Prunier 
(1995:56) notes that in 1963 the Tutsi rebels (called Inyenzi or cockroaches by the Hutu 
34 
 
authorities) launched an invasion that came close to the capital -- Kigali -- but were beaten 
back by the Kayibanda government. Again, the government seized this opportunity to 
justify massive reprisals against the Tutsis.  According to Nkunzumwami (1996: 88-90), it 
was estimated that nearly 10,000 Tutsis were slaughtered from December 1963 to January 
1964 including every single Tutsi politician living in Rwanda. A mass of refugees again 
fled the country by crossing the neighbouring borders. 
 
In July 1973, the Minister of Defence and head of the National Guard, Major General 
Juvenal Habyarimana led a coup against President Kayibanda on the pretext of re-
establishing order (Taylor, 1999:45).  He then became the President of Rwanda.   
Habyarimana suspended all political activities and proclaimed a military regime referred to 
as the Second Republic. He declared equal socio-economic and political access for all 
Rwandans, Hutu and Tutsi alike. Under Habyarimana’s regime, the persecution of Tutsi 
was brought to an end and a policy of regional and ethnic equilibrium was designed to 
allocate state administrative jobs, school and university placements on the basis of equal 
representation. Hutus would not be favoured over Tutsis or southerners over northerners. 
However, while the Tutsis were no longer being killed or harassed in principle, they were 
still discriminated against in practice (Taylor, 1999:45).  President Habyarimana introduced 
a one-party system in 1978 in order to strengthen his power base (Clapham, 1998:198).  For 
Prunier (1995:76-77), this party -- known in French as “Mouvement Revolutionaries’ 
National pour le developpement” (MRND) -- was a totalitarian party which every 
Rwandan (including babies and the elderly) had to belong to. 
 
However, Habyarimana’s government failed to resolve the issue of the hundreds of 
thousands of Tutsi refugees living in neighbouring countries who were demanding the 
opportunity to return (Taylor, 1999:47). On 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF), mainly composed of former Tutsi soldiers serving in the Ugandan army, launched 
an invasion from the north (Mamdani, 2001:160). The force was composed of Rwandan 
refugees from neighbouring countries such as Burundi, Tanzania, and DRC. They invaded 
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from northern Rwanda and occupied several towns in the north and north-east.  On the one 
hand, the RPF may be seen as deriving from a regional context, mostly in relation to the 
socio-political and citizenship crisis in Uganda that threatened the status of Tutsi refugees 
there (Mamdani 2001:159-184). On the other hand, it seems likely that without the support 
of the Ugandan Government (especially) and other supporters, the RPF would not have 
managed to operate from Uganda. Because they had served in the Ugandan army, it is 
likely that most of the RPF forces came from Uganda in the beginning. In addition, some 
other factors pushed Rwanda youth (both male and female) from Burundi to join the RPF 
front. Such factors would include:  
(1) a growing sense of insecurity among Rwandans living in Burundi because of repeated 
attacks. During the 1987 “coup d’état” by Pierre Buyoya againstJean-BaptisteBagaza, 
many Rwandese living in Burundi perished in Ntega and Marangara – the same case 
happened after the death of the elected president Ndadaye Melchior in 1993;  
(2) the fact that, generally, Rwandan refugees in Burundi (mostly Tutsi) felt they were 
oppressed and wanted to return home (see Green, 2002: 733-776). 
 
At the beginning, the RPF seemed disorganised and many of its members, including its 
leader (Fred Rwigyema), were killed. However, under the command of Paul Kagame, the 
RPF made progress in 1991 and controlled an important part of the Rwandan-Ugandan 
border.   As the RPF advanced on to Rwandan soil, large numbers of the local Hutu 
population fled their villages as they thought that the Tutsi “invaders” would kill them.   A 
local propaganda radio station warned the local population to defend themselves against the 
Tutsi invaders. Panic ensued as the Tutsi’s return was seen as a perspicuous return of the 
pre-revolutionary operation of the Hutu (Prunier, 1995: 167-168; Gourevitch, 1998:49). In 
fact, the invasion by the RPF served to create a bargaining situation with MRND (Clapham, 
1998:202).Despite the will to bargain, there was a series of unsuccessful attempts to 
negotiate a transitional government. A transitional government based on a broad coalition 
incorporating four main opposition parties -- the revived Democratic Republican 
Movement (MDR), the Parti Démocratique Chrétien (PDC), Parti Liberal (PL), the Parti 
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Social Démocrate (PSD) -- together with MRND was agreed to and announced in the latter 
part of 1991.  The seven smaller parties were included by Habyarimana, reputedly in a 
mockery of multi-partyism (Howard, 1999:67-69). Prunier (1995:127) notes that these 
seven smaller parties were not very active and were manipulated by Habyarimana to serve 
National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRNDD) purposes. 
Due to regional and international pressure, a ceasefire between the RPF and Habyarimana’s 
forces was initiated and later a concerted peace process began. At a later stage, according to 
Durch (1996:370), RPF attacks prompted the international community to advocate a 
ceasefire between the government forces and the RPF. The Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), led by Tanzanian president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, was to play a major role by 
mediating between the two belligerent forces. On the other hand, political liberalization and 
forced negotiation with the RPF pressured Habyarimana and his political circle to preserve 
the remaining power they had. Subsequently, this led to the formation of the Hutu extremist 
CDR (Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique) party in January 1993 (Ohlsson, 
1999:96). According to De Forges (1999:14), the donor nations, including the World Bank, 
threatened Habyarimana that financial assistance would be halted if he did not sign a treaty 
with the RPF by 9 August 1993. Given the fact that the government coffers was close to 
empty due to the economic recession and expenditure on the war, Habyarimana was 
obliged to sign the peace agreement on 4 August 1993 at Arusha, Tanzania. 
 
The Arusha Accord consists of two protocols. Firstly, it covered the integration of the 
government armed forces and the RPF. Secondly, it dealt with various other issues 
including human rights violations, the rule of law, power sharing, and transitional 
institutions, resettlement of displaced persons and reparation for refugees. A timetable was 
drawn up for a projected period of two months in which a Broad-Based Transitional 
Government (BBTG) had to be established 37 days after the signing of the agreement (10 
September 1993) and end with free and fair elections (Barnett,2002:62). For Barnett 
(2002:62), the parties to the negotiations seemed to be successful in paving a way forward 
for a stable Rwanda, but “underneath they were quite fearful of the future because the 
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extremists were venomously opposed to the accords”. Howard and Astri (1999:85-87) view 
the Arusha Accord as a recipe for disaster since it was viewed by the Hutu extremists as an 
agreement that was imposed on them by outsiders. Clapham (1998:204) notes that the only 
real achievement of the Arusha Accord was the ability of the international mediators to 
persuade all the parties involved “to put their signatures” on a piece of paper. Prunier 
(1995:194-195) concludes that even Habyarimana himself signed the agreement as “a 
tactical move calculated to buy time, shore up the contradictions of the various segments of 
the opposition and [to] look good in the eyes of the foreign donors”. Against this setting, 
the United Nations (UN) deployed its peacekeepers, the United Nations Assistance Mission 
in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in implementing the Arusha agreement and support the 
BBTG according to the mandate passed by the UN Security Council. The deployment of 
UNAMIR was structured into four phases. Phase I began with the departure of foreign 
forces and the Mission’s objective was to establish a secure environment within which a 
BBTG would be established. Once the BBTG was installed, the UNAMIR would move into 
Phase II that called for the preparation for disengagement, demobilization, and integration 
of former belligerents. In Phase III, the objective was to disengage, demobilize and 
integrate the former combatants. In the final phase, the objective was to normalize the 
situation and to subsequently withdraw the UNAMIR upon completion of the elections. 
Unfortunately, Habyarimana kept delaying the formation of the BBTG by challenging the 
interpretation of the Arusha Accord. 
 
The genocide began on the evening of 6 April 1994 after the aircraft carrying Habyarimana 
and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down while approaching Kigali 
Airport. Initially, the shooting was attributed to RPF by people like Burguiere (a French 
anti-terrorist judge), and according to “Liberation, premiere edition No 9538. 2012”,the 
shooting was attributed to the extremist group within the Habyarimana inner circle. The 
latter inquiry was very close to another conducted by a group of experts commissioned by 
the government of Rwanda (controlled by RPF leaders). According to  Shawcross(2010), 
regardless of who shot the plane down, the genocide started at that time as a youth militia 
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group known as “Interahamwe” (meaning “those who attack together)  was promptly 
organized by the ruling government. Additionally, from the views of the respondents 
during the focus group (Focus Group discussions, 2010), they mentioned that most of those 
young people enrolled in interahamwe were unemployed and were happy to do whatever 
they were told – killing every Tutsi and moderate Hutu they could find. Green, (2002) 
mentions that news broadcast on radio stations like the British Broadcasting Corporation( 
BBC) showed that as the RPF was advancing, the “Radio Television Libre des Mille 
Collines” (RTLM) continued to incite the local authorities and other ordinary Hutu by 
advising them to kill all the Tutsi found in the hills of the country.  They were asked to take 
the ‘job’ seriously. The violence that followed was one of the worst in the history of human 
kind. According to Howard and Astri (1999:234), during the first phase of the slaughter, 
prominent opposition politicians, human rights activists, lawyers, critical journalists and 
moderate civil servants were targeted. Among these was the Rwandan Prime Minister, 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana.   
 
According to Prunier (1995:244), the Catholic Church played a key and direct role in the 
genocide.  The majority of the killings took place in churches.  While 80 per cent of 
Rwandans were Christians, large numbers of church leaders and church members 
participated in killing church goers. Hutu extremists -- who were church leaders at the time 
-- became active participants in planning and perpetrating the massacre of their fellow Tutsi 
believers (Tom 2005:1).  According to Caplan Gerald (2004:35-36), the Roman Catholic 
Church in the country, which was very close to the government, did not denounce the 
genocide. During the first week of the genocide, the UN Security Council’s attention was 
focused on the task of evacuating foreign nationals from Rwanda (Barnett, 2002:100). 
However, the safety of the Rwandan civilians was not assured. According to Barnett 
(2002:134), on 21 April, the Security Council voted to reduce the UNAMIR’s strength to 
270 personnel with an adjusted mandate, that is, to negotiate a ceasefire, provide 
humanitarian relief operations, and monitor developments in Rwanda. He adds that on 17 
May, Resolution 918 was passed that increased the UNAMIR’s strength to 5500 troops 
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with a number of provisions: to provide safe passage for displaced peoples; assist and 
protect the relief efforts of humanitarian organizations; and provide protected sites for 
displaced peoples throughout Rwanda (Barnett, 2002:139). Almost 850,000 Rwandans 
were killed (Prunier, 1995: 261). 
 
On 22 June 1994, the UN authorized France’s intention to conduct humanitarian 
intervention for a period of 60 days. This was called “Operation Turquoise”. The 2,500 
French soldiers who were deployed promptly established a “humanitarian protected zone” 
in the Cyangugu- Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south western Rwanda. Although this 
operation provided refuge for around 1,500 to 25,000 Tutsis, it was criticized for providing 
a safe passage to the withdrawing genocidaires and Rwandan forces who fled the advance 
of the RPF (Barnett, 2002:149).  The RPF succeeded in defeating the Hutu regime’s forces 
and established a new government in Kigali on 17 July 1994 (Prunier, 1995:299). Among 
the new leaders, Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, was named as the President and Faustin 
Twagiramungu, another Hutu was named as Prime Minister (Shawcross, 2000:141).  The 
then Chief of Staff of the RPF, Major General Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, was named as Vice-
President. Nevertheless, some political analysts, especially from the opposition groups from 
the Rwandan Diaspora claimed that, even though Kagame was VP in the new government, 
he was in charge of the country despite the fronting of Hutus as President and PM. The 
RPF leadership announced that the new transitional government would serve for five years 
and hold to the Arusha Peace Accord.  
 
Despite the fact that the RPF controlled most of Rwanda by 24 August 1994, the situation 
of refugees was a serious challenge for the new government, as there were almost three 
million refugees, which included both interahamwe and innocent people who were doubtful 
of the way RPF was going to treat them. Inside the country, a national referendum on a 
newly drafted constitution was held in July 2003. In the presidential election held on 25 
August 2003, President Paul Kagame won 95.05 per cent of the total votes cast, making 
him the first Rwandan President elected through a multi-party election (IRIN News, 2004). 
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In spite of this landslide win, Dagne (2011) makes it clear that some individuals and 
organisations criticised the election process as having been fraudulent – a claim that was 
refuted by the Electoral Commission in Rwanda (Dagne, 2011). The above criticisms 
continued even after the elections, this time Human Rights Organisations talking about the 
oppression of the media by the Rwandan government.  However, given the way the media 
was used to spread ethnic divisions which culminated to the 1994 genocide, some 
organisations supported the views of Rwanda to keep an open eye on the media. In spite of 
these criticisms, many organisations appreciated the way Rwanda has made a remarkable 
transition from post-conflict reconstruction to development. In fact, the new government 
inherited a deeply-scarred nation whose economy had ground to a complete halt, where 
social services were not functioning, and public confidence had been shattered. It was 
within the confines of these enormous challenges that the government initiated a new multi-
party political system of democracy.  
 
The Rwandan population is not involved in all decision-making processes, especially in 
electing local government representatives.  Special social groups such as youth and women 
are represented in parliament.  The main political thrust is decentralisation to ensure 
participation by the whole population.  The United States Agency for International 
Development USAID (2003) noted: “local government is beginning to assume 
responsibility for many of the social services previously maintained by the central 
government.  The government is involved in an impressive effort to educate and inform 
citizens of their rights and responsibilities under a more pluralist system”.  However, 
transparency and inclusiveness at all levels is a prerequisite for developing democratic 
governmental processes and for sustainable peace.  Moreover, Rwanda is still dealing with 
armed refugees in the DRC in the DDR programme. These armed groups are still recruiting 




3.3 A comparative role of women in war and in peace 
According to Coulter, Persson and Utas (2008:7), in typical views on war and violent 
conflict, women and men are frequently placed at contradictory ends of a moral range, 
where women are considered peaceful and men aggressive; women passive and men active. 
These scholars also observed that the view that men and women are dissimilar on issues of 
war and peace is common; but that is not without its problems.  They noted that the image 
of the aggressive male is not only a stereotype but also, and more importantly, the tendency 
for conflict and aggression to be seen as something that is naturally male is an effective 
way to mask how women are affected by, and more significantly, actively participate in, 
violent conflicts and war. From this perspective, war remains an exclusively male concern, 
and women are seen only as victims and are therefore not organised.  In contrast to men, 
they are often not perceived as actors in social, economic and political structures. Coulter et 
al. conclude that presenting women as having more peaceful traits both supports and 
reproduces patriarchal values, in war as in peace (Coulter et al., 2008:7).  
 
The term ‘gender’ is most commonly used to refer to women.  Basically ‘gender’ refers to 
perceptions of suitable behaviour, manifestations and attitudes for women and men arising 
from social and cultural expectations.  The empirical facts, however, indicate that gender is 
a powerful shaper of individual experiences of war. There is overwhelming evidence that 
war affects men and women differently.  However, in trying to understand the complexities 
of these experiences, the male/female opposition seems an unnecessary limitation, one 
which hinders more than it helps.  It must be granted that stereotypes about men and 
women cannot be easily ignored as they are powerful and help to reproduce inequalities 
(Coulter et al., 2008:8).   Nevertheless, in current African wars and violent conflicts (as in 
many such wars and conflicts elsewhere), women have shown themselves to be as skilled 
as men in performing violent acts.   However, as soldiering has been included in the moral 
universe of men in ways that it has not for women, women in combat are often considered 
by their very existence to be transgressing accepted female behaviour. By definition the 
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very act of fighting makes women less feminine and, by extension, ‘unnatural’.  Women 
who oppose or transgress female stereotypes in war will thus often be regarded as deviant 
(Byrne, 1996:35).    
 
On the one hand, in terms of numbers, men - not women - are still overpoweringly the 
perpetrators of violence, and both men and women are victims.   On the other hand, by 
focusing on women only as victims we hide their full range as political and social actors. 
(El Jack, 2003:3).   Coulter et al. (2008:8) note that the presence of so many female 
combatants in Africa and elsewhere today requires inquiry into what women ‘really do’ in 
war and the critical analysis of women’s roles as perpetrators and perpetuators of war and 
armed conflict, while acknowledging that while one can talk about the violence of women, 
as in the example of female combatants, one often finds violence against women as well. In 
order to understand what women actually do in war-torn societies, it has to be 
acknowledged that women not only have their own agenda but that they constitute a highly 
differentiated social category (Coulter et al., 2008:8). 
 
During the 1980s, when Iraq was engaged in a devastating war with Iran, many progressive 
reforms were instituted because women were needed to maintain civil society while men 
were at war.   However, while Iraqi women were making gains in civil life, they were also 
suffering the effects of armed conflict in the wider society, politically, personally and 
economically (UNDFW 2005). After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 when the UN 
Security Council (by means of Resolution 661) placed Iraq under economic sanctions, 
followed by the 1991 Gulf War, the economy of northern Iraq plummeted. Although men 
were not spared from the various consequences of war such as losing their lives during the 
conflict, women were severely affected in all areas of their lives, physically and 
psychologically. The Baghdad government cracked down brutally on any signs of dissent to 
consolidate its hold on power, and women, “whether because they had family members 
suspected of dissent or because they were oppositionists in their own right, were harassed, 
imprisoned, ’disappeared’, tortured, beaten, raped and executed, or lost their husbands, sons 
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and brothers to similar treatment” (UNDFW, 2005:1). The Security Council Resolution 
(SCR)1483 (22 May 2003) re-affirmed, in the second paragraph, its commitment to a “rule 
of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, 
religion, or gender, recalling its pledge to promote gender equality as outlined in resolution 
1325”. 
 
3. 3. 1 Women’s experience in war 
All over the world, women have participated to some extent in combat; several recent wars 
(since the last three or so decades of the 20th century) have seen them fighting on the front 
lines and taking on leadership roles. In countries such as Angola, El-Salvador, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, female participation in regular 
armed forces or guerrilla groups offers a concrete example.  Women participated in wars of 
liberation against colonial powers as well as in contemporary rebel insurgencies, serving as 
both foot soldiers and in high-ranking positions (see Nzomo, 2002:9 and Bennett, Jo and 
Kitty, 1995).  It has been estimated that there is a substantial minority of female fighters, 
sometimes up to 30 percent, in many armed forces in Africa (Mazurana, 
2004:18).Currently, women in Africa participate in insurgencies and rebel movements, but 
they are also frequently employed in state-sanctioned violence. For instance, they have 
taken part in the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda since 
the on-going conflict in northern Uganda started in 1986.  Mackay and Mazurana (2004) 
have estimated that as many as 80 percent of the LRA fighters were child soldiers and of 
those approximately 30 percent were girls (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:29). Furthermore, 
Mackay (2007:390) argued that most of these soldiers are abducted and conscripted by 
force. According to Fox (2004), female combatants have not always been acknowledged by 
organisations working in northern Uganda.  From the mid to late 1990s non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) started recognising their presence and roles within the LRA (Fox 
2004:472).   Most reports on girls and young women within the LRA highlight their role as 
sex slaves and captive ‘wives’.  However, as in so many other conflicts, the roles of women 
and girls are much more diverse and complex than this.   It has been confirmed that nearly 
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all girls abducted by the LRA received military training.   In one study, 12 percent of the 
respondents reported that their primary role was as fighters, while 49 percent stated that 
their secondary role was as armed forces (Mckay and Mazurana 2004:73).  Abducted girls 
were also given as ‘wives’ to LRA commanders.  Apart from being fighters in frontline 
combat (some with command positions), and ‘wives’ to LRA commanders, girls and young 
women have also carried out supportive tasks such as preparing food, carrying loot and 
moving weapons (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:75). 
 
After Eritrea’s independence in 1991, female fighters had made up at least 25 to 30 percent 
of the total forces of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) during the war.  
Women were first permitted to join the EPLF in 1973 and encouraged to do so throughout 
the war (Klingebiel, Garke, Kreidler, Loner and Schutte, 1995).Women’s liberation and 
new alternative roles for women were important aspects of the EPLF’s ideology and part of 
the overall struggle for a liberated Eritrea (Barth, 2002:11).  This ideology of the EPLF, 
and the opportunity to expand existing gender roles, could have been one of the most 
important reasons for young Eritrean women and girls’ decision to join the movement. 
There is some evidence that the social environment created by the liberation struggle could 
have also spurred young boys and girls to join as part of their social responsibility. 
According to Mehreteab (2000:51), Eritrean women have always been involved at some 
level in all aspects of life within their society; this is despite the fact that they held a 
subordinate position. However, full participation in politics was unprecedented since they 
were traditionally prohibited from formally participating in public affairs.  Mehreteab 
observes that Eritrean women’s participation in the armed struggle and their contribution to 
realizing independence had changed their status in Eritrean society. Thirty percent of the 
fighters were women, who participated in production, education, health, and 
administration; 13 percent of these were frontline combatants (Mehrteab, 2004:54). 
 
In Mozambique between 1964 and 1974, female combatants in the guerrilla army Frente de 
Libertacão de Mocambique (FRELIMO) fought a liberation war against the Portuguese 
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colonial power that resulted in independence. West (2000) states that FRELIMO engaged 
in systematic recruitment and deployment of girls and young women; and in 1967, the 
Destacamento Feminino (DF) was created as a fully functioning female-only unit.  The DF 
was composed of girls and young women who were given military training.  The DF 
participated in armed combat, collected intelligence and mobilised civilian support.  
FRELIMO saw the liberation of women as a fundamental necessity for the revolution; it 
was decided that it was in the interests of women and girls to contribute to the struggle as 
FRELIMO would liberate everyone from oppression and exploitation (West, 2000:183). 
Women and girls within FRELIMO were respected and treated well.  Sexual relations 
between male and female fighters were not permitted.  To some extent these measures were 
put in place to protect women from abuse by armed men (West, 2000:190).   FRELIMO’s 
ideology contributed to voluntary female mobilisation. On the other hand, it has been noted 
that during the civil war in Mozambique from 1976 to 1992 between the rebel group 
Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique (RENAMO) and the government forces of 
FRELIMO, young women and girls were involved in both fighting forces.  During this 
period, the recruitment of female combatants differed from that during the war of 
liberation.  According to Mckay and Mazurana (2004) some women joined FRELIMO to 
escape from the rural areas, to improve their education or career opportunities and to 
expand gender roles, although others were obliged to join. Women were also abducted by 
RENAMO; others joined because of discontent with FRELIMO’s socialist policies and the 
lack of educational opportunities under their rule.  Some female fighters were also 
promised educational opportunities in other countries by RENAMO, which never 
materialised (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:107).  The female combatants in FRELIMO and 
RENAMO performed a range of diverse roles such as fighters, trainers of incoming 
recruits, intelligence officers, spies, recruiters, medics, first-aid technicians, weapons 
experts, forced and domestic labourers, and captive ‘wives’ of male combatants (Mckay 
and Mazurana, 2004:109). West (2000) observes that the female fighters in FRELIMO’s 
‘Destacamento Feminino’ in the liberation war in Mozambique were ideologically 
empowered and motivated. This was the same for women participating in the liberation 
46 
 
movements in both Zimbabwe (Staunton, 1990) and Eritrea (Bennett et al., 1995). These 
women recognised themselves as ‘freedom fighters’ and were said to be compelled by a 
sense of freedom and camaraderie, most of the time expressed in terms of a struggle for 
gender equality or social justice, as in Zimbabwe and Mozambique (West, 2000:195).   
 
According to Nzomo (2002:10), in many of the African ‘independence wars’; the liberation 
of women was seen as an integral part of the overall struggle, often with a socialist agenda.  
In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started their armed revolution against 
Sierra Leonean government forces in a civil war that lasted until January 2002.  The 
number of women in the various forces in Sierra Leone has been estimated at between 10 
and 30 percent; children constituted half of the RUF fighting forces and up to one-third of 
these were girls.  According to analysts, women and girls played several roles within the 
forces but at least half received military and weapons training (Mazurana and Carlson, 
2004:110). Although female combatants were in commanding positions, and in so doing 
had higher status, most women and girls were also forced to be ‘wives’ to male fighters and 
were repeatedly subjected to sexual violence, rape, and gang rape (Coulter, 2008, Mckay 
and Mazurana, 2004:110).Brett (2002:2) and Utas (2005:208) argue that the circumstances 
for women fighting in the recent post-independence wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 
Uganda were very diverse. While many were abducted, others confirmed that they joined 
the fighting forces for their own protection or private personal success.  Barth (2002:12) 
has shown, however, that in guerrilla warfare and liberation movements a strategy of 
outnumbering the enemy force often results in the recruitment of as many combatants as 
possible, including women and girls.  In liberation wars, female fighters may also add 
legality and symbolic power to the war effort, as they may symbolise unity. Different 
conflicts, such as liberation wars, might attract women to a higher degree than others, as 
women’s rights and equality are frequently emphasised in these struggles.  
 
In Africa, many women in fighting forces are still stereotyped according to their gender 
roles and responsibilities. According to Mckay and Mazurana (2004:112), women and girls 
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in fighting forces in, for example, Mozambique, Uganda, and Sierra Leone carried out 
traditional female roles such as cooking, cleaning, and serving men, which replicated the 
tasks that women and girls undertake in wider society. Utas (2005:209) observes that 
female fighters in different conflicts have been described by both other fighters and 
civilians as even more cruel and cold-blooded than male fighters.  However, as Barth 
(2000:12) notes, it is likely that when women act aggressively it comes as a surprise to 
many people. Such behaviour will therefore stand out as it contradicts traditional gender 
roles.  Women’s (and girls’) participation in fighting forces could result in new 
opportunities for them, such as achieving positions of power and learning new skills that 
previously would have been impossible.  Therefore war can oppress women and girls and at 
the same time it may also expand their potential opportunities (Mckay and Mazurana, 
2004:17).   It has been observed that women who volunteer to do battle are often those who 
possess strength, independence, courage, persistence, and character according (Keairns, 
2002:6).   They desire to establish a life of their own and often behave in ways contrary to 
social expectations. These qualities – strength, independence, courage, persistence, and 
character – are not highly valued female characteristics in many traditional African 
societies, which frequently promote women’s submission, servility, and willingness to 
endure and accept their secondary place (Coulter, 2008:14).  The researcher feels that the 
qualities described above are a stereotype of African values.  In any society, in Africa or 
elsewhere, physical strength is not a highly valued female quality. The researcher agree that 
while character is a highly valued female quality across virtually all African societies, 
strength and courage are important qualities for women in carrying out certain tasks such as 
household chores, farming and supporting their families.  
 
In most of the warfare forces in Africa, men have (in general) held the leading positions; 
however, a few young women held positions of command and authority (Mckay and 
Mazurana, 2004:113).  Ellis (2007:144) cites  examples from the Liberian civil war, where 
well-known female commanders included Martina Johnson in the National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia (NPFL), Ruth ‘Attila’ Milton in the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) and ‘Black 
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diamond’ in Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).  Despite the fact 
that some of the females in command positions led smaller groups consisting of female 
combatants, many commanded both men and women. In this way these women gained 
access to influential positions that they probably would not have had access to but for the 
war. Female combatants who did not hold important positions also experienced a new sense 
of freedom, as life with the fighting forces could expand traditional gender roles (Coulter, 
2008:15).  According to Mckay, female fighters said that by carrying arms they gained 
power, status, and control, and that they felt pride, self-confidence, and a feeling of 
belonging.  However, he notes that except for the most powerful female combatants who 
had commander status or were commanders’ favourite ‘wives’, most female fighters were 
subjected to abuse from men because of their low status in the gender as well as the 
military hierarchy (Mckay, 2007:388).  Specht (2006:15) observes that in the fighting 
forces in Liberia there was no true gender equality for female fighters, as male commanders 
were above them in the military structure, men who could force them to marry or demand 
sexual favours.  In the same vein, Utas (2005:207) confirmed that even though some of the 
most senior women commanders in Liberia were spared this kind of abuse, before they 
achieved a command position sexual abuse and gender discrimination were part of their 
experience. 
 
As seen above in the cases of Eritrea and Mozambique, women and girls generally had a 
relatively high status as the liberation movements viewed women’s rights and equality as 
integral parts of the overall struggle for independence.  According to Arnfred (1988:5), 
Mozambique was a powerfully patriarchal society prior to the eruption of war; women and 
men led separate lives with a clear division of labour and different rules for gender conduct. 
Women were subordinated to patriarchal family authority. However, during the war 
women’s emancipation was an important aspect of the revolutionary struggle.   Men and 
women came together on equal terms as Mozambicans in the struggle against the 
Portuguese colonial power. This recognised a new female identity and created the 
opportunity for new gender relations.   In Eritrea female fighters occupied an elevated 
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status within the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).  According to Barth (2002:15), 
the general view was that female combatants strengthened the EPLF’s struggle.  He argues 
that women’s dedication to the liberation struggle was said to have inspired the men to do 
their best.  The greater aim was a liberated Eritrea and this demanded the very best of all 
combatants, men and women.  When men tried to oppress women within the fighting forces 
due to their gender, women would complain to their leaders, and those men were criticised 
for their behaviour in formal sessions.  This strengthened the rights of female fighters in the 
EPLF (Barth, 2002:16). 
 
In Liberia, the first Liberian civil war began when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) led by Charles Taylor attacked Liberia in December 1989.  After eight years the 
war came to an end in 1997 and Taylor was elected president. However the security 
situation was still unstable and in 2000 civil war broke out once again as Liberians United 
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) launched a raid from Guinea (Coulter, 
2008:16).  According to Specht (2006:15), women and girls were part of the fighting forces 
in both fighting and non-fighting roles. There were also some units composed entirely of 
female combatants generally known as Women’s Artillery Commandos (WAC).  It is not 
easy to approximate how many female combatants joined voluntarily and how many were 
forced to join the fighting forces; estimates vary depending on the source of information.  
Amongst those who volunteered, the majority said that they did so to survive and to protect 
themselves, but other reasons such as economic motives, poverty, and the wish for revenge 
or for equality with men were also contributing factors (Specht, 2006:32).  Utas found that 
the majority of the young women who fought in the civil war became involved through 
combatant boyfriends (Utas, 2003:208). Most young women in the Liberian war zone were 
under immense pressure and many had no other choice but to attach themselves to a fighter 
with enough power to protect them.  With no protection these young women were at 
immediate risk of, for example, being forced to provide sexual services or of being raped 
(Utas, 2003:176).  Utas also remarks that even though most young women were in a fragile 
position in the war zone, some female fighters who gained positions as commanders and 
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high-ranking officers were able to turn war into a successful endeavour.  With looted goods 
some were able, for example, to build up business enterprises after the end of the war (Utas, 
2003:212). 
 
In the province of Tigray in Ethiopia, the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was 
founded in 1975 as a movement opposed to the military dictatorship. Women and girls 
were involved in active combat within the TPLF, and numbered approximately a third of 
the combatants.  Most female fighters were voluntarily recruited (Coulter, 2008:14).   Veale 
(2003:26) notes the contribution of female fighters to the liberation struggle is seen as 
almost legendary in Ethiopia, and within the TPLF women were highly regarded and 
respected as fighters. The Tigrean movement also had a clear agenda of addressing 
women’s equality in addition to the overall aim of liberation. Work within the TPLF, such 
as supportive tasks and fighting, was allocated equally between men and women. Women 
and girls seemed in general not to have been subjected to forced sexual relations and sexual 
abuse, as discipline was tight with respect to sexual relations. Rape was also rare and 
severely punishable. 
 
In the DRC, women and girls were actively involved as combatants within the armed forces 
during the six-year conflict from 1998 to 2004.  Thousands of girls were forcibly recruited 
by armed groups in the towns and villages of the Eastern Provinces (Verhey, 2004:10).   
Some revealed they joined the struggle by choice, while in a few cases they claimed to have 
participated because of patriotic values.   In other cases girls joined because they wanted to 
flee challenging domestic relations or because joining was seen as the only way to access 
food and material goods (Coulter, 2008:19). Within the armed groups of the DRC, the vast 
majority of the girls served multiple roles at the same time.  As Verhey (2004:10) has 
noted, the view that girls in the DRC were only used as ‘wives’ and did not serve in active 
combat roles is incorrect.  As in many other conflicts, it is hard to estimate how many 
female fighters were parts of the armed forces in the DRC.  However, in 2005 the Save the 
Children agency reported that there were up to 12,500 girls in the armed groups, and that 
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girls were estimated to make up 40 percent of all children in such groups in the DRC (Save 
the Children, 2005). 
 
Female participation in conflicts in Africa is presented as follows: 
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From the Table 3.1, it is clear that the roles and status positions of female fighters vary 
between different conflicts and fighting forces.  On the one hand, it has been observed that 
in the wars in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Mozambique, women’s participation was regarded as 
strengthening the overall aim of liberation and women thereby gained higher status 
positions.  On the other hand, in other conflicts like those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, 
and during the war between FRELIMO and RENAMO in Mozambique, individual female 
fighters might have been in positions of power and some also enjoyed more organisational 
power than prior to the outbreak of war, but their general status was low as many had been 
abducted, forced to labour, or were abused.  However, even in those cases where female 
fighters may have had high status positions during the war this was not necessarily 
maintained after the war. 
 
During non-revolutionary conflicts, women’s military participation has been largely limited 
to industrialised countries such as the Gulf War in 1991 that narrowed the gap between the 
duties of men and women in the US.   Females were allowed to launch patriot missiles, 
while they were excluded from ‘combat positions’. As military intervention progresses 
technologically, it is likely that women will play ever more active military roles (Ferris, 
2004:20).   In 1776, the Berlin Garrison of Frederick the Great consisted of 17,056 men, 
5,526 women and 6,622 children (Olsoon and Torrun, 2001:23).  According to Skjelsbaek 
and Smith (2001:7), United States of America and Israeli armed forces deploy women in 
direct roles in units of the Bosnian government army including the 17th Brigade, which was 
reported to be one of the most effective Bosnian units. Women combatants are often 
employed in direct combat, such as in the case of the Liberian Tigers of Tamil Ealam, and 
the Secessionist forces in Sri-Lanka, who were said to have more than 3,000 women 
fighters in the early 1990s.The Sandinista forces in Nicaragua employed women in 
relatively large numbers, both during the insurgence against Anastasia Somoza in 1978 and 




3.3.2 Women’s experience in peace time 
Women play a vital role in creating and maintaining peace at the community level in the 
Solomon Islands even though they have been greatly affected by the conflict through 
displacement, vulnerability to rape, harassment, and economic hardship. Despite their 
exclusion from formal decision-making processes, Solomon Islander women have tried to 
move between the different combatant groups, persuading men to lay down their arms.  
Thus, female negotiators took on the “traditional go-between role, which is a traditional 
method of conflict resolution” in the Solomon Islands (World Health, 2006). The 
Farabundo Marti Liberation Front in El-Salvador recruited large numbers of woman 
guerrillas.  During its 30-year war of independence against Ethiopia the Eritrea People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) used women in combatant roles.  While many people believe that 
women tend to be more “peace-loving” than men, there have been always aggressive 
women such as Joan of Arc who was glorified for her military prowess.  Rani Lakshimi Bai 
of Jhansi, a warrior in the great Maratha tradition, who led her troops against the British in 
India, is another example.  French women were incredibly violent towards Nazi 
collaborators after the Second World War.  In some Native American traditions, females 
were responsible for the torture and mutilation of prisoners.  It has been noted that females 
have played important military roles in violent struggles for national liberation (Ferris, 
2004:7).  However, when compared with male violence, female violence may be more 
“unstructured and anarchic, but the potential for violence is still present, though perhaps in 
different form from that within the men” (Ferris, 2005:3).  The heroism, aggressiveness, or 
violence of women fighters has never been proven historically. Rather, the issue is that on 
balance women appear to share certain qualities that suggest that they are more peace 
loving and violence-averse than men.   
 
Today, women’s stories of their struggles for social change and peace are beginning to be 
told.  There are women protesting against violence in Northern Ireland, Japanese women 
protesting against nuclear power and racism, and Palestinian and Israeli women trying to 
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overcome barriers of distrust and enmity. South African women’s long history of non-
violent resistance has been central to the country’s liberation struggle. Although women 
have played a prominent role in military service, they are still marginalised in many 
countries during and after the resolution process.   For centuries, females have played very 
important roles in peace movements both as activists and organisers.  They have taken 
leadership positions in countries such as Israel, Northern Ireland, and Argentina. Yet, when 
issues of war and peace are discussed in the mainstream media, women's voices are heard 
about as often as they are in the corridors of military power.   Despite the important work 
being done by some of the feminists cited above, peace research is still, as Betty Reardon 
observes, very much “another male preserve” (Reardon, 1985:7l).According to Ferris 
(2004:11), women were rarely present in the negotiations between the US and the Soviet 
Union during the 1980s; in the one or two cases where a woman was involved, it was at 
junior level. This was explicated by former US President Ronald Regan example when he 
observed that “women were not at the 1986 US-Soviet summit because for him, they are 
not going to know missile throw-weights or what’s happening in Afghanistan or what is 
happening in human rights.  Some women will, but [not] most women…Believe me, your 
‘female’ readers, for the most part …would rather read the human interest stuff of what 
happened” (Ferris, 2004:11). 
 
In times of peace, a woman’s place is regarded as being in the home (Mehreteab, 2004:51).  
Women seem to share one characteristic, which is limited access to benefits when peace is 
realised.  For Mckay (1994:23), dealing with conflict is in effect a male-dominant issue and 
during reconciliation times, women ex-guerrillas are pressured to put aside their needs in 
the name of peace.  This has also been the case in some countries in Africa.  Enloe (1993:  
257) observes that “Polish women are being urged to worry less about unemployment…and 
to take more satisfaction in bearing children for the sake of nationalist revival.  Angolan 
women are being urged to put their own needs as women on the political back-burner for 
the sake of keeping afloat the fragile boat of post-cold war Angolan democratisation”. 
Edward (1994) notes that the dedication to and sacrifices for the common cause of women 
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who participated in Marxist liberation movements in Central America did not translate into 
leadership in post-war civil institutions.  He observes that Nicaraguan women advise 
Salvadorian and Guatemalan women not to equate participation in the armed struggle with 
gender equality (Edward, 1994:52).Urdang (1989:11-12) noted how little change had taken 
place at household level in Guinea-Bissau.  Although the liberation of women was part of 
the ideological perspective of building a new society, women have been actively called 
upon to put gender issues aside and wait for the appropriate time to tackle them. In 
Somalia, women who want to help shape the reconstruction of their country were faced 
with the consequences of breaking tradition when men felt threatened by their new roles.  
The most active women community workers were shut out of negotiations for peace and 
reconstruction, and women were excluded from nearly every formal meeting where 
Somalia’s future was determined (Osman, 1993:12).Mathabane (1994) notes the 
significance of women’s involvement in South Africa’s national freedom struggle and 
observes that their agenda can no longer be ignored, postponed, or compromised.  These 
women are insisting that their emancipation should not be regarded as incidental to overall 
liberation from apartheid.  The two struggles are indivisibly linked. They want to ensure 
that South Africa doesn’t go the way of many independent states in Africa where women 
contributed as much as men to the overthrow of colonisation and yet find themselves still 
oppressed, discriminated against, and treated as second-class citizens (Mathabane, 
1994:346). 
 
Farr, (2002:10) observes that with ideologies and stereotypes firmly in place; it seems 
inevitable that men and not women will predominate in the peace agreements and 
reconstruction processes that are set in motion when wars end.  During the Arusha Peace 
Negotiations on the Burundi conflict, women were granted observer status only when male 
delegates insisted that, “the women are not parties to this conflict.  This is not their concern. 
We cannot see why they have come, why do they bother us?  We are here to represent them 
(Anderlini, 2000:10).Furthermore, Shikola (1998:147) notes: No one mentions the 
contributions women made during the struggle. That’s true all over the world.  You never 
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find an appreciation of what women did.  Men appreciate women, who cook for them, and 
they respect women who fought war with them, but after independence, they [don’t] really 
consider women as part of liberation movement. 
 
The table below summarises women participation in the peace building. 
Table 3.2 Participation of women in peace building and post-conflict outcomes 
Level Model Cases 
Active War makers (Jean d’Arc, Rani 
LakshimiBai) 
France and  India 
 Violence breeders  French women were 
incredibly violent towards 
Nazi collaborators  
Yugoslavia 
Native America 
 Traditional go-between role, negotiator Salomon Islands 




Passive Mere observers in the peace building 
process 
Burundi peace negotiations 
 Absence/exclusion in the peace building 
process 
Negotiations between US 
and the Soviet Union during 
the 1980s 
 Give up gender equality and women’s rights 







For De Pauw (1998:p.xiii), “women have always and everywhere been inextricably 
involved in war [but] hidden from… During wars, women are ubiquitous and highly 
visible; when wars are over and the songs are sung, women fade away”. As noted by Farr 
(2002:11), a careful deconstruction of ideas about space in wartime shows that gender 
stereotypes naturalise ideas of how people behave.  Recognising a pattern in the ways in 
which societies manipulate gender ideologies, feminist scholars have worked to nuance our 
understanding of how women’s roles, and their identities that fulfil these roles during the 
build-up to war, in wartime, and when the war ends, are strategic and shifting.  Arguing 
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against the predominant stereotypes of women as innately peaceful and men as inevitably 
warlike, feminists have suggested that we recognise the complexity of gender ideologies 
and the multiple roles they play in drawing different social actors into war (Fukuyama, 
1998:36; Goldstein, 2001:60).In peacetime as well in wartime, females display a wide 
variety of responses to organised and/or state-sanctioned forms of violence (Farr, 2002:6).  
There is a long and much celebrated history of feminist pacifism, and some females, as 
peace activists, play essential roles in maintaining social connections, and building 
coalitions across communities divided by violence, and are therefore well positioned to 
play important roles in rehabilitation, reconciliation, reintegration, support and peace 
building roles in the aftermath (Anderlini, 2000:12).  At the same time, there are also many 
cases of women embracing “revolution with hope and war with enthusiasm” (Hill, 
2001:21). 
 
As noted above, women may participate in conflict through supporting and maintaining 
guerrilla forces even though they are not recruited as soldiers.  They provide the essentials 
of war: information, food, clothing and shelter.  They nurse soldiers back to health like the 
work undertaken by other women - their contributions are too often overlooked after the 
conflict has come to an end (Farr, 2002:6).Many feminists have observed that women’s 
peace building activities receive too little recognition in the period of reconstruction 
(Anderlini, 2000:13); it is also true that women who saw active combat are not allowed to 
participate as leaders in the development of transition and reconstruction processes.  They 
are often acknowledged only as mothers, sisters, wives or daughters (Farr, 2002:7).While 
their levels of participation in the business of the war are varied, they remain at the margins 
of political, economic, and social power, and their voices and experiences tend to disappear 
when peace processes begin (Goldblatt and Meintjes, 1996:96).Coulter et al. (2008) 
provide an overview of the situation of women in African war and post-war situations, with 
particular focus on gender-sensitivity in the DDR programmes.  They describe the difficult 
reintegration process that many of the former female combatants experience, and note that 
“surviving war does not automatically mean surviving peace” (Coulter et al., 2008:28). 
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Tonheim (2009:40) observes that in the DRC that women are often overlooked both as 
victims of war but also as resourceful survivors of war. Documentation on their victimhood 
is more accessible than documentation of their coping mechanisms and increased 
independence and self-confidence.  Even though Congolese women have taken several 
initiatives in the peace process, the author claims that they remain largely untapped and 
sometimes deliberately excluded resources.   Tonheim calls for women to be included in 
the peace process at an early stage, and argues that if this does not happen it will be more 
difficult to insert them at a later stage. 
 
Despite the problem of the invisibility of women, countries that have emerged from a 
situation of war and conflicts are often seen as potential sites of positive change.  Some 
theorists observe that war and the aftermath of war can present opportunities to influence 
social and political structures that, in peacetime, were beyond women’s expectations (Farr, 
2002: 11).  The following section examines the gender perspective and conflict. 
 
3.3.3 Women and the gender perspective 
To be a man or a woman means facing different and well-defined social expectations about 
appearance, qualities, behaviour and work.  Relations between women and men - whether 
in the family, in the market place, or in the community - are structured around a culture-
based understanding of the characteristics and behaviour appropriate to each.  The social 
nature of gender is evident in the variation between classes and ethnic groups in the same 
culture or in changes over time.  However, the following basic facts are evident: Men and 
women do different types of tasks and have different jobs within the family, in household 
production and in the marketplace.  Women have less access to power, status, resources, 
choices and benefits than men. 
 
The division of labour along gender lines is crucial in understanding and addressing 
inequalities between men and women.  Although the power and roles of women vary across 
countries, women are universally unequal in both the economic and political spheres (Scott, 
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1986:21).  The structural inequality of power that exists between men and women across 
societies creates the conditions for the social control of women.  Furthermore while the 
levels of violence prevalent in specific social situations can limit the degree of violence 
used to control women, violence against women reflects relations of domination and 
subordination. Gender, according to UNPFA, is a multi-faceted aspect of discrimination 
with issues of gender determining roles, power relationships, responsibilities, expectations, 
and access to resources (UNPFA, 2003).  For Caprioli (2003:5), gendered structural 
hierarchies are based on stereotypical gendered behaviour that values masculine 
characteristics over feminine ones and that accord men a higher social status in relation to 
that of women.  The roots of violence may be found in power relationships with a 
patriarchal hierarchy enabling “men to use and abuse their power” (Pillay, 2001:39).  The 
relationship between militarism and patriarchy has been studied by feminist researchers 
such as Reardon (1985:12) who observes: Authoritarian patriarchy, which seems to have 
emerged with the major elements of ‘civilisation’ - human settlements, organised 
agriculture, the state, and male domination – invented and maintains war to hold in place 
the social order it spawned. 
 
The fact that males are more likely than females to engage in fighting is often ascribed to 
their greater physical strength and to cultural beliefs that warfare is appropriate male 
behaviour.  According to Adcock (1982:214):Militarism is primary a male phenomenon 
and the ultimate of power patriarchy is the organised, legitimised violence of the nation-
state.  For millennia, part of women’s role has been to decry male aggression.  We often see 
ourselves as posing a better way – a more loving, nurturing way of life than masculine 
mode poses.   Sometimes love and hatred seem polarised along sex lines …We have 
generally portrayed ourselves as the victims of male domination, downplaying the areas in 
which we ourselves hold power. Seidman (1993:291) noted that since at least the turn of 
the century, nationalist movements have regularly promised to improve women’s status 
before taking power.   They have pledged to end gender-based subordination.   Just as 
regularly, however, most of these promises have gone unfulfilled.  Gender stereotypes have 
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also affected women in the military, and their participation has been limited because of 
their gender.  As observed by Olsoon and Torunn (2001:23), popular opinion would have it 
that women do not make good soldiers because they are physically and emotionally weak. 
According to Shikola (1998:147-148):[No] one mention (s) the contributions women made 
during the …struggle. That is true all over the world.  You never find an appreciation of 
what women did. Men appreciate women, who cook for them, and they respect women who 
fought the war with them, but after independence, they [don’t] really consider women as 
part of the liberation movement. 
 
It has been observed that war brings about only temporary changes in gender roles.   While 
not necessarily true for all women and girls, life as a female combatant can provide 
opportunities to occupy powerful positions and gain agency in a way that would not have 
been possible prior to the war. Women may also hope to change their status positions after 
the war has ended, but more often than not they revert to more traditional or conservative 
gender roles (Coulter et al., 2008:30).  In the outcome of war, women are gradually pushed 
in the direction of a gender role that is considered appropriate in that particular society 
(Barth, 2002).To add to the debate put forward by Honwana (1998) and Dyregrov, Gupta, 
Gjestad and Raundalen (2002), Denov and Maclure (2007:259) points to one element that 
is not discuss by either- the reality and importance of gender.  Culturally accepted 
traditional gender stereotypes limit the potential of both males and females, and the author 
raises the question of whether gendered exclusionary customs, such as discrimination 
against women, should be accepted and perpetuated.  She uses the DDR programmes in 
Sierra Leone as an illustration of how, due to traditional gender roles, girls were made 
invisible and excluded from the programmes, and thus inequalities were reproduced and 
gendered power differentiation was extended as the girls and women are left alone to fend 
for themselves.  She concludes that the pluralistic approach to psycho-social intervention 
must be gender-sensitive and avoid reproducing inequalities. For Marlowe (1993), men and 
women have different capacities for “certain kinds of things”. He argues that fighting is one 
of these things, certainly in the forms required in land combat, and that, “the male’s greater 
61 
 
vital capacity, speed, muscle mass, aiming and throwing skills, his greater propensity for 
aggression and his more rapid rise in adrenaline make him more fitted for physically 
intense combat” (Marlowe, 1993:190).  
 
However, while different attitudes toward our bodies constitute a basic part of our self-
identification as feminine or masculine, these attitudes are also contradictory, given the fact 
that some women are stronger than men. Rwandan anecdotes illustrate how weak some 
men have always found reasons for being challenged by women. In the Rwandan culture, 
people have always assumed that there are fairly substantial innate sex differences in body 
form that explain why men generally show superior performance in tasks reflecting 
strength or athletic ability. In the context of this research, we will see later how such 
assumptions have powerful personal and social consequences on women ex-combatants.   
In view of this, traditional gender roles must accordingly be reviewed. Enloe (1998) holds 
that the manipulation of gender-appropriate behaviour is a central component of ethnic 
nationalism. She adds that the “militarisation of women has been crucial for the 
militarisation of governments and of international relations” as well as the militarisation of 
men (Enloe, 2003:3). For Stiefel (1998:p.iii) gender roles and social values [are] extremely 
affected by the experience of war, so that the reconfiguration of gender roles and positions 
is a fundamental part of the challenge of reconstruction. Cock (1991) concluded that while 
significant attention has been paid to the ways in which men and ideas about masculinity 
are mobilised as part of the war machine - and this attention has not always been critical - it 
is only in recent years that people have begun to understand that women, and deeply-held 
beliefs about femininity, are also militarised and mobilised in support of the ideology of 
war. 
 
3.4 The case of Rwanda 
During the violence and conflicts in Rwanda, men, rather than women and children, have 
been the main targets.  While churches had been places of refuge for people threatened with 
violence in 1994, they also became chambers of death and the massacres targeted women 
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and children as well as men.   Although some Hutu women were victims of sexual abuse, it 
was mainly Tutsi women who were at risk; rape became a weapon of war, and ethnic 
cleansing primarily targeted Tutsis.  On the other hand, during the 1994 genocide 
individual women were at risk simply because of their gender; others were targeted because 
of their actual or presumed membership of particular groups.  Because of their ethnicity, 
Tutsi women were targeted generally, and a large number were killed, normally after 
having been subjected to sexual violence and torture (Newbury and Baldwin, 2003:3). Even 
though this situation was fuelled by the war and politically motivated in the post-genocide 
period in Rwanda, gender-based violence continued to be a problem; women and small 
girls continued to be raped and defiled as in many other war-affected African countries 
(MIGEPROFE, 2004).  Newbury and Baldwin (2000) estimate that 200,000 or more 
Rwandan women were victims of some form of sexual violence during the genocide.   As 
Human Rights Watch has documented in “Shattered Lives, Sexual Violence during the 
Genocide in Rwanda and its Aftermath”, sexual abuse was used as a weapon to humiliate 
the Tutsi by destroying their women.  The survivors of this brutal treatment have been 
described as the ‘living dead’; some were sexually mutilated, and others have had to deal 
with chronic pain, in addition to the fear of pregnancy, AIDS and other sexually-
transmitted diseases.  The psychological burdens are also severe, as the Interahamwe 
militia often sexually abused Tutsi women and some Hutu women from moderate Hutu 
families in public, even in the presence of their own families (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 
22). Eyewitnesses during the period of the fieldwork highlighted that, in some cases, Tutsi 
women were forced to serve as ‘sex slaves’ for Hutu men (Focus Group interview, 2010) 
Women who have been violated often hesitate to talk about it, mostly because of the trauma 
of rape, but also because of shame and threat of rejection by their friends or families. 
Psychological trauma thus leads to social isolation.   As a Rwandan testifying at the Fourth 
International Conference of women at Beijing noted, “Raped women are doubly punished 
by society.  First, judicial practice does not grant them redress for rape as long as graphic 
evidence is not brought out into the open.  Second, from society’s point of view there is 
little sympathy, for at the moment that men and children died without defence, these 
63 
 
women used the sex card, ‘selling their bodies to save their lives’. Thus they are judged 
from all sides, and even among their families they are not easily pardoned. Even worse, 
people reproach them of having preferred survival through rape” (Newbury and Baldwin, 
2000:23).Many women who have been raped are denigrated by society and their families.  
Their chances of getting married are low and some have given birth to children who are 
scorned. This situation was aggravated by the fact that many women would not want to 
report or talk about this issue. As many as 5,000 children are estimated to have been born 
as a result of rape during the genocide.  Some women choose not to keep these babies. 
Those who did often encountered resistance and reprobation from their families and 
society.  The terms used to describe this off-spring reflect such reprobation: ‘children of 
bad memories’, ‘devil’s children’, as well as ‘little Interahamwe’ (Newbury and Baldwin, 
2003:24).One example of the stigma attached to rape is a young girl who had been forced 
to be a slave of a Hutu militia man during the genocide.  She was engaged to be married to 
an RPF soldier, but when she told her fiancé that she had been raped, and that one of her 
parents was Hutu, the soldier called off the wedding and ended the relationship.  She was 
depressed and worried about what kind of future she would have.   
Many Rwandan women have dramatic stories to tell and the issue of gender stereotypes is 
even more pronounced when it comes to demobilisation from the army.  Almost every 
Rwandan woman who survived war and genocide experienced serious problems such as 
social and economic insecurity, hunger, fear, loss of family and friends, and female-headed 
households that are often very vulnerable. Socially, politically, and economically, the 
situation of the Rwandans in general and women in particular after the war and genocide is 
catastrophic. As a result of the genocide, it is estimated that 60-70 percent of Rwanda’s 
population is now female, 50 percent of whom are widows (Kumar, Tardif-Douglin, 
Maynard, Manikas, Sheckler, and Knapp, 1996).Women in Rwanda face many problems, 
including: family responsibilities such as caring for their own children, orphans, children’s 
relatives or friends as well as caring for elderly or infirm relatives.  Vulnerable women 
include widows, women whose husbands are in prison, and young girls heading 
households.  Rwandan women are still suffering from poverty in general and the number of 
 
women-headed households increased dramatically after war and genocide. A demographic 
survey conducted by the government in 1996 estimated that 54 percent of the population 
was female and that 34 percent of households were hea
widows (Layika: 1998). 
(2009) CFSVA and Nutrition Survey data shows that the population of Rwanda is 
characterized by a relatively high proportion of female
of the households are single
 
Figure 3.1 Heads of single
Source: Rwanda National Institute of Statistics, Comprehensive Food Security 
andVulnerabilty Analysis and Nutrition Survey (CFSVA), July 2009, Kigali.
 
Almost all of the single
headed by a widow(er) were female
gender into account in reconstruction efforts in Rwanda after the genocide.  The evid
of poverty reinforces this point; the World Bank has estimated that 70% of the population 
in Rwanda is living below the poverty line.   It is also estimated that the average income per 
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household per month rarely exceeds 
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This has been linked to the low educational lev
diagrammatically represented as shown in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 Literacy and education levels for 
Source: Rwanda National Institute of Statistics, Comprehensive Food Security 
andVulnerability Analysis and Nutrition Survey (CFSVA), July 2009, Kigali.
 
Female heads of household were less likely to be literate (43 percent) compared to 
heads of household (73 percent). Male heads of household were the most likely to have at 
least some education (28 percent had none) while female heads of household were the most 
likely to be uneducated (56 percent w
increasingly directly involved in the development and implementation of policies that affect 
them as part of their efforts to ensure not only the eradication of poverty and the promotion 
of education and literacy but also an end to discrimination
of vulnerability, Rwandan women have had to assume new roles and responsibilities 
previously dominated by men.  Women in Rwanda are playing a central role in the 
reconstruction of the country. At the national level and in
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women’s associations and individual women are playing has shown encouraging initiative 
in addressing the challenges of rebuilding the country and their communities.  The number 
of women in high positions in the central government has increased but is still limited. 
Rwanda’s new constitution stipulates that women must constitute 30 percent of decision-
making mechanisms of government.   Rwanda is leading the world ranking in terms of the 
number of women in its parliament as a result of the 2008 parliamentary elections.   The 
September 2003 elections saw 48 percent of seats in the National Assembly going to 
women.  This is admirable achievement in light of the fact that previously only 25.7 percent 
of the seats were occupied and even more so considering that the world average is 15.2% 
(Inter-parliament Union, 2003).  Since 2009, women have held a third of all Cabinet 
positions, including the position of Foreign Minister, Supreme Court Chief and Police 
Commissioner General.  Rwanda became the first country in the world where women are in 
the majority in government; 56percent in the Chamber of Deputies and 34 percent in the 
Senate.   The current Speaker’s chair is held by a woman.  In post-genocide Rwanda, 
women took work which was traditionally done by men such as working on construction 
sites, driving taxis and trucks, etcetera.    
 
Economically, the country has a new persuasive economic force which is women. Women 
are building their own homes, they are investing in their families, increasing savings, and 
they are paying school fees for their children. Nevertheless, despite these tremendous 
achievements, as in other African country, the freedom and emancipation of women in the 
rural areas of Rwanda are still jeopardised by patriarchal beliefs whereby men treat women 
as second class citizens. On the other hand, some women abuse their freedom and mistreat 
men in different ways, and this creates backlash from men.   Women have assumed new 
roles in Rwandan society and some efforts have been made to promote gender equity 
following the war and genocide.  These include the establishment of the Ministry of Gender 
and Social Affairs.  The government is also in the process of creating a legal framework 
that recognises women’s rights.  The revision of the matrimonial code offers couples a 
choice of property regimes, including the option to own land and property equally.  New 
67 
 
legislation enacted in November 1999 gives men and women the equal right to inherit land 
from their parents.  In the past, according to customary land tenure system in Rwanda, only 
men had the right to own land.  Upon marriage, women had to leave their families to join 
their husbands who inherited land from their parents.  In her new family, a woman could 
not inherit her husband’s property.   A woman could inherit land only when she had neither 
male children nor living male relatives of her deceased husband.  However, the widow had 
the right to use her late husband’s land as long as she stayed in her husband’s house and 
raised their children.  In the proposed new comprehensive land law, women and men have 
equal land rights; women will be able to inherit land and property from their parents and 
husbands. In terms of judicial reforms, a number of discriminatory aspects of some 
legislative provisions such as the penal code and civil code were revised. A Bill on 
amendments to the family code is in its final drafting stage and will be sent to the cabinet 
for endorsement. In connection with this research, all of these reforms created a good 
environment for women ex-combatants in their integration process. Indeed, in the post 
1994 Rwanda, one can see a proliferation of associations of women ex-combatants 
involved in different businesses, even the businesses formerly taken as taboo like taxi 
driving. In other words, the improved circumstances and achievements by women in post-
genocide Rwanda due different policy reform could be seen as an indication of progressive 
and successful integration programs for female ex-combatants. 
 
This study critically examines the current situation of women with a view to identifying 
opportunities that are available for female ex-combatants to reintegrate into the mainstream 
of society and how they can contribute to the rehabilitation and reconstruction process in 
post-genocide Rwanda.  Despite numerous challenges, women in Rwanda are proving to be 







Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will use the work of various authors to assess the demobilization and 
reintegration of combatants. This literature review will be undertaken not only to develop 
an understanding of the subject matter but also to situate the study within the broader 
theoretical literature. It presents the definitions of key concepts such as combatant, 
demilitarization, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The first section discusses 
the implementation of DDR Programmes, where the researcher identifies the key themes 
found in many scholars’ assessments of DDR programmes.  These are DDR as a prelude to 
post-conflict social transformation; demobilization as demilitarisation; DDR as a social 
contract; the international community as support to DDR; DDR as support of transitional 
justice; DDR as support of security sector reform; the conception of demobilization; DDR 
in the peace building environment; and the success of a DDR programme. Each of those 
themes is discussed in different sub-sections. 
 
The second section focuses on the context of DDR Programmes with particular emphasis 
on female ex-combatants in some African countries as an introduction to the experience of 
female ex-combatants in Rwanda which will be discussed in chapters five and six. In 
section two, different sub-sections discuss female ex-combatants’ participation in DDR 
programmes; the exclusion of female ex-combatants from those programmes; female ex-
combatants and gender issues; the education and skills gained by female ex-combatants 
during and after the struggle; female ex-combatants and health issue’ as well as their 
stigmatisation.  
 
4.2 A conceptual clarification 
To understand better the discussions in the next sections, concepts that are relevant to this 
study such as combatant, demilitarization, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
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will be defined. More details of these concepts are found in the annex. A brief attempt at 
definitional clarity is crucial given that the concepts are most often confused and used 
interchangeably.  This is despite the fact that each of the concepts signifies different steps 
of the whole peace process. 
 
4.2.1 Combatant 
The term “ex-combatant” has not been well-defined. The United Nations recognises when 
dealing with DDR officially that combatants become ex-combatants when they are 
registered as disarmed (UN, 1999:52).  For Nilsson, this is of little use as it says nothing 
about who should be considered as a combatant or a fighter.  It is therefore necessary to 
first establish what a combatant is (Nilsson, 2005:15).All members of armed groups, 
including people working in administration and women and children, who have stayed with 
an armed group, may be targeted for demobilisation.  However, for Houghton (2000), a 
combatant is one who engages in combat or armed struggle: a belligerent, fighter, soldier or 
warrior. As with Houghton (2000), this study will define a ‘combatant’ as a person or a 
combat vehicle that takes part in armed strife. 
 
4.2.2 Demilitarization 
Harris (2002:6) holds that the term ‘demilitarisation’ refers to a significant and sustained 
reduction in terms of the power and influence of the military, which is indicated not only by 
a reduction in military personnel but also the projections of force.   Demilitarisation refers 
to a social environment within a society where the emphasis is on the non-violent 
resolution of conflicts and the attainment of personal and social justice (Harris, 2006).For 
Lamb( 1997), ‘demilitarisation’ includes some or all of the following components: civilian 
control over the armed forces; demobilisation of combatants; disarmament; cuts in military 
spending; conversion of arms industries; the formation of solutions to conflict; and an 





Disarmament involves reducing military forces and weapons numerically.  This includes a 
reduction in weapons, military personnel and/or military power according to the Bonn 
International Centre for Conversion (BICC, 2001:13).For the United Nations (2000:2), 
‘disarmament’ refers to the collection of small arms, as well as light and heavy weapons 
from combatant groups within a conflict zone.   Initially, this entails the gathering/assembly 
of combatants following the cessation of conflict after which disarmament, weapons 
storage and accounting under national auspices.  Demining could also be part of the process 
of disarmament.  
 
According to Ollek (2007), the disarmament phase of DDR is understood as the first step in 
reducing the possibility of future outbreaks of hostilities. Disarmament programmes may 
include incentives to combatants to turn in their weapons such as cash payments or 
weapons-for-development schemes.In essence, ‘disarmament’ can be defined as the 
collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy 
weapons of combatants and often the civilian population. This process includes the 
development of responsible arms management programmes (Jennings, 
2007:205).Disarmament refers to a part of demobilisation where the aim is to reduce the 
number of fighters, or to disband an armed unit. Gleinchmann, Ian, Kees, Wilkinson and 
Buschmeier, (2003:29) identified the following steps in disarmament; weapons survey, 
weapons collection, weapons storage, weapons destruction and weapons re-utilisation. The 
process is essential as a confidence-building measure aimed at increasing stability in a very 
tense, uncertain environment with nervous participants and a wary population. 
Gleinchmann et al., conclude that all measures must be aimed at changing the mindset of 
participants, irrespective of whether these are standing armed forces, guerrilla groups, 





According to Kingma (2000:26), ‘demobilisation’ is a process that significantly reduces the 
number of military personnel as well as the civilian personnel employed by the armed 
forces. This process involves a reduction in the size of regular military and military forces.  
In this way, ‘demobilisation’ is a process whereby government forces or opposition 
factional forces reduce their force size or completely disband, as part of a broader 
transformation from war to peace (UN, 2000). As such, ‘demobilisation’ refers to the 
process of dissolving the forces in opposition after their integration into new regular armed 
forces (Kingma, 2002:182).For Kimberly (1995:2), the term ‘demobilisation’ refers to the 
process of converting a soldier to a civilian.  Carames and Sanz (2008:9) noted that the 
demobilisation process is “the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from 
armed forces or other armed groups”. They added that the first step in this process could be 
the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres or the massing of troops in 
chosen camps for this activity. This includes cantonment sites, encampments, assembly 
areas or barracks.  They conclude that the key steps of demobilisation involve the planning, 
stationing, registering, disarming, and orientation of ex-fighters prior to their release, as 
well as their release. McLeod (1999:2) defines ‘demobilisation’ as the process where 
regular soldiers stop working as soldiers.  He holds that the process starts with the 
identification of soldiers who will be demobilised and ends with formal acknowledgment of 
discharge from military service.  ‘Demobilisation’ helps to restructure the armed forces to 
make them more efficient.  Similarly, Batchelor, Cock and Mckenzie (2000:41) note that 
‘demobilisation’ refers to a significant reduction of people employed in the military and 
their reintegration into civilian life.For Dzinesa (2006), “demobilisation” is a planned 
process whereby the number of personnel under arms and in military command structures is 
significantly reduced.  The demobilisation process includes a reduction in the size of the 
regular military, and paramilitary forces, as well as rebel groups (sometimes after their 




However, in practice, demobilisation often involves the assembly, disarmament, 
administration, counselling, skills assessment and then the discharge of ex-fighters, with a 
compensation package and/or assistance programme in place. Demobilisation follows 
closely after a core, integrated force has been formed and the decision to demobilise the 
rest.  According to the UN (2000:2), this involves disbanding military structures and leads 
to the transformation of ex-combatants into civilians.  According to Ollek (2007), the 
demobilisation phase concentrates on decreasing the numbers of participants in armed 
groups in order to begin their transition to civilian life. For Tonheim (2009:8), 
demobilisation is: “the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed 
forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the 
processing of individual combatants in individual centres to the massing of troops in camps 
designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). 
The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the 
demobilised, which is called re-insertion”. 
 
The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards, IDDRS’ 
definition of demobilization emphasises the importance of the discharge of individual 
fighters and the disbanding of entire military structures, compared to earlier UN definitions 
of demobilisation. The amassment of combatants in cantonment sites facilitates their 
registration, information meetings, the identification of vulnerable groups, and pre-
discharge orientation (IDDRS, 2006:10). Although closely related, demobilisation is quite 
distinct conceptually from ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘disarmament’. Whereas demobilisation 
seeks to significantly reduce or eliminate altogether certain military personnel, 
demilitarisation and disarmament seek to accomplish slightly different objectives. 
 
4.2.5 Reintegration and reinsertion processes 
4.2.5.1  Reintegration process 
The reintegration process refers to the reinsertion of ex-combatants and their dependants 
into society to enable them to experience and exercise civilian economic, social and 
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political life.  Kimberly (1995:2) defines ‘reintegration’ as the process that facilitates the 
ex-combatants’ transition to civilian life.  For Nilsson (2005), the reintegration of ex- 
combatants is “a societal process aiming at economic, politic, and social assimilation of ex-
combatants and their families into civil society”. In other words, reintegration is “the 
process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment 
and income”. He adds that this process involves social and economic activities with open 
timelines, primarily within the community.  Reintegration is a component of the broad 
development of a country as well as a national responsibility and often requires long-term 
foreign aid (Nilsson, 2005:27).  McLeod (1999:1) holds that ‘reintegration’ refers to the 
process wherein ex-combatants and their families are assimilated into social, economic and 
political life in civilian communities. For Kingma (2000:28), “re-integration” is a complex 
process that encompasses social, political or economic aspects.  The integration process 
also involves the families of ex-combatants and takes some time.  Social reintegration 
refers to the process where the ex-combatant and his or her family become a full part of 
decision-making processes as stressed by Kingma” (2000:28).  Reintegration programmes 
also include cash assistance and compensation in kind, as well as vocational training and 
income-generating activities (Kingma, in Reycheler and Paffenholz, 2001:405). 
 
The IDDR standards also address the reintegration of children and state that it “includes 
family reunification, mobilising and enabling the child's existing care system, medical 
screening and health care, schooling and/or vocational training, psychosocial support, and 
social and community-based re-integration.  Reintegration programmes need to be 
sustainable to take into account children’s aspirations (IDDRS, 2006:20).According to the 
United Nations (2000:2) ‘reintegration’ refers to the process that enables ex-combatants 
and their families to adapt economically and socially to productive civilian lives.  In 
general, they receive a package including cash, in-kind compensation, jobs and 
encouragement to embark upon self-help projects, and training in income generating 
activities.  These programmes should be ‘tailored’ to the specific needs of former 
combatants, should reflect their different political, social, economic and educational 
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backgrounds and should cover topics such as accommodation, education and training, 
economic activities, medical and health issues, psychological assistance and legal and civil 
matters (Keiss quoted in Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001:406).The following is a list of the 
types of reintegration support that have been provided by governments and/or donor 
agencies: cash payment, foodstuff (or coupons), healthcare, clothing, housing - furniture 
and housing equipment and building material, seed or agricultural equipment, agricultural 
extension services, scholarships and school fees for children, counselling and vocational 
guidance, legal and business advice, job placement or apprenticeships, general referral 
services, access to land, public works and public sector job creation, wage subsidies, credit 
schemes and managerial and technical training. 
 
4.2.5.1.1 Economic reintegration 
For Kingma (2000:28) economic reintegration is the process wherein an ex-combatant’s 
household builds up its livelihood from production and other gainful employment.It is the 
process through which retired soldiers or ex-combatants achieve financial independence by 
securing a livelihood for themselves and their families.  The process is often difficult in 
areas where unemployment is high, where there is low growth and where the individuals in 
question do not have marketable skills. Researchers and DDR practitioners put forward 
some definitions of political, social, and psychological reintegration during a DDR 
Advanced Course on Reintegration at the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre 
(KAIPTC, 2 June 2010) as follows: 
 
4.2.5.1.2 Political reintegration 
Political reintegration is the process whereby retired soldiers or ex-combatants participate 
in the political life of their communities through membership of organisations or 
participation in various activities such as local councils, school committees, churches, trade 





4.2.5.1.3 Social reintegration 
Social reintegration is the process whereby ex-combatants and their families consider 
themselves to be part of, and are accepted by, the communities in which they live and 
society at large.  The attitudes of communities towards categories of ex-combatants are 
often dependent on the perceptions of the historical role these individuals played, and, if a 
major armed conflict has taken place, the degree of reconciliation in that society. 
 
4.2.5.1.4 Psychological reintegration 
Psychological reintegration is the process through which ex-combatants make the 
psychological adjustment from a military lifestyle, which is generally characterised by a 
hierarchal system of command and control, where an individual’s life is defined by a clear 
set of rules and regulations, to a less formal and more flexible civilian lifestyle.  Support 
and counselling may have to be provided to former soldiers who may suffer from 
psychological disorders as a result of being exposed to traumatic or life-threatening events.  
In addition, some ex-combatants may have lost the ability to be self-sufficient, as the 
military organisation to which they had belonged, had consistently provided for their basic 
needs during the period of armed conflict (KAIPTC, June 2010). 
 
4.2.5.2  Reinsertion process 
According to Tonheim (2009:8), re-insertion refers to short-term assistance offered to ex-
combatants during demobilisation prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. 
Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-
combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothing, 
shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.  It is a 
short-term process and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to 
one year. The amount of reinsertion assistance offered to ex-combatants differs according 
to criteria such as individual needs assessments, rank, and the number of years with an 
armed group. IDDRS’s definition of reinsertion identifies it as a short-term process, which 
is different from the longer-term process of reintegration. Ball and Van de Goor (2006) 
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concur that most of the activities associated with reintegration are better understood as 
reinsertion support that connects the ‘DD’ (disarmament and demobilisation) aspects of 
DDR with the ‘R’ of reintegration. Reinsertion, rehabilitation and resettlement can be 
inserted in the reintegration process, because they provide ex-combatants with 
opportunities for vocational training and a social component in a society that is undergoing 
post-war restoration. According to Dzinesa (2006), re-integration is a complex economic, 
political, social and psychological process whereby former fighters make the transition 
from a military to a civilian life.  Therefore, a distinction is often made between economic, 
political, social and psychological reintegration. 
 
4.3 The implementation of DDR programmes 
Different DDR programmes adopt different terminologies.  These vary according to the 
context in which DDR programmes are implemented.  DDR aims at a comprehensive 
reversal of the conditions of war to conditions of peace amongst belligerents and serves to 
bring about peaceful conditions, and enhance human security, stability and development 
through the transformation of the role and behaviour of armed combatants (United Nations 
Report, 2000:2).  Hence, one can say that DDR is part of a wider strategy of peace building. 
With this in mind, and as  noted above, the researcher will attempt to identify the key 
themes  in scholarly assessments of DDR programmes such as: DDR as a prelude to post-
conflict social transformation; demobilization as demilitarisation; DDR as a social contract; 
the international community as support to DDR; DDR as support of transitional justice; 
DDR as support of security sector reform; the conception of demobilization; DDR in the 
peace building environment; and the success of a DDR programme. 
 
4.3.1 DDR as a prelude to post-conflict social transformation 
The critical objective of DDR is the stabilisation of the security environment and the 
establishment of a peaceful post-conflict environment (Ollek, 2007:12). Thus, it highlights 
the creation of a process of long-term transformation.  Divergence is observed up until the 
stage at which DDR itself must contribute to this long-term process. The most significant 
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debate considers whether the major reason for addressing short-term security is that DDR is 
a programme for post-conflict social transformation. The IDDRS (2006:24) notes that the 
objective of DDR is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments 
and, consequently, when recovery and development can begin. However, the disarmament, 
demobilisation, and re-integration of ex-combatants are complex processes with political, 
military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions.  On the one hand, DDR 
aims to deal with the post-conflict security problems that occur when ex-combatants are left 
without livelihood or support networks, especially during the vital transition period from 
conflict to peace and development.  On the other hand, through a process of removing 
weapons from the hands of combatants, taking them out of military structures and helping 
them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR supports ex-combatants so 
that they can become active participants in the peace process (IDDRS, 2006:25).  The 
narrowest approach to DDR is simply as a short-term security project (Jeong, 2005:27). In 
the latter context, disarmament, followed by the demobilisation of combatants, becomes the 
primary concern.  By contrast, social development is approached as a secondary goal when 
compared to the security objectives. The Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
argued that a failure to immediately and effectively disarm and demobilise combatants 
might contribute to an immediate deterioration into conflict (UN, 2000:16) if the process of 
demobilisation fails or becomes inefficient.  The military-centred perspective views DDR 
as one of many post-conflict programmes that must co-ordinate with parallel peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Knight and Ozerdem (2004:506) argue 
that the UN is linking demobilisation too closely with disarmament so that disarmament 
becomes the key strategic and political focus.  They contend that concentration on the 
disarmament aspect of DDR does not go far enough in meeting the socio-economic needs 
of ex-combatants and their dependants. However, there is no automatic relationship 





In view of the above, it can be argued that a successful demobilization programme requires 
several integrated actions such as:  
• classifying ex-combatants according to need, skill level, and their desired mode of 
subsistence,  
• offering a basic transitional assistance package (safety net),  
• finding a way to deliver assistance simply, minimizing transition costs while 
maximizing benefits to ex-combatants,  
• sensitizing communities and building on existing social capital,  
• coordinating central yet decentralized implementation authority to districts, and  
• connecting the DRP to ongoing development efforts by retargeting and restructuring 
existing portfolios. 
 
4.3.2 Demobilization as demilitarization 
There is no demobilization without disarmament and discharge, just as there is no 
reinsertion without resettlement and reintegration. In other words, the DDR programmes 
and demilitarization are interconnected. However, demilitarisation is less well-defined than 
militarisation (Batchelor, 2004:13).  The mobilisation of civilians in support of the war 
effort is part of the process of militarisation (Enloe, 2002:3).  Militarisation is “a step-by-
step process by which a person or a thing gradually becomes controlled by the military or 
comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas” (Enloe, 2002:3). The more 
militarisation transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society 
comes to see military needs and militaristic presumptions as not only valuable but also 
normal. In other words, militarisation involves cultural as well as institutional, ideological, 
and economic transformation. Thus, war becomes the “dominant mode of production” in 
society (Barth, 2002:1). Furthermore, militarisation contributes to the increasing 
involvement of both men and women in warfare (Gamba, 2006:9). For women, 
militarisation is an input element into that of men. In summary, demilitarisation is a social 
process of reducing societies’ involvement in warfare through redirecting resources from 
conflict-related activities, decreasing the strength of armed groups, and shifting combatants 
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into civilian life.  Farr (2005:197) refers to DDR as part of a broader demilitarisation 
process that includes both the demilitarisation of state apparatus and the demilitarisation of 
society. The demilitarisation approach to DDR understands demobilisation as the 
dismantling of the whole military organisation and apparatus of armed groups (Knight and 
Ozerdem, 2004:506).  This perception stresses that the failure to fully dismantle this device 
not only allows chains-of-command to persevere but also increases the chances of a 
resumption of violence. A focus on demilitarisation implies an increasing role for 
communities in DDR processes. In conclusion, disarmament/demilitarisation or 
demobilization and reintegration programmes form part of a usual continuum in the peace 
process and necessitate an inclusive, integrated and coordinated approach in their planning 
and implementation. When disarmament or demilitarisation ends, demobilisation begins 
and where demobilisation ends, reintegration commences. 
 
4.3.3 DDR as a social contract 
DDR is viewed as a social contract in the sense that there are two parts involved in the 
DDR process. In this process, ex-combatants and those who conceive and implement DDR 
must be able to rely on one another to keep their agreements. In other words, the social 
contract is an agreement intended to explain the appropriate relationship between DDR and 
the ex-combatants.  One perspective forecasts a bigger role for DDR in post-conflict socio-
economic transformation. As noted in the previous section, this examines DDR as a social 
contract between ex-combatants and those in charge of the design and implementation of 
DDR programmes.  In disarmament and demobilisation, combatants surrender the source of 
their primary means of revenue, their weapons, and the support and organisation offered by 
armed groups. Thus, it is the obligation of DDR to offer socio-economic assistance to ex-
combatants as they integrate into civilian life (IDDRS, 2006:24-26).  In its operational 
guide IDDRS offers a more comprehensive approach to DDR, going beyond disarmament 
to address the needs of combatants, and recognising the impact of DDR on long-term 




The DDR programmes are related to broader peace building initiatives; this means that 
sustainable re-integration support must go beyond immediate reinsertion support (Berdal, 
1996:4).  Despite the fact that the link between DDR and peace building is apparent, critics 
argue that DDR itself can only influence a narrow range of political and security objectives 
as part of the wider process of security sector reform.   It has been noted that DDR is not 
intended to be either a substitute for development initiatives or a promise of the successful 
reintegration of fighters. It is clear that as DDR programmes assume a significant role in 
providing long-term socio-economic support to ex-combatants, questions arise at the 
operational level about the responsibilities of the different implementing agencies and the 
mobilisation of resources to support these programmes (United Nations Report, 2004:3-4).   
Ollek (2007:15) notes that it is a gross simplification to suggest that different approaches to 
DDR are mutually exclusive.  Whereas there is considerable overlap between the 
approaches, each contributes to a different orientation during DDR programme design and 
implementation.  Ollek argues that “the context in which DDR programmes are designed, 
particularly the basic framework for DDR, affects the prioritisation of these different goals. 
Most basic frameworks for DDR programmes are laid within ceasefire agreements and 
further anchored in peace agreements between armed groups”. In most DRR programmes, 
these are implemented through DDR national commissions and the role of the UN is to 
encourage the parties to provide assistance for the planning and implementation of DDR 
processes (IDDRS, 2006:25-26). Thus, the DDR national commission supports the DDR of 
a combination of state armed forces and other armed groups through the demobilization of 
part of the state armies or regular armed forces. This applies to the disbanding of irregular 
or informal armed groups.  Furthermore, the DDR is necessary to support security sector 
reform and the re-establishment of legislation controlling arms (IDDRS, 2006:26). 
 
4.3.4 The international community as support to DDR programmes 
The presence of the UN has been noted in most of the countries with DDR programmes. 
However, the mission mandates differ considerably, depending on the country.   For a 
mission depending on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, it is imperative for 
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DDR to play a direct role, although this is not always the case.   However, the mission of 
the Department of Political Affairs and the political missions of the DPKO have a tendency 
to refrain from participating in DDR apart from secondary tasks.  Where there is an absence 
of UN missions, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has served as the 
central institution for international interventions and, in many instances, for the DDR 
process.  There is also the World Bank and the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Re-
integration Programme (MDRP), although these institutions play a more modest role 
compared to other international organisations. In terms of funding, the UN has become 
increasingly involved in DDR processes since the early 1990s.   Since 1992, it has engaged 
in more than 24 DDR-related processes, 22 of which are currently ongoing. Only six are 
outside Africa while the 16 within the continent account for 81 percent of the UN’s 
involvement (Spanish Agencie Catalane de Cooperacio el Develupement [SACCD]: 2007).  
 
Turning to specific DDR programmes in Africa, some (especially Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia 
and Uganda) have been innovative and significantly effective. Others such as Sudan, 
following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and Somalia 
(with its disparate and incessant conflicts) have been far less effective. The UN has not 
been alone in its involvement in DDR processes on the African continent. The African 
Union (AU) played an important role in west and southern Africa and the Horn of Africa; 
regional economic and security groupings have also played an important role. Other aid and 
support has come from the European Union Multi-Country Demobilisation and Re-
integration Programme (MDRP) and the group of Scandinavian states.  The MDRP, which 
is managed by the World Bank and established in 2002 by more than 40 western 
governments for the purpose of creating support for DDR, focuses on the Great Lakes 
region as well as west, central, southern and east Africa (Quarterly Progress Report,2006).  
The following countries are part of the MDRP: Angola, Burundi, the Central African 
Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. 
In Liberia, UNICEF leads child DDR, and no less than six other groups -including the 
World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organisation (WHO), Action Aid, and 
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the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) were involved in adult DDR.  
Recently, there has been a need to transfer the work of DDR from international groups to 
national commissions that co-ordinate the efforts of all international partners such as in 
Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda.  Lastly, institutions such as the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) and the Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) have 
offered concrete assistance to post-war reconstruction and DDR, for which the rest of the 
world provides minimal international intervention. Despite the expressed desire to transfer 
the work of DDR from international groups to national commissions that coordinate the 
efforts of all international partners, UN organisations and donor agencies continue to use a 
top-down and non-holistic approach towards DDR in post-conflict countries. In the 
demobilization process, the abovementioned organizations do not consider the context of 
countries. Furthermore, they fail to emphasise preventive measures such as educating 
school children about peace making.  This would allow children to develop ideas about 
peace, conflict, and violence. Efforts to break the cycle of violence must focus on 
prevention, and a peaceable environment provides the best possible foundation for helping 
the younger generation to understand peace as members of a democratic community. 
 
4.3.5 DDR as support of transitional justice 
Transitional justice involves the full range of processes and measures linked to a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.  Nevertheless, transitional justice is 
not a ‘special’ kind of justice, but an approach to achieving justice in times of transition 
from conflict and/or state repression. By means of accountability and redressing victims, 
transitional justice provides recognition of the rights of victims, promotes civic trust, and 
strengthens the democratic rule of law. 
  
Turning to the DDR in Rwanda, most DDR programmes begin once adversary groups sign 
a peace agreement to end armed conflict, and agree to a cessation of hostilities and the start 
of a new political cycle, normally involving joint participation in political and military 
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matters. One of crucial aspects of DDR is the legal and political treatment of ex-combatants 
once these actors/agents have surrendered their arms. Generally, this involves discussion on 
the criminal responsibility of armed groups who have participated in conflict that may have 
resulted in serious human rights violation such as massacres, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity.For Sanz and Carames (2008:15), transitional justice refers to judicial and extra-
judicial processes that facilitate or permit transition from a dictatorial regime to democracy 
or from a situation of war to a situation of peace.  Transitional justice strives to clarify the 
identities and fates of victims and persons responsible for human rights violations, to 
establish the facts related to these violations, and to design ways in which a society might 
deal with the crimes perpetrated, as well as reparations.  Fisas (2004:15) argues that the 
objectives of transitional justice are mainly the search for truth, the clarification of the 
identities and fate of victims, the identities of the perpetrators, the establishment of 
responsibilities, and the development of reparations mechanisms. If the armed conflict has 
been longstanding and resulted in many deaths, the psychosocial context may favour 
amnesty, pardon, and reconciliation, but this is never achieved without difficulties, 
contradictions, and opposition from other affected individuals or groups. Reconciliation is a 
very long process. It involves truth, justice, and reparations, the results of individual and 
collective efforts to find a higher good and a future which allows the transcendence of 
individual pain.  Sanz and Carames (2008:15) observe that the normal outcomes of 
ceasefires, cessation of hostilities and the signing of peace agreements, are amnesty, the 
creation of transitional structures, the distribution of political power, and the reform of the 
security sector, amongst others.   This occurs in the context of a lack of special courts, 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and other measures connected to core concepts of 
truth, justice, and reparations.  Truth Commissions, according to Duthie (2006:14) are great 
opportunities to provide impartial explanations, to clarify the events of a conflict, and to 
provide structures of models that arise in conflict. In this way, perpetrators are able to 
explain their stories, although this may serve to reinforce stereotypes and resentment if 
commissions exclude ex-combatants or members of the community in which this process 




It has been noted that reparations are the key issue in the process of transitional justice. The 
purpose of reparations is to recognise victims, strengthen trust between citizens and the 
state, and reduce resentment between victims and communities.  This objective cannot be 
fulfilled if a perception remains that ex-combatants have obtained benefits at the expense of 
other affected groups, or if victims of human rights violations have not agreed to welcome 
ex-combatants into their community.  In general, mechanisms of transitional justice can 
have a positive impact on the security of citizens, but they can also intensify resentment 
among ex-combatants and increase tension between communities. For example, in 
Colombia, where demobilisation has not affected all armed groups collectively, the 
situation led to endless conflict, and a psychosocial environment favourable to amnesty and 
pardon could not occur because the cycle of violence has not yet been entirely broken (Sanz 
and Carames, 2008:16). This has left some with a sense that certain impunities or more 
favourable treatment are offered to select groups accused of crimes. However, the Peace 
and Justice Law that Colombia approved in 2005, along with amendments to the 
Constitutional Court in 2006, offered demobilised paramilitaries reduced sentences if they 
confess to their crimes. In turn, this revelation of crimes acted as a foundation of justice for 
the victims of these crimes. This kind of achievement is very rare at the international level. 
 
In summary, and drawing from the previous section, one can state that transitional justice 
aims to contribute to accountable DDR programmes that are based on more systematic and 
improved coordination between DDR and transitional justice processes, so as to best 
support the successful transition from conflict to sustainable peace. Transitional justice 
provides a legal framework, guiding principles and options for policymakers and 
programme planners who are contributing to strategies that aim to minimize tensions and 
build on opportunities between transitional justice and DDR. However, coordination 
between transitional justice and DDR programmes begins with an understanding of how 
transitional justice and DDR may interact positively in the short-term in ways that, at a 




4.3.6 DDR as support of security sector reform 
In 2007, Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) published a new edition of its manual on security 
sector reform. The manual’s objectives are to provide donors with new guidelines on 
understanding the relationship between security and development, as well as to illustrate 
certain key positions on evaluating the design, implementation, and evaluation of security 
sector reform for different institutions, including the police, the armed forces, and 
intelligence services (OECD 2007).The DDR programme refers to security-sector reform, 
in many instances, through the reduction of the number of participants in the security 
sector, the professionalization of security institutions, and training focused on human rights 
and international law (Sanz and Carames, 2008:17).    Measures to reform the security 
sector resound throughout the DDR process. These may touch on the creation of new 
eligibility criteria for ex-combatants of armed opposition groups to enter the official 
military forces. Even though there is a need to carefully consider the details of each, in 
reality some processes are identical, for example the process of absorption into new armed 
forces, the demobilisation of child soldiers, and examination for HIV/AIDS, etcetera ( Sanz 
and Carames, 2008:17). 
 
In order to prevent armed conflict and violence, as well as fight the impact of uncontrolled 
and excessive proliferation of small arms in peace-building contexts, it is important that 
governments take into account the control mechanisms that go beyond DDR programmes. 
According to Sanz and Carames (2008:17) the possession of illicit small arms by the 
civilian population, or the discovery of territory with landmines, are indications that in 
post-war contexts, the disarmament of armed groups must be combined with other types of 
initiatives, ranging from landmine removal and the collection of arms from civil society to 
the strengthening of state legislation on related issues.   They stress that disarmament 
initiatives must be understood as a practical means for disarmament. These means may be 
divided according to objectives: on the one hand, by decreasing demand, or influencing the 
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motivations which generate the need for arms; on the other hand, by controlling the existing 
supply of arms through legislation and practices which restrict their use; and lastly, by 
restraining surpluses through the collection, reduction, and destruction of arms in the hands 
of the civilian population, in illegal armed groups, and in government arsenals. 
 
4.3.7 The conception of demobilization 
Generally, demobilisation is understood to be the second stage of the DDR process, after 
the disarmament process; its form and functions differ according to the given context.  
Tanner (1996:171) notes that “…demobilisation refers to the disarmament and dissolution 
of the force structures and the transition of combatants to civilian status”. He sees 
disarmament as an element within demobilisation and not a pre-condition for the fighter to 
enter the demobilisation phase of the DDR programme. This differs from Berdal’s 
(1996:39) argument that does not establish disarmament as an imperative either before or as 
an integral element of demobilisation. Rather, he not only describes the objective of 
demobilisation as the disbanding of the fighting forces but also stresses the activities 
required to achieve this. 
 
Drawing on different discussions, arguments and debates with reference to the purpose and 
meaning of demobilisation, the UNIDDRS (UN, 2006) concluded that effectively: DDR 
programmes should support the process of turning combatants into productive citizens. 
This process starts in the demobilisation phase, during which the structures of armed forces 
and groups are broken down and combatants formally acquire civilian status (UN 2006a, 2 
and10).Within the different definitions of demobilisation, there is either an explicit 
statement that the structures of the armed forces should be dissolved, or an implied 
understanding that this can be achieved through processes involving encampment and the 
targeted distribution of assistance to individuals.  In view of DDR within a context of war-
to-peace transition, this requires the dissolution of the structures of the insurgent 
organisation (Knight, 2008:9).   It is clear that:  
DDR aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that results from  
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ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their 
former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and 
development (UN 2006:10). 
According to Knight (2008:11), there is increasing evidence from countries that have 
experienced DDR processes -- such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Eritrea, East Timor, 
Northern Ireland and Namibia -- that ‘former comrades’ maintain a support network, and 
the veterans associations have become significant political actors. On the other hand, 
governments that failed to properly reintegrate ex-combatants later found themselves with a 
price to pay as restless ex-combatants threatened national stability. 
 
In conclusion, demobilization is the process of standing down a country’s ex-combatants 
from combat-ready status. Demobilization may be the net outcome of victory in war, or 
because a peace situation has been reached and military force will not be needed.  In the 
final days of World War II, the USA Armed Forces initiated a demobilization plan which 
was set up to discharge soldiers based upon on a point system that favoured length and 
certain types of service. The British armed forces were demobilized by means of an ‘age-
and-service’ scheme. However, with regard to the gender aspect of demobilization, 
experience has shown that international implementing organisations have not planned for 
the inclusion of women’s needs and concerns in demobilisation programmes. The impact of 
returning male fighters on women and the existence and needs of female fighters have 
historically been overlooked. This neglect of the mainland complex roles that women play 
during war and peace leads to a less effective, less informed demobilisation that does not 
fully extend to the community level and may not lead to long-term or sustainable peace. 
 
4.3.8 DDR in the peace building environment 
International peace building is now measured as a critical instrument of the international 
community in addressing countries emerging from conflict or countries under risk of 
violent conflict.  Bryden (200:27) argued that a growing awareness of the inter-relationship 
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between different elements of post-conflict peace building requires conceptual clarity as a 
precondition for co-ordinated, coherent and comprehensive interventions. He observes:  
The need to understand and operationalize the linkages between DDR and SSR is 
increasingly recognised. It forms part of a growing awareness of the imperative to provide 
more coherent and co-ordinated support from the International Community across the post-
conflict peace building agenda. Peace building is defined as “action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:11).  For Knight (2008:3-4), the DDR of ex-combatants 
constitutes one such activity, and within the perspective of the war-to-peace transition it 
can have a number of important effects upon the wider transitional development. The well-
organized implementation of the DDR programme can restore confidence between 
belligerent parties in the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities, as they are often 
the most visible element of the peace agreement.  In addition, a well-planned and flexible 
re-integration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally 
and internationally.  
 
Berdal (1996:73) refers to the relationship between DDR and peace building as ‘interplay’ 
and ‘a subtle interaction’. Clearly, a sustainable recovery after war cannot be achieved 
without a successful DDR process; on the other hand, without a successful peace building 
process in general, the viability of a DDR process would be questionable. In this regard, 
Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer (1996a:18) stress the relationship between the economic 
reintegration of former combatants and the sustainability of the peace process.   A 
successful long-term DDR process can make a major contribution to national conflict 
resolution and also to the restoration of social capital.   In other words, failure to achieve a 
successful DDR process can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual 
levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun.  
 
When DDR programmes are badly planned, conceived and poorly executed, they may 
become a source of future conflicts.   The incomplete disarmament in Mozambique 
89 
 
contributed to the proliferation of weapons not only throughout that country, but also in 
neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Malawi.    In 1998, Mozambique 
was the single largest source of small arms in the South African domestic market.  Kingma 
and Grebrewold (1998:12) categorize a number of situations in which the reintegration of 
displaced populations and former combatants may have an impact on the re-appearance or 
the development of conflicts.   These include the absence of a functioning state and legal 
system, lack of economic opportunities, competition for natural resources, political 
marginalization and the absence of appropriate conflict management systems, and the 
availability of light weapons.   In other words, war-torn countries with demobilized 
combatants run the risk of returning to conflict if they are not provided with a 
comprehensive DDR strategy. DDR programmes have featured in post-conflict 
reconstruction from Afghanistan to Haiti.  The failure of early DDR programmes in 
Somalia and Liberia, mainly attributed to their vague mandates, prompted a shift in recent 
years toward more focused interventions. The DDR programmes in Ivory Coast, Sierra 
Leone, and the DRC have disarmed hundreds of thousands of combatants; however, these 
programmes are still poorly funded, and a lack of research has prevented practitioners from 
developing better re-integration efforts (Hanson, 2007:2). In 2007, 14 African countries 
participated in one way or another in a DDR programme. On the one hand, some countries 
did so in order to reduce their armed forces, while on the other hand, other countries 
participated in the programme in order to disarm and demobilize armed opposition groups.   
In countries like Uganda and Sudan, which had a huge number of child soldiers, the DDR 
programme focused mainly on the demobilization of the children.   
 
In combination with the macro-insecurity structure, if the frustrations of ex-fighters are not 
addressed through a DDR strategy, they can easily re-organise and create security risks at a 
regional level; this occurred in 1998 following the border conflicts between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia (Knight, 2008:5).   Knight highlights three conditions for ensuring an effective 
relationship between peace building and a DDR process. Firstly, it must consist of a 
coordination of activities. While a wide range of programmes are carried out by a diversity 
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of agents, these are but not necessarily coordinated by a single vision for the future. 
Secondly, armed conflicts also affect cultural norms and reciprocal relationships in a 
society. For example, women as both fighters and war-affected civilians acquire new roles 
during a war. However, they are expected to revert to their traditional roles after the war.  
Thus, there is a need to provide female ex-combatants with special assistance to enable 
them to participate fully and equally in social, economic and political life. Thirdly, the 
trauma of war can have a profound psychological impact on the population, particularly on 
children, both as soldiers and civilians, affecting their social and emotional development. 
Knight (2008:6) proposes three key components to address this trauma: family 
reunification, psychological support and education, and economic opportunity.  This has 
been observed in Sierra Leone where the DDR process was seriously disrupted by the 
outbreak of renewed hostilities, and many child soldiers whose distinctive needs had been 
abandoned in the process, returned to the conflict in April 2000.  
 
On the subject of the peace building-DDR relationship, there are a number of issues 
connected to social and cultural norms and psychological impact that may require attention.  
Social reintegration involves the re-establishment of family and community ties that play a 
significant role in the achievement of reintegration programmes (Knight, 2008:5).   
According to Kingma, (2000:25), in a number of cross-cultural experiences, there is a 
pattern of more successful reintegration in rural than in urban areas.  This trend is explained 
by the likelihood of there being stronger supporting societal networks in rural than in urban 
areas.   In the rural areas of Ethiopia, a key factor for successful social reintegration was 
acceptance and support by the community as well as their extended families (Knight, 
2008:5).  Knight concludes that armed conflicts also affect cultural norms and mutual 
relationships in a society.   As noted earlier, women as both combatants and war-affected 
civilians gain new roles during a war.   However, they are expected to revert to their 
traditional roles after the war. Kingma, (2002:12) links this attitude to the high divorce rate 
in Eritrea, where about one-third of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) were 
women.  Knight, (2008:5) notes that the analysis of socio-economic and demographic data 
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on former combatants in Guinea-Bissau and Eritrea has also shown that female former 
combatants were more vulnerable than their male counterparts. Thus, there is a need for 
special support for female ex-combatants to enable them to participate fully and equally in 
social, economic and political life.  
 
As noted above, the cessation of hostilities or at least the end of widespread armed conflict 
provides an opportunity for war-torn people and countries to rebuild their societies, 
economies, and political institutions and to embark on reforms and restructuring.  Nations 
transitioning from conflict to peace face an immense challenge in rebuilding their societies.   
Ex-combatants must shift into newly formed national military forces or be reintegrated into 
civilian life.  Experience has shown the nations that endured civil conflict, such as 
Afghanistan, Haiti, Colombia, Angola, Ethiopia, Burundi, Liberia, Eritrea, Mozambique, 
Sudan, Somali, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe …etcetera, required a highly 
effective programme for demobilisation and reintegration, not only as part of the process 
toward peace, but also to ensure that in the post-conflict stage peace agreements brought 
stability.  This may lead to the success of DDR programmes. 
 
4.3.9 The success of a DDR programme 
The United Nation’s Briefing Note for Senior Managers (IDDRS) notes that DDR is 
basically a politically driven process, and that many DDR programmes stall or are only 
partially implemented because of the political climate.  The success of the DDR process is 
therefore dependent on the political will of the parties to enter into the process in a genuine 
manner (UN, 2006:3). It has been observed that the success of a DDR process is not only 
the political will to enter the process but rather the maintenance of this will.   In a 
comparative analysis of peace agreement provisions that address paramilitary groups and 
programmes for DDR, the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) notes that 
political goals, such as constitutional or legislative reform, are conditional upon the 
completion of DDR programmes (PILPG, 2006:11).   The maintenance of political will is 
vital to the success of the wider peace process and transition from conflict to peace, all of 
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which is conditional upon a successful DDR process (Knight, 2008:7).  In an analysis of 
DDR programmes, Escola de Cultura de Pau (2006:7) notes that:  
In the great majority of cases the decision has been made to opt for the creation of a 
National Commission for the DDR (NCDDR), with the military component playing 
a predominant role in this, either because the Commission itself is co-ordinated by 
the Ministry of Defence or due to the existence of a military sub-commission.  
The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006) states that the literature on DDR concepts, 
design and implementation correctly asserts that national leadership and institutions should 
play the leading role and bear political responsibility for the DDR of ex-combatants, while 
the UNIDDRS (2006:25) stresses that one of the key characteristics of DDR is that it 
should be nationally owned:  
 
The primary responsibility for the successful outcome DDR programmes rests with the 
national and local actors, and national stakeholders are responsible for planning, co-
ordinating and running institutions set up to manage different aspects for the peace 
agreement. As noted in a UN (2006:24) briefing to senior managers, the success of the 
DDR program depends significantly on the political will of the key parties to undertake 
seriously the project of disarmament demobilisation and re-integration of the targeted ex-
combatants.  An alternative perspective for international stakeholders would be to view the 
implementation of the DDR process as a continuation of the political dialogue that led to 
the peace agreement, and approach the implementation as an essentially political task. 
Within this view the process and structures established to perform DDR are correctly 
viewed as the political field in which the belligerent parties to the conflict continue the 
process of dialogue with the aim of cementing the commitments that would lead to a 
sustainable peace (Knight, 2008:7). The structures and membership of these structures 
would be conceived and established based on the requirement to maintain the political will 
of the two parties. Furthermore, the demobilisation and reintegration programmes for 
military downsizing and socio-economic revitalisation are essential for the country’s 
transition to sustainable peace and development.  If these programmes are well planned, 
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structured and well-managed, increased employment, social justice and decreasing social 
tension will follow (Kingma, 2000:35). 
 
The end of the Cold War and persistent economic deterioration in many sub-Saharan 
African (SAA) countries has created a situation in which a growing number of countries, 
whether emerging from internal conflict or at peace, are exploring ways to reduce their 
military expenditure in order to redress persistent poverty and growing inequality.   
Worldwide, the demobilisation of former fighters over the past decade has been impressive 
(Kingma, 2000:36).  Since 1989, the total number of armed forces personnel has declined 
considerably and continuously. As noted above, the end of armed conflict and hostilities 
supply an opportunity for war-torn people and countries to reconstruct their country and to 
launch reforms and rebuilding.  This applies to Rwanda as well.  The former ex-combatants 
may be useful in assisting the process of development if their experience is properly used; 
however, they may become a destabilising factor if a number of them fail to re-integrate 
properly into civilian life.  The experience of many war-torn societies indicates that when 
effective demobilisation and re-integration programmes were not, or could not be 
implemented, fragile peace arrangements could be jeopardised and conflicts reignited 
(World Bank: 1995).A survey of demobilisation in Africa in the early and mid-1990s 
shows that it has occurred in the following circumstances: 
• after a peace accord between fighting parties; 
• after the defeat of one of the fighting parties; 
• with a perceived improvement in the security situation; 
• as a result of a shortage of adequate funding; and 
• through the perceived economic and development impact of conversion or as a 
result of changing military technologies and/or strategies (BICC, 2000). 
 
As already noted, the context in which DDR programmes are implemented should inform 
the objectives and structure that the programme adopts.  Alusala (2007:47) argues that in 
order to achieve an effective result, each DDR programme should be based on a clear 
94 
 
understanding of the dynamic foundation of a particular post-conflict environment. It has 
been observed that in all armed forces or groups, there was a presence of women and girls; 
however, in most cases women were excluded from the DDR programme. In order to be 
successful, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes must be planned in 
a gender-sensitive way. 
 
4.4 Female ex-combatants and DDR processes 
DDR programmes for ex-combatants represent a very important part of peace-keeping 
operations and post-war rehabilitation processes.  The main objective of this kind of 
initiative is to ensure the transition of ex-combatants (including members of government 
and non-governmental forces as well as armed groups) from military to civilian status.  
These programmes differ widely in terms of the number of troops to be demobilised and re-
integrated, their budget and the bodies implementing and financing the process.   It is clear 
that child soldiers, women combatants and disabled soldiers require different approaches as 
collectives with specific needs. This section focuses on female ex- combatants and DDR 
processes.  
 
In general, female ex-combatants are seen as a threat to their male counterparts.  
Theoretically, female fighters have been included in African DDR programmes; however, 
as Mazurana and Carlson (2004:2) noted, most programmes are more effective in reaching 
out to male fighters than female fighters who are constantly underserved. The agenda for 
the majority of DDR programmes for ex-combatants is negotiated in official peace 
agreements.   The objectives of these programmes are to collect, register, and destroy all 
conventional weapons, to demobilise, and lastly to re-integrate ex-fighters.   Combatants 
who are enrolled in DDR programmes are generally given some monetary and material 
support as well as vocational or literacy training.   Women and girls who have registered in 
DDR programmes in Africa are small in number and are not reflective of the number of 
female fighters. The majority of DDR programmes in African countries with high numbers 
of women in the armed forces experience a low attendance of girls and women because 
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most women do not demobilise unless specific measures are made to include them in the 
process (Coulter et al., 2008:20). Most female ex-combatants do not join official 
programmes and consequently do not benefit from the DDR programmes.  On the other 
hand, there are other reasons that push female ex-combatants not to disarm;   these include 
local, social, and cultural factors. Female combatants are advised by commanders, fellow-
fighters or relatives that it is not appropriate for women to disarm.  There may be local 
cultural taboos concerning young women and violent practices that must be considered by 
planners and implementers of DDR.   In general, female fighters do not occupy a position 
that can be easily reconciled with predominant gender ideologies (Farr, 2002:8). In contrast 
with their male combatants, they are often excluded from the new army, and from new 
political structures, and are also refused access to retraining or land.   Many are also 
regarded with fear and suspicion when they try to return to the lives they lived before war 
broke out (Coulter et al., 2008:27). Gardam and Charlesworth (2000:152) observe that the 
treatment of female combatants by the military institution reflects the subordinate position 
of women in society in general. The majority of girls and women silently go back to their 
families or communities, and although this secrecy protects them, it also hides their need 
for support (Coulter et al., 2008:27; Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:35). Utas, (2005:25) notes 
that during the years female combatants spent in fighting forces, often under immense 
pressure, former women combatants learned survival techniques, made strategic choices, 
and obtained the skills and strengths that kept them alive.   Watteville, (2002:1) notes that 
while the roles and status of female combatants vary broadly during war, they all seem to 
share the characteristic of limited access to benefits at the time of peace and demobilisation. 
Female ex-combatants are often doubly punished: they are often excluded from DDR 
programmes due to the failure to implement these programmes in gender-sensitive ways, 
and they are not easily welcomed back and are stigmatised by civil society, often because 
they have transgressed traditional gender roles (Coulter et al., 2008:28).Furthermore, the 
society’s rejection of female ex-combatants when they return to civilian life and their 
history of having resorted to ‘unwomanly’ behaviour like being aggressive or having been 
sexually abused sometimes cause them to feel enormous shame, which makes reintegration 
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more difficult.   While they bear the physical scars of combat, torture and sexual violence, 
female ex-fighters also suffer from trauma which presents additional post-conflict 
challenges. Female ex-combatants become invisible when the guns become silent and they 
do not join national armies.  This will be discussed in the sub-sections below with a focus 
on female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, Eritrea, and in Ethiopia. 
The section discusses also the participation of female ex-combatants in DDR processes, 
their exclusion, gender issues, the skills they gained during struggle and education, and 
health, as well as stigmatisation.   
 
4.4.1 Female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone 
When the Sierra Leone DDR programme ended in December 2001, a total of 72,500 
combatants had demobilised; of those, 4,751 (6.5 percent) were women and 6,787 were 
children; and of the children, 506 (9.4 percent) were girls (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:6). 
They agreed, however, that the few women and girls who entered the official DDR 
programme do not represent the actual number of female combatants.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Ex-combatants who have been demobilized in Sierra Leone, by gender
Source: Adapted by the Researcher 2010
 
Despite the low female participation, the Sierra Leone DDR was not only considered a 
success by the UN, the Sierra Leone government, and many others, but also a model for 
future DDR programmes in other countries. However,  the low participation rates of female 
fighters has led some to question the design, implementation, and success of the DDR 
programme in Sierra Leone (Mazurana and Carls
UN Security Council Resolution 1
implementation of the Sierra Leone DDR, which has been described as either “gender
discriminatory”, or then absolutely “gender
process aimed at adult combatants, but in Sierra Leone many combatants were under the 
age of 18 and, as such, were categorised as child soldiers. With regard to the demobilisation 
of child soldiers, the Cape Town Principles are a strong guiding policy document.  
However, as with Resolution 1
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on, 2004:7).   It has been observed that the 
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-blind” (Coulter et al., 2008:21).   The DDR is a 







Sierra Leone DDR.   Many child soldiers had either to produce weapons or demonstrate 
experience in using them in order to be registered and sent to Interim Care Centres (ICCs) 
(Coulter et al., 2008:21).   In a study by Coulter et al., half of the female ex-combatants 
who were interviewed declared that they had wanted to disarm, but only a small number 
did.  Out of these, 22 percent revealed that the cause for this was that they did not have 
access to a weapon (Coulter et al., 2008:24).  Mazurana and Carlson (2004:20) noted that 
46 percent of the female ex-combatants who did not go through DDR in Sierra Leone 
revealed that the reason for this was their lack of a weapon, and the authors concluded that 
one of the reasons that female ex-combatants lacked access to weapons at the time of 
disarmament and demobilisation was that their commander had already collected their 
weapons.  In this regard,  Mazurana (2005:33) states that when “weapons are used as a 
condition to get access to a DDR programme, and when access to the programmes also 
means access to money, women and junior soldiers are often tricked out of their weapons 
by senior, predominantly male commanders”. 
 
4.4.2 Female ex-combatants in Liberia 
After the war in Liberia, an official DDR programme was launched that lasted until late 
November 2004.  Specht (2006:82) states that by that time 22,020 (22 percent of total ex-
combatants) women and 2,517 (2 percent of total ex-combatants) girls had gone through 
the DDR process.   According to Specht, as many as 14,000 young women participated in 
the armed conflict but, for a range of reasons, did not legitimately demobilise. 
  
 
Figure 4.2 Shallow outreach of DDR
Source: Adapted by the Researcher 2010
 
After the war in Liberia, the vast majority of girls were left by male combatants to fend for 
themselves and their children, often ending up in camps for the internally displaced (United 
Nation Children’s Fund Liberia, 1998).  
clear that the international community and responding agencies are aware of the fact that 
girl soldiers constitute a significant number of the fighting groups, they are still unable to 
access and respond to the needs of those girls th
UN Security Council on the situation in Liberia, the UN Secretary
special measures should be taken to address the gender
as well as the wives and widows of for
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM, 2004:4) observed some 
weakness in the Liberian DDR.  For example, an initial target of only 2000 female 
combatants to be demobilised was established, which pr
Sierra Leone experience had shown that women were associated with fighting forces to a 
larger extent than was originally estimated. That could and should have been integrated 
when planning DDR in Liberia. The UNIFEM (2004
women supporters and dependants and not just female combatants were supposed to be 
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incorporated into the DDR process, no preparations were made to accommodate them.   
Other reasons why female combatants were excluded from DDR included the fact that they 
did not trust the process to help them, or that they were scared of repercussions and social 
stigma if they were identified as ex-combatants. 
 
Specht (2006:82) observes that the first criterion for entering the DDR programme in 
Liberia was possession of a weapon or ammunition to hand in.  For female combatants 
under the age of 18 this was not a problem, as child soldiers could demobilise without 
handing in a weapon. On the other hand, the adult programme was much more difficult as 
fighters over the age of 18 were denied access if they did not hand in a weapon, which only 
a small number were able to do.  Another reason for the exclusion of female fighters in the 
DDR programmes that Specht noted in Liberia was the use of lists of all members made by 
commanders within a unit.  Access to the DDR and any cash payment depended on being 
on the list.  This process has been used in many DDR programmes around the world and 
may be effective in conflicts where it is more or less clear who the fighters are.   
 
However, in contexts such as in Liberia where the armed forces are more fluid and the 
distinction between civilians and combatants is difficult to establish, commanders have 
occasion to abuse their authority. Female combatants in Liberia were in general 
discriminated against under this system as they were often omitted from the lists in favour 
of friends and relatives of their commander (Specht 2006:92). Many female fighters who 
should have been eligible for DDR benefits were denied access. Mazurana and Carlsson 
(2004:21) observe that there is an over-classification of girls and young women as ‘bush 
wives’, camp followers, and sex slaves, which has prevented the organisation of DDR 
programmes to address these girls’ and women’s actual lived experiences.  It is also 
apparent that both disarmament and reintegration are explicitly gendered processes, a factor 
that has not been addressed in many DDR processes in Africa.  The focus of most DDR 
programmes is on disarming male fighters, and as girls and women had in part played other 
roles in the war their classification as dependants effectively excluded them from the 
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process.    Practitioners and policy makers in the field of DDR often take as a point of 
departure the narrow and conventional way of defining fighters as young men over the age 
of 18 in possession of weapons. Women and girls are excluded from this group (Mckay and 
Mazurana, 2004:114; UNIFEM, 2004:4). 
 
It has been observed that war involves an impermanent change in gender roles.   Although 
not true for all women and girls, life as a female combatant can provide opportunities to 
achieve a position of power and gain agency in a way that would not have been possible 
prior to the war. Women may also hope to change their status after the war has ended, but 
normally revert to more traditional or conservative gender roles (Coulter et al., 2008:30).  
After the war, women are gradually pushed in the direction of a gender role that is 
considered appropriate in that particular society (Barth, 2002). 
 
4.4.3 Female ex-combatants in Mozambique 
In Mozambique, during the independence war a new female identity emerged and some 
women developed a new idea of themselves as women, with new aspirations and new goals 
(Arnfred, 1988:6). Such include support and equality with men. FRELIMO encouraged 
such changes in gender roles.   But after the war, FRELIMO either failed to provide support 
for or directly opposed the women’s struggles (Arnfred, 1988:10).  It is evident that 
women’s liberation was promoted only when women were needed in the overall struggle 
for independence. When Mozambique was finally liberated and FRELIMO took power 
men were not ready to share power with women, resulting in traditional gender roles being 
reinforced (Coulter et al., 2008:30).   Barth argues that if women leave their traditional 
gender roles this will clearly affect gender relations in general, and ultimately also 
necessitate changes on the part of men, although alternative male gender roles are not on 
the agenda of many poor, post-conflict states in Africa today (Barth, 2002:22). Fuest (2008) 
states that the post-conflict settings may bring about windows of opportunity with regard to 
equality between women and men and the expansion of traditional gender norms.   But, as 
noticed by Coulter et al., such changes will not come easily. It is of fundamental 
102 
 
importance that these opportunities are acknowledged and seized; otherwise, there is a risk 
that peace will come as a disappointment (Coulter et al., 2008:30). 
 
According to Coulter et al., (2008:31), in post-war Mozambique, it has been observed that 
female combatants looked back at their experience in FRELIMO and Destacamento 
Feminino (DF) with nostalgia as they felt that their participation in the liberation struggle 
had broadened their horizons and expanded and extended their independence from their 
families. During the war, female combatants felt that they were equal to the men, but after 
the war this was no longer true. Arnfred notes that women felt that after the war men took 
back what they had lost in the way of patriarchal power and many women expressed anger 
that they had been forgotten by their one-time supporters (Arnfred, 1988:7).  According to 
West, the post-independence period was the most traumatic experience for female ex-
combatants as they said that FRELIMO had abandoned them.  The promises made to DF 
about the empowerment of women were never fulfilled.   Leadership roles for women were 
inadequate and the employment market was non-existent.   Many female ex-combatants 
also lacked social networks because they had left their families as girls or young women, 
and also because they had not married during the war.  Many found it difficult to get 
married as they said that men – even former guerrillas – did not want equal partners in 
marriage after the war.   Men complained that former DFs were too aggressive and 
independent to be married (West, 2000:189). Mckay and Mazurana (2004:34) state that in 
the UN and government DDR programmes that followed the end of the war between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO in 1992 male combatants were prioritised even though girls 
constituted up to 40 percent of the minors in the RENAMO.   It has been observed that only 
a small number of female ex-fighters participated in Mozambique’s DDR and most did not 
receive any support at all from the government.   The reason for this was that the 
FRELIMO government did not want to acknowledge or collect evidence of their use of 
girls (Mackay and Mazurana, 2004:35).   An additional reason for female ex-fighters not 
being present for demobilisation could have been that they were deliberately excluded or 




4.4.4 Female ex-combatants in Eritrea 
In Eritrea, a study of female ex-combatants found that their reintegration is more difficult 
than male combatants.  While Eritrean female ex-combatants experienced relative equality 
during the independence struggle, their newfound freedom disappeared soon after the end 
of the war; this was regardless of the fact that the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF), which won the war, had particularly stressed that it was also fighting for gender 
equality. During the war, female fighters gained significant equality with male fighters but 
when the war ended these young women were again confronted by patriarchal Eritrean 
society. On the political and legal level, women are deemed equal but, in practice, 
patriarchal traditions are deeply rooted in civil society (Klingebiel, Gärke, Kreidler, Lobner 
and Schütte, 1995).Barth observes that many Eritrean female ex-fighters felt that the years 
of war were preferable to the post-war period.  Within the EPLF they had felt respected, 
equal and empowered but these were all lost after the war when women were pushed 
towards traditional gender roles (Barth, 2002:34).     
 
Mehreteab (2007:29) observes that when the DDR process started in Eritrea it was decided 
that women were going to be treated in the same way as men and that at least one-third of 
the trainees in the programmes should be women.   Women were also trained in 
traditionally female fields such as mat-weaving, basket-making, tailoring, embroidery and 
typing.  This did not generate enough income opportunities, so this support was phased out 
in 1995.  However, training in traditionally male trades did not automatically make them 
employable.   Female ex-fighters had a hard time getting married after the war as men 
asserted that these women had lost their femininity during the war.  Many male ex-fighters 
divorced their fighter wives for this reason and married civilian women (Mehreteab, 
2007:34).  Therefore, female ex-fighters, despite being empowered and treated equally 
during the war, faced cruel challenges afterwards. Persson (2005:42) notes that on 
occasion, even female ex-combatants from fighting forces where the status of women and 
girls was low in general, or who had been abducted, abused or kept as sex slaves, said they 
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missed being in the armed forces. Bearing in mind how hard life was for most women and 
girls in armed conflicts, such statements seem to point to the complexity of the civilian life 
facing female ex-combatants after leaving the military.  Surely, such views reveal just how 
challenging surviving peace is for female ex-fighters. When male and female ex-
combatants return to civil society they are received differently; while men are supposed to 
have strengthened their gender role through fighting, women are increasingly marginalised 

























Table 4.1 summarises the efficiency of DDR programs in the aforementioned countries as 
far as female ex-combatants are concerned. 
 
Table 4.1 Efficiency of DDR programmes vis-à-vis female ex-combatants in some 
countries 




Reasons or observations 
Sierra Leone Not known Less than half  Poor design of DDR programme 
Pretext that females did not have 
weapons 
Desire to conceal that young 
women had been soldiers 




Poor design of DDR programme 
(underestimation of the number of 
female ex-combatants to be 
demobilized) 
Poor planning 
Poor definition of the term 
‘beneficiary’ that disadvantages 
females 
Resistance of females themselves 
who get back to the traditional 
schema of gender roles 
Gender discrimination 
Mozambique 40% of all the 
ex-combatants 
Very few Men’s patriarchy (do not want to 
share power with women) 
Government wants to conceal the 
use of girls in the military 
Lack of information 
Gender discrimination 
Eritrea 1/3 of the 
beneficiaries  
1/3 Females could not get value from 
the programme, because they were 
trained in non-marketable trades. 
Persistence of gender discrimination 




4.5 Female ex-combatants’ participation in DDR programmes 
Many female ex-combatants are reported to have severe difficulties in adapting to civilian 
life for different reasons. In conflicts such as the liberation wars in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and 
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Mozambique female combatants had relatively high status positions within the fighting 
forces. Women and girls joined these movements partly because women’s rights and 
equality for both men and women were included in the overall liberation ideology, but at 
the time of peace women’s expectations of what their struggle should have resulted in were 
seldom fulfilled (Coulter, 2008:30). 
 
For Barth (2002:20), it was surprising to hear many Eritrean female ex-combatants 
expressing their views that the war years were preferable to the time that came afterwards. 
They described the war years as a time when they were treated as equals and experienced 
empowerment. When the war was over, all of this was lost as women were expected to 
return to their traditional gender roles and status. DDR practitioners have noticed the fact 
that many female ex-combatants choose not to take part in official DDR programmes 
because they simply panic, or they think that they have nothing to gain.   It can be a 
question of security with regard to the demobilisation camps.   The facilities in Sierra 
Leone were perceived to be dangerous for women and girls because of the large numbers of 
men and inadequate protection (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:28). Watteville observed that 
on some occasions female combatants in Mozambique and Zimbabwe never showed up 
during encampment for demobilisation.  She argues that this may have been because they 
were not informed or were intentionally excluded.   In Mozambique the encampment phase 
lasted several months, and soldiers became increasingly aggressive, stressed by their 
immobility and inactivity in the poorly-equipped camps. Watteville concluded that had 
women been present, their security would have been at risk if no measures to protect them 
had been put in place, such as armed guards and fenced female quarters (Watteville, 
2002:6). 
 
However, female ex-fighters may also not turn up for disarmament and demobilisation out 
of fear of having their identity as former combatants disclosed. This issue has not been 
critically dealt with in the planning and implementing of DDR programmes.  There is often 
a high degree of stigma attached to being a female combatant, and women and girls may 
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feel that registering at the DDR centres will result in further social exclusion by the civilian 
community. Given that female fighters are not easily accepted back into civil society and 
are often looked upon with fear and suspicion, these concerns may be justified.  Therefore, 
DDR might become counterproductive for the reintegration of female ex-combatants. One 
effect is that female ex-fighters will self-demobilise and therefore not receive the assistance 
or benefits they are entitled to as ex-combatants (Coulter et al., 2008:26-27). 
 
4.6 The exclusion of female ex-combatants 
In most African countries, female ex-combatants have been excluded from DDR 
programmes. Mazurana’s study of female fighters from Angola, Burundi, the DRC, 
Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, 
found that the majority of the women and girls within the armed forces neither participated 
in nor benefited from DDR programmes.  Among the number of reasons given, the main 
issue was that women were excluded because they had not been identified as ‘combatants’ 
(Mazurana, 2005:33).The reason why DDR programmes do not work actively to include 
girls and women could be that female combatants also perform additional roles – they are 
labourers, ‘wives’, girlfriends, domestic workers, farmers – and this can cause confusion 
over who is a fighter and who is not. They are regularly represented, incorrectly, as being 
only dependants or wives of male fighters, and few efforts are made to determine whether 
in fact they were also combatants (McCay and Mazurana, 2004:120).   The different roles 
played by female combatants, according to Brett and Specht, could prevent the UN, aid 
organisations, and civilians from considering girls and women as ‘real’ fighters, excluding 
them from the process of demobilisation (Brett and Specht, 2004:99).  Enloe (2000:37) 
notes that women and children associated in one way or another with male soldiers are still 
in general considered as ‘camp followers’.   She argues that in the late twentieth century, 
females who have been mobilised to serve the military’s needs are still vulnerable to the 
stereotype of camp follower – dispensable, disreputable – no matter how professional their 
formal position is in the military (Enloe, 2000:40).  Women’s participation in war-related 
activity may be overlooked because stereotypical notions of gender-appropriate labour are, 
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most of the time, remobilised after war, when a society strives to return to “normal” (Farr, 
2002:7).  The literature notes that the DDR programmes in some African countries such as 
Sierra Leone and Liberia require a combatant to produce a weapon in order to be identified 
as a combatant; this poses a problem for many women’s and girls’ demobilization as it 
excludes them from benefiting from the DDR programmes. 
 
The exclusion of female ex-combatants from decision-making has a negative impact when 
demilitarisation is set in motion, because women who have seen active combat are even 
more marginalised than other women in the society under reconstruction: they do not 
occupy a position that can be easily reconciled with predominant gender ideologies, and 
militarised women pose a unique set of challenges in the demobilisation phase (Farr, 
2002:8).  Ranchod-Nilsson (2001) observes that unlike male combatants, female 
combatants are drummed out of the army; excluded from new political structures; refused 
access to retraining or land; overlooked in veteran’s organisations; and regarded with fear 
and suspicion when they attempt to return to the lives they lived before war broke out.  
Women who contradict the stereotype of appropriate female behaviour (through active 
participation in the violence associated with war) “are regarded as more deviant or 
unnatural than men” (Byrne, 1996:18).  Thus, to address the challenges faced by female 
combatants after war, demobilisation planners may have to recognise the different needs of 
combatants of both genders, and not assume that one action plan will be suitable for all ex-
fighters (Farr, 2002:8). 
 
As stated above, girls and women combatants face special problems after war.  DDR 
programmes often ignore their problems. Turshen and Twagiramariya (1998) highlighted in 
Teckla, (1998) observe that in some countries where there is a severely restrictive gender 
ideology after war, female combatants who were active in the conflict, in whatever roles 
they played, are likely to become invisible in demobilisation process because of the threat 
they pose to this ideology.  The DDR process represents an opportunity to lay the 
groundwork for long-term changes in the political status of women combatants (Farr, 
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2002:24). Special attention is required to ensure that women and girls are included in DDR 
programmes and that women also benefit from reconstruction efforts, otherwise DDR 
activities run the risk of widening gender inequalities.   
 
4.7 Female ex-combatants and the gender issue 
As far as DDR of female combatants is concerned, Watteville (2002:11) has drawn 
attention to gender issues in official demobilisation and reintegration programmes in post-
conflict contexts. Mazurana et al. (2002:31) report that the disarmament and demobilisation 
programme in Mozambique gathered no data on how many women were linked to the rebel 
movement.  In Angola, thousands of boys were formally demobilised compared to no girls, 
even though there was systematic evidence that large numbers of girls had been abducted 
and forced to be part of the Angolan armed forces. In the South Sudan, Bouta (2005) 
highlights that DDR programmes had become associated with security risks, unfairness to 
female combatants, and other poor outcomes, and that establishing criteria for participation 
in DDR quickly presented particular challenges. In fact, the 21-year civil war in South 
Sudan had involved the entire Southern population in one way or another, and distinctions 
between civilians and combatant generally, and specifically between female-ex-combatants 
and the society on the other side - were often difficult to establish (Bouta, 2005). Once 
again, this reinforces the idea that female ex-combatants should be involved in planning 
and carrying out any programme developed for them.    
 
Investigation should also be conducted into whether distinct cultural and religious rituals 
could be used to help girls re-integrate, as well as the role of gender-specific psychosocial 
support in assisting reintegration and healing (Mazurana et al., 2002:32).  The host 
community could be prepared to receive female combatants before they arrive because 
sometimes the community do not trust them. According Farr, (2002:32) gender-aware 
demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants is important because it 
formally recognises female’s participation in armed conflict, but can also prove a catalyst to 
increasing the participation of women in political life in the post war period, and  support to 
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long-term peace building.  Farr (2002:34) concludes that feminist accounts of 
reconstruction after war have indicated that “the process by which people become aware 
that gender roles are not fixed in stone but are adapted to meet changing social 
circumstances will, in the long term, aid the development of a social and political 
environment which facilitates positive changes in women’s status”.  The potential social 
benefits of this shift in perceptions are enormous, as there is growing evidence that there is 
a higher rate of success in peace processes in which women play a significant role 
(Anderlini, 2000; Cock, 2001; Hill, 2001).UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 
“Women, Peace and Security” was passed on 31 October 2000.  Point 13 of the Resolution 
specifically addresses DDR programmes and notes that the UN “encourages all those 
involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration to consider the 
different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of 
their dependants”.  The Resolution also notes “the importance of their equal participation 
and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, 
and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and 
resolution”. However, in the eight years since its inception the Resolution has rarely been 
implemented and there are no built-in mechanisms of accountability or follow-up 
procedures (Coulter et al., 2008:25).  Resolution 1325 commits governments to find ways 
to help women, including ex-combatants, to participate in post-war reconstruction.   
 
Peace building and advancement of human rights would be strengthened if Resolution 1325 
were to be implemented (Farr, 2002).  Female combatants would be enabled to play an 
important role in the reconstruction of country as peace builders. The Cape Town 
Principles (CTP) addresses the fact that many child soldiers  involved in African wars are 
below the age of 18 and, therefore, do not fall within the official category of children. In 
1997, UNICEF and the NGO working group on the Convention of the Rights of the Child 
held a symposium in South Africa. The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices were a 
product of this symposium.  The document specifically addresses the prevention of the 
recruitment of children into the armed forces as well as the demobilisation and social re-
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integration of child soldiers in Africa.  One of the recommendations is that the definition of 
child soldier should be: 
any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular 
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, 
porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as 
family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage.  
It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms 
(Coulter et al., 2008:25).   
There have been some attempts to extend the definition of combatants, but although both 
UN Resolution 1325 and the CTP address this issue, and have included those not bearing 
arms  in the category of combatants, this has not improved the situation for female fighters 
who continue to be excluded from DDR efforts.  If the goal is to include all combatants, 
including women and girls, it is essential to understand the mechanisms behind female 
fighters’ lack of access to official DDR programmes and the reasons why they sometimes 
choose not to participate (Coulter et al., 2008:25). 
 
The Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 set the stage for women’s 
needs in conflict and post-conflict zones to be better addressed.  The following strategic 
objectives were set:  
• to increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making 
levels, 
• to protect women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign 
occupation, 
• to promote non-violent forms of conflict resolution and reduce the incidence of 
human rights abuse in conflict situations, 
• to promote women’s contribution to fostering a culture of peace, 
• to provide protection, assistance and training to refugee women, other displaced 




It has been noted that the changes the women go through during wars make them reluctant 
to go home.   Female ex-combatants should be assisted to find alternative ways of living.    
Education and training may help as there is a need to value the skills that ex-combatants 
have gained within armed groups.   
 
4.8 Female ex-combatants and the skills gained 
It is evident that useful skills gained during war are often not recognised in peacetime.   In 
Eritrea, female fighters learned a number of skills, apart from the actual combat and 
shooting. They were, for example, involved in public administration, health, construction, 
teaching, electronics, and communications on the frontline. Unfortunately, these 
qualifications were not accepted by civil society because they could not be formally 
confirmed (Barth, 2002). Mazurana observed that skills developed by female fighters 
during conflict could be built upon in post-conflict settings. It is therefore important to 
identify which activities female fighters undertook during war and conflict and what skills 
they acquired.   Some of the skills that were identified in Mazurana’s study were: medical 
skills, military intelligence work, management skills, decision-making skills, negotiation 
skills, mediation and conflict resolution skills, searching for common ground and 
mobilising women (and men). Such skills could be well-utilised in livelihood activities in 
post-conflict settings (Mazurana, 2005:41).Those responsible for planning and 
implementing programmes for reintegration should therefore be made aware of which skills 
women and girls may possess so that these skills can be made use of and strengthened. As 
Mazurana and Carlson state, when women and girls are treated as passive victims or 
‘dependants’, with no acknowledgement of the skills and resources they have achieved, 
female ex-combatants are again exposed to control over their lives and a sense of loss of 
dignity. Thus, DDR programmes risk losing remarkable social capital that could be of 




4.9 Female ex-combatants and education 
After the end of the struggle, the majority of female ex-combatants want to receive an 
education when they return to civilian life.  As many young women and girls lost 
educational opportunities due to the war they feel a strong need to access education for 
themselves and their children once the war is over (Coulter, 2008:22).  According to 
Mazurana, this wish was especially expressed by women who had been abducted or 
pressured into the armed forces, been held as forced wives or had given birth to children as 
result of these unwanted relationships.  He argues that, of all the groups returning from the 
war, young mothers were most often stigmatised (Mazurana, 2005:29).These young women 
probably saw education as their opportunity to regain control over their lives and to offer 
their children a brighter future (Coulter, 2008:22).   As Veale reports, female ex-combatants 
felt that being educated also meant being independent. These women ex-fighters focus 
mainly on economic independence and/or having political awareness (Veale, 2003:11). 
 
4.10 Female ex-combatants and health issues 
It has been observed by several DDR practitioners that many female ex-fighters return from 
war with physical and psychological health problems. Given the extent of sexual violence, 
a major problem for young women who have been associated with the armed forces is 
sexually-transmitted diseases. However, McKay and Mazurana (2004:62) note that few are 
diagnosed and treated unless they go through a rehabilitation or interim care centre where 
such services are offered or if primary medical care is provided by an NGO, but in war-torn 
countries there is an almost total absence of sexual and reproductive health services.  In 
order to prevent further infections, female ex-combatants must be informed and educated 
before they are discharged as the demobilisation phase presents a unique opportunity to do 
this. In the most of cases, they are tested during the demobilisation process. Post-war 
trauma is a major health issue for many girls and women ex-fighters. These traumas are 
medical, psychological and social, and must thus be dealt with in all their aspects.  In many 
African post-conflict zones, various kinds of traditional healers provide trauma counselling 
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at both individual and social levels.  Female combatants tend to turn to these healers.  
Churches and other religious institutions are also very active in helping women deal with 
trauma (Utas, 2004:14). 
 
4.11 Female ex-combatants and stigmatization 
Female ex-combatants feel stigmatised when they return to civil society.  They are looked 
upon not only with suspicion and fear but also are viewed typically as perpetrators of 
violence who have violated established gender roles.  The feelings of shame begin when 
they are called a ‘rebel’ or accused of having a ‘rebel child’. In this and many other cases 
the issue is less a sense of personal guilt than of social shame (Coulter, 2008:35).   The 
social stigma of having been ex-combatants pushes them often times to hide their past and 
result in them turning their backs to the option of drawing from the benefits they are 
entitled to from the DDR programmes (Persson, 2005:28).    Another effect of having been 
a female combatant is the difficulty of getting married. This is of great importance in many 
African societies as marriage is seen as mandatory for women. Unmarried women are 
sometimes likened to social outsiders (Mckay 2007:393).  
 
From Persson’s observations in Sierra Leone and Uganda, female ex-combatants were 
worried about their marriage prospects. The female ex-combatants often discovered that 
when the war was over, men preferred civilian women, those without battle scars, women 
who were sexually ‘untouched’.  In both countries, men said that they preferred not to 
marry a woman who has been associated with the armed forces.  Female ex-fighters were 
believed to have been sexually active with many men, but what seemed more important 
was that men feared that these women would be unpredictable and aggressive due to their 
past experiences (Persson, 2005:40).In Eritrea, for example, it has been observed that most 
female ex-combatants who were married did so with male ex-fighters, and that most male 
ex-fighters were married to civilian women.  By contrast, female ex-fighters were hardly 
ever married to civilian men (Barth, 2002:26). Similar observations were also made by 
West after the Mozambican liberation struggle. Female ex-combatants said that men, even 
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male ex-combatants, did not want equal partners after the war. Men complained that the 
female ex-fighters were too aggressive and independent to be appropriate marital partners 
(West, 2000:190).  This could be interpreted as meaning that even though female ex-
combatants were highly respected within the armed forces, they were not preferred 
marriage partners in the aftermath of war due to their war-time actions, and that they faced 
stigmatisation (Coulter, 2008:36).  In this way, the female ex-combatants often found 
themselves further marginalized and effectively inhibited from fitting into or transitioning 
seamlessly into civilian life -- unlike many of their male ex-combatants.  
 
4.12 Female ex-combatants in the post-war situation 
It has been shown that the post-war situation of female ex-combatants is not unknown to 
the national and international institutions dealing with post-war rehabilitation.  Women 
have frequently been identified as the most vulnerable category in war-torn societies.   
However, little funding has been allocated to projects targeting them, particularly if they 
are ex-combatants.  Despite the goodwill of the UN and NGOs, the types of vocational 
training offered to war-affected women are often not geared towards securing an income 
for girls and women.  The training programmes are often too short and there is a lack of 
training materials.  The variety and differentiation in the types of training is also extremely 
limited and demonstrate a lack of vision more than anything else (Utas, 2005:16). Most 
programmes in post-war projects targeting female ex-combatants are not successful in 
terms of economic viability. Although few women can actually manage to make a living 
from the skills they learn, many women revealed that the projects provide them with 
something new.  Some said that these types of project make them more self-confident and 
help them to cope better socially.   For women known to be marginalised and stigmatised in 
African post-war societies, this is significant. Some projects, although unintentionally, 
seemed more successful as a form of ‘trauma healing’ or ‘psycho-social activity’ than they 





4.13 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter discussed the implementation of DDR Programmes. The key themes arising 
from the literature on DDR programmes were discussed. The chapter also examined female 
ex-combatants and the DDR processes. It has been noted that most female ex-combatants 
do not join official programmes, and therefore do not benefit from such programmes. 
Female ex-combatants become invisible when guns fall silent and/or they do not join 
national armies.  An overview of the situation of female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the DRC, and Eritrea was presented.  Finally, the chapter 
discussed the participation of female ex-combatants in DDR processes, their exclusion, 
female ex-combatants and gender issue, the skills they gained during the struggle, 
education, and health issues and stigmatisation, as well as the situation of female ex-
combatants in the post-conflict situation.  In re-integrating female ex-fighters, in line with 
the  findings of this chapter, it is crucial to examine their social position and the links 
between being able to make a living and social well-being, and between economy and 





Data presentation and analysis: 
Rwanda Demobilization and Reinsertion Commission 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Since the Rwandan war and genocide in 1994, the government has been engaged in re-
establishing state institutions and re-organising the public administration for better service 
delivery.  During the period 1994-1997, the focus was on restoring the public 
administration structures and reconstructing the basic social and physical infrastructure that 
were destroyed during the war and genocide.  One of the programmes that were introduced 
was the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants.  The selection of combatants for 
demobilisation was left to the Ministry of Defence, while the process of demobilisation and 
reintegration was entrusted to the Rwanda Demobilisation and Re-integration Commission 
(RDRC).  With the above in mind, this chapter examines the work of the RDRC with 
specific focus on its prosecution of its official mandate.  It discusses the main activities 
performed by the RDRC that are re-grouped in four issue areas: demobilisation and 
repatriation of armed groups, reinsertion, economic reintegration, and social reintegration. 
In essence, the chapter will assess the nexus between the mission and objectives of the 
RDRC and the data collected on the reintegration of Rwandan female ex-combatants.  The 
researcher solicited and collected data on the views and opinions of key informants, 
including local leaders, military officers, RDRC Commissioners and the female ex-
combatants themselves with respect to the nature and extent of their reintegration into 
civilian life.   
 
5.2 The Rwanda Demobilization and Re-integration Commission 
The RDRC is located in Kigali Urban Province, Kacyiru District, in the suburb of Remera.   
It came into existence as part of the Arusha Peace Agreement of August 1993 between the 
RPF and the former Rwandan Government.  Although Protocol III of the agreement 
provided for integration of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) into the Rwanda Defence 
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Forces (RDF), the opposite actually occurred: the ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR) 
members were integrated into the RPA. According to the Arusha Accord, any excess 
number of military personnel was to be demobilised. At the end of the war, and given the 
associated genocide and massacres, the former government had calculated that it needed to 
maintain and sustain a large army.   In reality, it was now a mixture of both armies, taking 
into account the absorption of ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises into the RPA during and after 
the war. As a result, demobilisation became a priority, especially considering the scarcity of 
national resources.   The RDRC was formed in January 1997 to effectively implement and 
achieve the demobilisation and to oversee the reintegration process. The RDRC has a 
mandate to oversee the planning and implementation of the Rwanda Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Programme (RDRP). The RDRP is currently in its third stage since January 
2009. Stage I started in 1997 and ended in 2000, while Stage II started in 2001 and ended in 
2008.  
 
5.2.1 Mission and objectives of the RDRC 
As noted earlier, the following tasks were assigned to the RDRC: 
• To reduce the expanded RPA or the actual RDF to a size that is economically 
sustainable (freeing up resources for economic and social development). 
• To achieve the successful reintegration of demobilised RPA veterans and ex-child 
soldiers (Kadogo) in such a manner that they are able to contribute to national unity and 
economic development. 
• To reintegrate ex-FARs returnees into civilian life (RDRC, 1998). 
 
The four principal objectives of the RDRC are to: 
• Demobilise an estimated 20,000 ex-combatants from RPA/RDF and 12,500 
members of armed groups and support their transition to civilian life in the spirit of the 
Arusha Agreement;   
• Support the reinsertion of up to 13,000 ex-FAR troops;  
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• Support the social and economic reintegration of all ex-combatants to be 
demobilised in Stage II (2001-2008) and all Stage I (1997-2000) ex-combatants who 
remain socially and economically vulnerable; Under RDRP stage III which started in 2009, 
the Government of Rwanda aims to demobilise and support the social and economic 
reintegration of up to 4,000 ex-combatants from the RDF and 5,500 members of Rwandan 
Armed Groups operating mainly from Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The 
programme also includes support to dependants of ex-combatants from the armed groups 
who returned with them from the jungles. 
• Facilitate the reallocation of government expenditure from defence to the social and 
economic sectors (RDRC, 1998). 
 











Source: Adapted from RDRC, http://www.rdrc.org.rw/mainstreaming.phpDecember 2011. 
 
The Rwandan government also adopted the following guiding principles for the RDRP: 
• Target all ex-combatants irrespective of previous military affiliations; 
• Affiliation in the interests of national reconciliation; 
• Allowing ex-combatants to choose their community of settlement and path to their 
economic re-integration; 
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• Ensuring consistency and fairness, by providing all assistance to ex-combatants 
through the RDRP, developed and supervised by the RDRC; 
• Relying on existing government structures to the fullest extent possible in order to 
build sustainable capacities beyond the programme’s duration; and 
• Addressing pension and social security issues for ex-combatants outside the RDRP, 
in accordance with their respective terms and conditions of service. 
 
5.2.2 Activities of the RDRC 
The activities of the Commission focus on demobilisation and the reintegration of ex-
combatants.  The socio-economic reintegration process includes more than a dozen, diverse 
focal areas: 
• Preparing ex-combatants for a new civilian life 
• Reinsertion 
• Reintegration: fighting poverty and fostering unity 
• Vulnerability support: grants for widows 
• Formal education 
• Vocational training 
• Apprenticeships: as they learn, they earn 
• Support to cooperatives formed by ex-combatants 
• Adult literacy 
• Employment 
• Child ex-combatants: rehabilitation and reintegration 
• Vocational training for child ex-combatants 
• Medical treatment and rehabilitation for disabled ex-combatants 
• Psychological support 
• Information and sensitisation activities 
 
In order to better assess policy implementation and effectiveness, the key focal activities of 
the RDRC are re-grouped into four issue areas that are mapped in this section: (1) 
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demobilisation and repatriation (2) reinsertion (3) economic reintegration and (4) social 
reintegration.  
 
5.2.2.1 Demobilization and repatriation of members of armed groups 
5.2.2.1.1 Demobilization 
The soldiers to be demobilized were selected by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on the 
basis of a recommendation by the army.  At the brigade level, committees composed of the 
brigade commander, the head of intelligence, a medical doctor, a social worker and the 
person responsible for civil-military relations drew up the initial lists.  These lists were 
forwarded to the army headquarters, where the chief of staff and his deputy prepared the 
final recommendation. It should be emphasised that demobilization was open to members 
of all services of the RPA.  The fundamental criteria for being included in the 
demobilization were disability, age and health status.   Those who wanted to pursue their 
education were also allowed to leave. This applied particularly to those who had joined the 
armed forces during the war, but did not have any intention of becoming professional 
soldiers.   After the selection for demobilization, the RDRC visited the relevant army units 
to conduct a socio-economic survey of all soldiers to be demobilised and these soldiers 
were then transported to the demobilization camp where they were given information, 
among other things, on their entitlements, their opportunities for economic reintegration, 
and the general challenges of their reintegration into civilian life.   Before leaving the camp, 
combatants were registered and their records were checked and updated.  Each was then 
given a demobilisation card and the first financial instalment.   The ex-combatants were 







Table 5.1 Demobilization up to 2007 
Affiliation Target Demobilised % of target 
RDF 22 000 22 362 101.6% 
Ex-FAR 13 000 12 969 99.7% 
Ex-AGs 12 500 6 397 51.1% 
This includes 661child ex-soldiers (RDRC, 2007). 
Table 5.1 illustrates that one of the key problems facing the RDRC is the repatriation of 
members of armed groups (AGs). In 2007, only 51.1% of ex-AGs were demobilized. Since 
2006, the RDRC has increased its capacity to receive these ex-combatants. The programme 
also supports the dependants of returning members of AGs with reinsertion packages in 
order to assure them that their families will be secure while they are undergoing 
demobilization (RDRC, 2007). From December 2001 to 31 May 2007, the RDRC 
demobilized 20,039 RDF soldiers, 12,310 ex-FAR, 5,873 ex-AG combatants, and 624 ex-
AG child soldiers. These totals include 57 women and 2 girls (RDRC, 2008). 
 
The demobilization of RDF soldiers began in April 2002 and ended in 2006. The formal 
criteria for demobilizing RDF soldiers included illness, disability and age. Every RDF 
soldier received a demobilization allowance amounting to three times their last monthly 
pay. Ex-combatants from AGs were usually disarmed in the DRC by MONUC before being 
transported to the Mutobo demobilization camp in northern Rwanda. To be eligible for 
Stage II, all ex-combatants went through sensitization training in “solidarity camps” 
(ingando) as part of their demobilization. This training covered Rwandan history, civic 
education, national unity and reconciliation, traditional justice (gacaca), micro-financing 
and public health (particularly HIV/AIDS). The length of the sensitization training varied: 
ex-RDF and ex-FAR combatants completed two-week courses, while ex-AG combatants 
attended two-month courses in a separate camp (Mutobo in northern Rwanda). Ex-FAR 
who passed through solidarity camp (ingando) uring Stage I, were given refresher courses 
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during Stage II. While ingando has been criticized as political propaganda, the ex-FAR and 
ex-AG fighters researcher interviewed generally expressed satisfaction with the training.  
 
5.2.2.1.2 Repatriation of members of ex-armed groups 
The RDRC has met its target goals for demobilising RDF and ex-FAR soldiers, but has 
only reached a third of its goal for ex-combatants from the AGs in Congo. In 2005, 664 
members of AGs out of the revised target of 3,000 were repatriated and received at the 
Mutobo Demobilisation Centre (DC).   It had initially been estimated that 12,000 members 
of ex-AGs would repatriate in the first year, but this was revised downwards before mid-
year to 3,000.   Of the 664 repatriated ex-AGs combatants, 653 were from the DRC, while 
11 were from Congo Brazzaville.   The United Nations Mission in DRC (MONUC) brought 
in 592, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR 11, while 61 
surrendered to the Rwandan government authorities near the DRC borders. In addition to 
the ex-AGs combatants, 687 civilian repatriates were also received at Mutobo DC.   Out of 
the 687 civilians, 242 were dependants of ex-AGs members while the rest (445) were 
civilians who initially presented themselves as returning members of the AGs (RDRC, 
2006). 
 
5.2.2.2  Reinsertion 
Reinsertion is designed as a transitional stage for each ex-combatant, although it is also 
necessary to provide help with their family members’ basic requirements. The main 
objective is to ensure the return of former combatants to their communities, and facilitate a 
financially sustainable position for them and their families for at least a limited period. 
They are given a basic subsistence kit: enough food for three months and basic survival 
tools valued at around US$100. These services, along with other forms of assistance and 
advice on reinsertion, are also extended to the people demobilised during Stage I.  In terms 
of reinsertion, all ex-combatants demobilised in Stage II have received a Basic Needs Kit 
(BNK) equivalent to Rwf60,000 each (approximately US$100) as a once-off payment to 
facilitate their initial transition to civilian life in order to buy food, seed, tools, basic 
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household items and transport to their community or settlement. In addition to the BNK, all 
former professional soldiers (ex-RDF and ex-FAR) received a Recognition of Services 
Allowance (RSA) as part of their reinsertion assistance.  The amount is differentiated by 
rank, ranging from Rwf180,000 (approximatelyUS$300) for a private to Rwf600,000 
(approximately US$1, 000) for a colonel.   The RSA is paid in two instalments.  The first 
(RSA1) of Rwf60,000 was paid after one month of settlement in the community for ex-
RDF or registration with the RDRP for ex-FAR, and the balance is paid two months later. 
This instalment system was not well-received by ex-combatants; they would prefer to 
collect it all at one time. As of May 2007, 38,846 ex-combatants, including 260 women, 
had benefited from reinsertion support while 40,068 ex-combatants, including 346 females, 
received reintegration funds. The most vulnerable ex-combatants are eligible for a once-off 
payment.  
 
Table 5.2 Structure of payment 
Ranks Reinsertion Stage 
Reintegration Stage 
Other potential benefits 
Bonus Training 
1st month 3rd month 6th month   
Privates US$ 100 US$ 100 US$ 200 US$ 220 US$ 720 
Colonels US$ 100 US$ 300 US$ 700 US$ 220 US$ 720 
Source: Author, 2011. 
 
Ex-combatants are able to choose the place they will be reintegrated; this is an attempt to 
minimise market distortions and it involves the communities that combatants will be 
joining.  Six months after signing up, members of the former RPA receive a bonus of 
US$220, with special attention paid to the most vulnerable groups. Ex-combatants also 
receive a subsidy up to US$720 for university studies or other training of their own choice. 
The RDRC established four Veteran Field Offices (VFOs) and deployed staff there to 
receive the veterans, and help solve their problems and provide them with guidance as they 
settled into civilian life. The offices were established in four different zones where large 
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numbers of veterans were expected to resettle. The main functions of the VFOs are the 
following: 
• To oversee the veterans’ economic and social reintegration and initiate corrective 
measures when required. 
• To undertake, with the collaboration of the local administration, regular tours of the 
districts in order to sensitise the communities to facilitate the reintegration of the veterans. 
• To prepare and submit monthly reports to the Commission on the progress of the 
programme’s implementation in their province. 
 
5.2.2.3  Economic reintegration 
The main effort to support the socio-economic reintegration of combatants into civilian life 
has been the establishment and implementation of a micro-credit scheme implemented by 
the Commercial Bank of Rwanda (CBR) with whom the RDRC concluded a memorandum 
of understanding. Economic reintegration aims to provide sustainable living conditions for 
a limited period, thus avoiding the creation of a culture of dependence.  The possibility of 
creating employment in the long-term is closely linked with the role played by the private 
sector, with emphasis on ex-combatants as a resource and in terms of their contribution to 
the civilian economy. For example, through the Reintegration Grant and Vulnerability 
Support Window, the RDRP provides ex-combatants with economic support to help them 
achieve sustainable livelihoods by supporting their economic projects via the RG. The 
programme also gives additional support to ex-combatants who remain vulnerable after 
exhausting all their benefits through the VSW. All ex-combatants that receive RG are 
sensitised on profitable investment.   Through sensitisation and training, ex-combatants 
have formed associations that are generating income. Despite the limited employment 
opportunities in the country, the RDRP continues to advocate for ex-combatants’ 
employment.  Indeed, ex-combatants’ associations are getting financial support through 




Generally, the programmes provide economic reintegration assistance and access to 
employment through job counselling and referral services, skills development, micro-
enterprise support schemes, rural development activities and employment promotion 
activities.  A number of individuals and groups of ex-combatants benefited from training 
support provided by the programme and its partners.   This mainly relates to building 
economic skills through training in entrepreneurship, project planning and management, 
agriculture, waste management, and painting. Individual ex-combatants received 
sponsorship from the German Technical Co-operation (GTZ), and were skilled in welding, 
plumbing, electrical installation, masonry, carpentry, motor vehicle mechanics, bricklaying 
and construction. The reintegration process only starts when ex-combatants come face-to-
face with the socio-economic realities of civilian life in their chosen resettlement 
communities.  The transformation from military to civilian life is a long process that 
requires a lot of effort not only on the part of ex-combatants, but from all relevant groups, 
especially the recipient community.  For the ex-combatants and the community to come to 
terms with reality, both parties require substantial support, be it social or economic.  The 
RDRP is the main broker of such support.  Reintegration support to the individual ex-
combatants is targeted at helping them initiate economic self-sustenance while re-
establishing them in the social fabric of the community. 
 
In the general context of the Rwandan community, life involves access to (or, preferably, 
acquisition of) personal shelter, opportunities for subsistence and economic prosperity, and 
access to social services for oneself and one’s children (the main social services being 
health and education, both of which can be either formal or informal).   It also involves 
cross-cutting issues such as the needs of special groups (women, the disabled and the 
chronically ill, as well as children).Ex-combatants have been taught how to work together; 
the net result is that a sizable number became active members of different associations.  
The RDRC constantly supports these associations, mainly in the area of institutional 
capacity building, through facilitation of training in different relevant aspects such as 
project planning and management, entrepreneurship, agro-business, and HIV/AIDS 
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awareness and prevention. At an individual level, the RDRP has facilitated counselling on 
the rational use of their benefits to enable a number of vulnerable ex-combatants to acquire 
and develop marketable skills.  Many have used their programme benefits to acquire formal 
education, or skills training and development, which have boosted their competitiveness in 
the labour market.  On the other hand, a sizable number of ex-combatants have invested 
their benefits in income-generating activities (IGAs) and/or the acquisition of shelter.  
However, a lot remains to be done as homelessness, unemployment, a lack of marketable 
skills, HIV/AIDS, and lack of access to land remain major challenges to the effective 
reintegration of ex-combatants. To address the issue of shelter, the RDRP involves the local 
authorities and the ex-combatants themselves. Turning to education, the programme 
delivered education support through VSW to ex-combatants pursuing secondary and 
tertiary education around the country; this is in addition to those who received training in 
different trades.    The acquisition of literacy and numeracy skills is regarded as a pre-
requisite for vocational training. 
 
 
5.2.2.4  Social Reintegration 
The RDRP social reintegration activities covered community perceptions, participation in 
community life, access to social services  (health, education, shelter) and cross-cutting 
issues such as gender and HIV/AIDS awareness.  The programme regards community 
perceptions as the cornerstone of social reintegration (RDRC, 2006).  Social reintegration 
focuses on support for the family network, although there is also an opportunity to create 
informal networks of former combatants in order to aid reintegration such as discussion 
groups and associations of former combatants.  This is also aimed at preventing any stigma 
based on previous military status. In order to ensure more effective reintegration, the RDRP 
works with ex-combatants, local authorities and other community-based actors in 
promoting positive community perceptions.  This is done through sensitisation in all 
meetings with local partners and ex-combatants’ associations and the different forums 
when the RDRC addresses ex-combatants.  The programme continues to sensitise ex-
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combatants on the significance of participating in community life, which involves monthly 
community work, community meetings in which a cross-section of issues is discussed, and 
participation in rituals such as funerals and weddings. The following sensitisation activities 
have been conducted; 
• Joint RDRC/MONUC field visits to reintegrated ex-combatants and their families; 
MONUC gathered testimonies and transmitted them to combatants still operating with 
armed groups in the DRC. 
• A theatre drama entitled “HABURIKI” which encourages members of AGs to 
repatriate. 
• A weekly radio programme known as “Isange mu banyu” on Radio Rwanda, which 
keeps ex-combatants and the general public informed on issues related to demobilisation 
and reintegration. 
• A documentary film entitled “Nta heza haruta iwanyu”, which is screened by 
MONUC to members of AGs still in the DRC, encouraging them to repatriate. 
• Radio spots on Radio Rwanda. 
• Print media supplements (RDRC, 2008). 
 
In terms of health issues, the programme works jointly with local government authorities, 
NGOs and district representatives of ex-combatants to encourage ex-combatants and 
support them to subscribe to medical insurance. The programme continues to raise 
HIV/AIDS awareness among ex-combatants during the training for ex-combatants’ 
associations and other meetings involving RDRC/RDRP officials and ex-combatants. Ex-
combatants living with HIV/AIDS continue to receive counselling and referral to support 
services.  This is in line with the RDRP approach of integrating ex-combatants into 
mainstream support structures for specially disadvantaged groups. 
 
5.2.2.4.1 Partner involvement 
On the one hand, the RDRC’s partners are encouraged to include ex-combatants in their 
activities. On the other hand, the ex-combatants are encouraged to seek services from the 
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existing government agencies and NGOs in their communities (RDRC, 2011).  The RDRC 
has continued to work closely with its partners for technical advice and information sharing 
through the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC).  The TCC members and donor 
representatives continue to work closely with the RDRC on issues of demobilisation and 
reintegration of ex-combatants. The Stage I DDR, which was originally budgeted at US$40 
million, received only US$18.3 million in financing, approximately half of which came 
from the Rwandan government. Donor reluctance to fund demobilisation was attributable 
to Rwanda’s involvement in the Congo wars during this period. For the Stage II DDR, 
which started in 2001, the international community created a regional programme, the 
Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), to promote DDR in 
seven countries affected by the second Congo War: Angola, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, DRC, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda and Uganda.  The US$500 
million program was co-financed by the World Bank and a Multilateral Donor Trust Fund. 
The programme’s ambitious goal was to demobilise and reintegrate 350,000 ex-combatants 
from national armies and irregular forces over a five-year period (2002–2006). The MDRP 
envisioned national ownership: each state would manage the DDR process with technical 
assistance and financing from the MDRP. Rwanda set up the RDRP late in 2001 and placed 
the RDRC in charge of the programme. The RDRP benefited from the MDRP and the 
budget for this stage of DDR was US$57.3 million. While the programme was scheduled to 
end in 2005, it was extended to the end of 2008 because of the slower than expected return 
of AGs from the DRC (RDRC, 2008). 
 
5.3 Reintegration of female ex-combatants in Rwanda 
Rwandan women participated in the liberation struggle on both sides of the internal 
conflict.  Some participated as civilian cadres; for example, they did political work such as 
diplomacy.   Others participated as combatants and contributed in combat, medical, 
logistics and other areas.  The military newspaper “INGABO” has a regular women’s page, 
which explains the role of women in the military and in the general reconstruction process 
of the country: ‘Uguhiga ubutwari muratabarana’ meaning that it is at the battlefield that 
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courageousness is proven…women were there…Among liberators there were women who 
sacrificed a lot, they had the will, the courage and the patriotism to sacrifice their life and 
fight for the liberation of Rwanda.  They were not scared of the cold, hunger in the 
mountains and all the hardships; they participated in the medical field, in the mass 
communication for example ‘Radio Muhabura’, in logistics and political education among 
other things (Ingabo Newspaper 114, July 2004).Rwanda does not have a tradition of 
preparing women for combat.  This is illustrated by the fact that only 500 female ex-
combatants were demobilised, which is less than 1% of all former combatants registered as 
demobilised since 1997.  According to the 2004 RDRC report, Stage I provided no special 
support for female ex-combatants and was not concerned with gender issues within the 
communities in which the ex-combatants resettled.  Despite their small number, the 
significance of female ex-combatants as important role players in the Rwandan socio-
political and military contexts should be underestimated.   
 
Overall, DDR has not been gender sensitive in Rwanda, except for the fact that a large 
percentage of Vulnerability Support Window grants went to demobilised female soldiers.   
Out of the 111 (66%) demobilised female ex-combatants in Stage I only 73 accessed the 
fund (RDRC, 2004).The small number of female ex-combatants demobilised thus far is 
unlikely to be an accurate reflection of the actual number of women associated with the 
army.  The MDRP secretariat notes that the number of women combatants in Rwanda is 
under-reported by combatant groups at the front end of the process, and that more needs to 
be done to encourage women combatants to present themselves, and to properly identify 
and incorporate them into national DDR processes (MDRP, 2004).The RDRC describes 
several other steps that are being taken to support female ex-combatants, including:  
• ensuring women’s needs are met in demobilisation centres; 
• ensuring benefits for ex-combatants are equal, and equally accessible; 
• encouraging implementation partners to facilitate women’s participation in 
reintegration activities; 
• strengthening the gender awareness and capacity of staff; 
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• including women in community-level counselling activities; and 
• monitoring the impact of the demobilisation programme on women (RDRC, 2004). 
 
In Rwanda, as in many other African countries, effective socio-economic reintegration of 
ex-combatants into civilian life is proving to be more challenging for women than men.   
The perception that society and female former combatants have of each other is crucial to 
the effectiveness of any reintegration process.  As noted earlier, Rwanda does not have a 
tradition of preparing women for combat.  They are often not understood, as the following 
illustrates:Ibintu byageze iwa Ndabaga, meaning that under exceptional circumstances even 
women can take up arms and fight (Ingabo Newspaper 114, July 2004:24).Women went to 
the front line and some died; they did different things including combat. Many women in 
exile got the patriotic call for the love of their country.  Normally they say that women have 
no strength, but they survived the bush, climbed high mountains, stayed in the swamps and 
even hungry (Ingabo Newspaper114, 2004:25).In Rwanda, there is a cultural precedent for 
women taking up arms in Ndabaga, a figure in Rwandan popular history.  Ndabaga was a 
young woman whose father had left for war, leaving no son to replace him so that he could, 
according to the tradition, retire from combat in his old age.  In the absence of brothers, she 
disguised herself as a man and went to war.  She fought with such courage that she helped 
the king to victory.  Ever since, she has been associated with unusual means to resolve a 
desperate situation (RDRC, 2004). 
 
During the liberation struggle, Rwandan women participated as combatants on both sides of 
the internal conflict.  In 2001, female ex-combatants formed the “Ndabaga Association” 
which was the first association of female ex-combatants in the Great Lakes Region, if not 
in Africa.  Its members are from both sides of the conflict.  Its aim is to assist women with 
reintegration into society.  However, they also have an interest in seeking a greater role in 
regional peacekeeping missions in Africa in order to ensure that these missions are gender 
sensitive (IRIN News, Nov 18, 2004).In essence, then, despite their comparatively small 
numbers (when compared to their male counterparts), Rwandan female ex-combatants were 
132 
 
important contributors to the war effort. They also have an equal stake and responsibilities 
(with other members of society) in the social and political order of post-conflict Rwanda.  
As such, support from the society receiving them, and assistance with their psychological 
trauma and social reintegration would serve the collective interests of both the ex-female 
combatants and the general society. As the expert-consultant to the RDRC expressed, there 
is hope that these female ex-combatants could play important roles as peace builders in 
their communities as some of them are already active in grassroots organisations.  
 
5.4 Assessment of key informants 
In this section, the researcher will evaluate the views of some key actors or stakeholders on 
the problems, challenges and overall effectiveness of the Rwandan government’s efforts to 
facilitate the resettlement of female ex-combatants through its demobilisation and 
reintegration programme. The views of a variety of actors such as local leaders, military 
officers, RDRC Commissioners and the female ex-combatants themselves will be 
presented.  
 
5.4.1 Profile of the study participants 
Given the main purpose of this study, which is to investigate how effectively female ex-
combatants are integrated into the mainstream of Rwandan society, the researcher randomly 
selected 20 (twenty) local leaders1; 10 (five males and five females) in Kigali city, five 
local leaders (three males and two females) in the Southern Province, and five local leaders 
(two males and three females) in the Northern province.  Ten (10) military officers were 
interviewed as well as four (4) RDRC commissioners. The researcher also interviewed four 
(4) female ex-combatants and five (5) experts on DDR in order to get their views on the 
reintegration of female ex-combatants.  
                                                
1 Local leaders are usually elected by the local communuty within a decentralised structure and may range 
from the head of the village (umukuru w’umudugudu) to executive secretary, to head of sector (umukuru 
w’umurenge) of the same village.  In other words, a village may have several local leaders at any given time.  
Although unpaid, they wield a great deal of power due to the recognition given to them by state authorities. 
As a result, they are highly respected by the general population, and are frequently the individuals tasked with 





For ethical reasons, respondents’ names are not mentioned. Instead, a local leader is 
described as LL; MLL stands for male local leader and FLL means female local leader. 
Military officers are referred to as MO, Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Commissioners are represented as RDRC-C, experts on DDR as EDDR, and female ex-
combatant as FEX. LL 2, for example, represents interview number two with a local leader. 
LL 2KC, represents interview number two with local leaders from Kigali City and LL 2SP, 
represents interview number two with local leaders from Southern Province, and LL 2NP, 
means interview number two with local leaders from Northern Province.   
 
A purposive sampling technique was used to select the study sample.  As noted by Cohen 
(2000) in purposive sampling, researchers handpick the cases to be included in the sample 
on the basis of their typicality. In this way, they built up a sample that meets their specific 
needs. As its name suggests, in terms of this approach, the sample is chosen for a specific 
purpose. (Cohen, et al., 2000:103.) 
 
Table 5.3 Key informants 
Position of the informant Number of informants interviewed 
Local leaders 20 
Military officers 10 
RDRC commissioners 04 
Female (ex-)combatants 04 
Experts on DDR 05 
Source: Author, 2010. 
 
The local leaders were chosen because they are members of the host communities where 
female ex-combatants settled. The military officers shared experiences with the female ex-
combatants during military service; some served as their commanders. The RDRC 
commissioners were chosen as agents in charge of the DDR programme for ex-combatants. 
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They play a significant role in the effectiveness of the reintegration programme.  It was 
crucial to access the views female ex-combatants themselves on the programme; this will 
be further explored in chapter six. A group of experts on DDR, including researchers, 
designers, planners, and programme practitioners, were also interviewed. What follows is a 
summary of the views articulated by members of each of the identified constituencies. 
 
 
5.4.1.1 Local leaders 
Local leaders revealed that the problems facing female ex-combatants mainly relate to 
reintegration. For example one male respondent highlighted that they return to discover that 
their civilian friends are much better off than they are; this causes frustration (MLL, 16NP: 
20 June 2010). Furthermore, in the African context, women ex-combatants have special 
needs and responsibilities, such as seeing to the education of their children as well as the 
survival of their households. A dedicated programme is therefore needed to give them 
special attention. Two male local leaders from the Northern Province observed that 
preparation should involve psychosocial support (MLL, 16 and 17 NP: 21 June 2010), 
while a local female leader from the same area stressed that, “receiving societies should be 
sensitized to receive female ex-combatants” (FLL, 18NP: 21 June 2010). However, a male 
local leader from the Southern Province indicated that, “it is more costly to reintegrate a 
woman than it does for a man (MLL, 4KC: 06 June 2010)”. As noted earlier, even though 
both women and men are responsible for the care and education of children, the bulk of the 
responsibility falls on women’s shoulders.  For example, a female local leader explained 
that: some women join the military as an opportunity to address livelihoods challenges 
(excluding ex-FAR), but unfortunately when they don’t achieve their expectations, they get 
frustrated and prefer to be demobilised. They have remained in poverty (FLL, 7KC: 08 
June 2010).Moreover, it was noted that women joined the military to challenge traditional 
gender stereotypes. A female local leader from Kigali City remarked: “female ex-
combatants sought the freedom to earn a salary, wear trousers and take on leadership roles” 
(FLL, 6KC: 09 June 2010). The female local leaders argued generally that there was a need 
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for a more sensitive approach to the DDR programme, particularly given the patriarchal 
social order in Rwanda and male attitudes.  One respondent argued that:  
“reintegration is seen as returning a woman who thought she had emancipated 
herself back to the life she left, which is not easy; hence the training of female ex-
combatants should be sensitive to their situation for example; near their homes, less 
time/duration and relevant skills, and that the reintegration package for male ex-
combatants should be given to their families because some men misuse it (FLL, 
10KC: 10 June 2010).  
 
The female local leaders were generally of the opinion that female ex-combatants were 
often better organised and more responsible than many of their male counterparts.  For 
example, a local leader noted that some female ex-combatants have used their package 
well, with others investing it (FLL, 14SP: 12 June 2010). In general, local leaders raised 
three crucial points:    
• Reintegration is affected by voluntary and non-voluntary demobilisation. Those in 
the latter category take time to comprehend why they were demobilised. They ask what 
wrongs they have committed (FLL, 8KC: 05 June 2010).   
• A large number of female ex-combatants are working as local leaders, Gacaca 
judges or INYANGAMUGAYO (this is voluntary work, and does not provide an income), 
while a small number are trying to set up businesses; however, society also has a complex 
about them; nobody wants to marry a female ex-combatant except soldiers or fellow ex-
combatants; they lost the opportunity for formal education and have no formal 
qualifications (FLL, 9 and 10KC: 04 June 2010).  
• In general, women in the whole district have a long way to go as far as poverty 
alleviation is concerned.  Although women’s councils help female ex-combatants to gain a 
certain level of confidence, they are still very vulnerable and much more needs to be done 








Considering the phases of DDR programme, the views of the local leaders are presented in 
the following way: 
Table 5.4 Views of local leaders on the lives of female ex-combatants compared with the 
objectives of the DDR programme 
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Asked about the effectiveness of DDR for female-ex-combatants, a local leader responded 
as follows: “The overall outcome of DDR for female ex-combatant is negative. The 
Rwandan government authorities not only failed to do needs assessment before 
demobilisation but also failed to convince many of the female combatants that the exercise 
was actually in their best interests, with the net effect that some amongst them actually 
viewed the programme as a form of punishment (MLL, 11SP:  11 June 2010)”.Another 
local leader highlighted that, not  surprisingly, “reintegration became a challenge as many 
of the projected beneficiaries became frustrated after discovering that while they were away 
fighting they had fallen behind their peers at the economic level and that the DDR 
programme was not really a panacea for rectifying the perceived gap” (MLL, 1KC: 02 June 
2010). According to him, this is due to the fact that DDR did not adequately factor female 
ex-combatants’ psychosocial needs into the design and implementation of the programme 
before rolling it out. 
 
5.4.1.2  Military officers  
 The researcher conducted interviews with ten (10) military officers to ascertain their views 
on female ex-combatants.  One military officer from the Ministry of Defence revealed that 
women played a largely supportive role while in the military (MO, 2KC:18 June 2010). 
Another stated: “the role of women in the military ranged from being radio operators at 
Muhabura to medical caregivers, administrative officers, and political mobilizers” (MO, 
3KC:25 June 2010). One military officer stressed that “some also worked in the areas of 
logistics, intelligence and counselling. They did not forget their natural roles as care givers. 
Civilian women cadres played some roles, while military women cadres played others” 
(MO, 5KC:10 June 2010).  He concluded: “the participation of women in the liberation 
struggle was much appreciated by the military officers” (MO, 5KC:10June 2010). Another 
respondent pointed to the national record of female empowerment and argued that it is no 
surprise that the government of Rwanda is ranked among the best in the world in promoting 
women in decision-making. He linked this directly to the role of women in liberating 
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Rwanda (MO, 7KC:29June 2010).During the interview, military officers further argued 
that:  
• the RPF/RPA leadership tried to design ways and means to encourage women to 
participate in areas where they can excel (MO, 1KC:7 June 2010);  
• during the ceasefire, military officers pulled women into their own unit – YANKEE 
– for reorganization, different reflections, seminars and specialized training. With the 
resumption of war, they resumed regular work in their units (MO, 4KC:7 June 2010).  
• the combative atmosphere of the struggle brought a certain level of maturity in 
terms of experience and exposure not found in non-combatant women. As one military 
officer concluded: “These women saw colleagues die, were exposed to danger, and learnt 
crisis management” (MO, 6KC:28 June 2010). 
 
The military officers noted the following: 
• that the intensity of female combatants’ experience was high (above average), as 
was the volume of work. A nurse could do what a doctor does under normal circumstances. 
Unfortunately, although these are valuable experiences, they are still informal and do not 
translate into academic qualifications or diplomas (MO, 8KC:21 June 2010);  
• that the military experience was advantageous in so far as it gave female combatants 
confidence and leadership skills and the capacity to endure and take risks in life – this helps 
them to be role models to young girls. However it could be disadvantageous in a society 
which has a complex about them, and which sees them as unusual. The women combatants 
could have also undergone transformation; a lot should be done to help them reintegrate in 
society (MO, 9KC:30 June 2010). 
• few women in the army are deployed to the front line; the majority are deployed in 
different departments like welfare, medical logistics, political administration and 
information; this is done in good faith to protect them and deploy them where they can be 
useful. But this sometimes becomes counter-productive; work in departments is more 
specialized and people with education are easily promoted. Soldiers at the frontline are 
promoted whether they are educated or not. This is why most women/females found 
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themselves with low rankings at the end of the war. This affects their demobilization 
process; they find themselves lost since all they have is informal experience. Their 
demobilization benefits have also been affected, since the lower the rank, the less the 
package (MO, 10KC:13 June 2010). 
• Support in vocational training and income generating activities is crucial; an 
advisory committee to help orient female ex-combatants would be useful. This group 
should not be too big, but should include people with different experiences, including men 
who are gender-sensitive.  It would be useful to organize special fundraising for female ex-
combatants.  People are sensitive to their needs and would be willing to contribute; it just 
needs a team to organize it. This would provide support for various activities, because it is 
hard to do anything without money (MO, 4KC:7 June 2010). 
Table 5.5 Views of the military officers 
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In conclusion, the military officers were concerned by the fact that the skills that women 
acquired in the military were not converted into academic qualifications or diplomas. Only 
a few women were deployed to the front line; most were deployed in different departments 
like welfare, medical logistics, political administration and information, and many other 
fields. The view of the military officers is that acknowledging these skills would help 
female ex-combatants reintegrate in society. This means that the Demobilization 
Commission’s economic reintegration programme must aim to equip former fighters 
generally and female ex-combatants specifically with productive skills and employment 
options so that they can return to civilian life. 
 
5.4.1.3  RDRC commissioners  
The third group of key informants is the RDRC commissioners. The researcher interviewed 
four commissioners; all male, as the commission does not have a female commissioner. All 
were clear that women need specialised training.  For example, one of the commissioners 
noted that: “the tourism industry and hotel industry in Rwanda is slowly picking up; they 
should be encouraged in those areas” (RDRC-C, 2KC:17 June 2010. Another suggested 
that: “female ex-combatants could learn to put on lipstick, put on trouser, despite the fact of 
having served in the military” (RDRC-C, 1KC:01 June 2010).  The commissioners 
indicated that the RDRP has tried to be gender-sensitive. For example, a large percentage of 
Vulnerable Support Window (VSW) grants were awarded to women. They said that they 
are open to more ideas and highlighted that the researcher’s study would help them plan 
better to cater for female ex-combatants.  One of the commissioners said: “I must 
congratulate you on this study, it is good, and I have never doubted the need of having a 
separate study to understand issues of gender in our programme. We have started the ‘all 





The chairman of the RDRC observed that the Commission has been associated with the 
Ndabaga association, which helped them since their inception. They have tried to include 
civilians from the beginning; continued support to such organisations would no doubt be of 
great help to female ex-combatants, as they may take the place of the Commission in 
future. Some of the female ex-combatants still have issues that keep them in the jungles of 
the Congo; they are afraid to come home.  The Commission has everything it needs to help 
with their demobilisation and reintegration (RDRC-C, 4KC:16 June 2010). 
 






Expected output Disarmament, 
discharge, 
orientation and 




Provision of a 
transitional 
safety net of cash 
and in-kind 
payments spread 
out over a period 
of several 
months 
Assistance in the 




















 The programme 
is gender 
sensitive: VSW 





-Be more gender 
sensitive. 
- Combatants still 
living in DR 
Congo to come 
back and undergo 
process of 
demobilization 




training fit for the 
current market. 
- Support for 
Ndabaga 
Association  
-Role of Ndabaga 








In summary, and as illustrated in Table 5.6, the RDRC commissioners divided the process 
into three phases:  
(1) Demobilization: disarmament, discharge, orientation, and relocation of the ex-
combatants to a community of their choice. 
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(2) Reinsertion: provision of a transitional safety net of cash and in-kind payments spread 
out over a period of several months. 
(3) Reintegration: assistance in the form of access to productive assets (particularly land 
and capital), training and employment, and information and counselling services.  
While the whole process is gender-sensitive, implementation in the field when women 
return to their respective communities is not. Even though this cannot be attributed to the 
RDRC, some positive things happened.  As soldiers, women found they were able to rise 
above some of the limitations in their lives. When they left home to take up arms, they also 
left behind their traditional roles. Women shed their docile image, strapped on bandoliers 
and wielded guns – much like men. The idea that a woman could take up a non-traditional 
profession such as a soldier was a radical one. Many women were active participants during 
the war in Rwanda. 
 
5.4.1.4  Female ex-combatants  
The fourth group of key informants is the female-ex-combatants themselves. In this section, 
they are classified according to their rank.  Interviews were held with one female ex-
combatant (other rank and former ex-FAR from the Northern Province), two captains 
(former RPA from Kigali City), and two lieutenants (former RPA from Kigali City). 
 
Female ex-combatant number one (FEX1) is from Northern Province and a former ex-FAR 
army. At the time of the interview, she was 43 years old, a widow and the mother of four 
children.  She has become a successful entrepreneur in the clothing sector.  She was 
demobilised in 2002 through the RDRP which provided her with demobilisation and 
reintegration assistance.  “I was a member of the Forces Armees Rwandaises or Ex-FAR.” 
The researcher met her where she is based in the Northern Province. She said that her first 
priority was to find a way to look after her family.  With regard to the reintegration 
programme, she argued that: “Before joining the FAR, I had practiced tailoring, and I had 
always loved commerce. With that same spirit of business, I used my RDRP reintegration 
benefits to start business in selling second-hand clothing.  Then after, I applied for an 
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RDRP Vulnerable Support Window (VSW) grant and thank God, I received it.  This helped 
me overcome my weak economic situation (FEX, 1NP:20 June 2010).She continued: I am a 
happy woman and mother.  I can sell over 15 bales of seasonal second-hand clothes a 
month; I also employ five sales agents in neighbouring districts.  This has enabled me to 
pay for the education of my children and to build a house for my family. She saved 2.5 
million Rwandan Francs (almost US$4 500) and invested this in various business projects.  
“My wish is to spread out my business and supply more markets in the neighbouring 
districts,” she revealed. As for her successful reintegration into civilian life, she noted that: 
“because of my good behaviour and the result of entrepreneurial activities, I benefited the 
trust and confidence of local community members, and have been appointed secretary of 
the community bank in my district” (FEX, 1NP: 20 June 2010). 
 
Female ex-combatant number two (FEX2) is an ex-FAR captain from Kigali-City. She was 
generally unhappy with the performance of the RDRP with respect to female ex-
combatants.  She underscored the universal plight of female ex-combatants: In general, 
female ex-combatants are living in bad conditions.  Some of them do not have 
accommodation, no jobs, and are not benefiting from medical care.  A lot has to be done by 
the RDRP by helping groups at least as it may be difficult to help individuals.  I am sure 
that we can make it, we are hard-working (FEX, 2KC: 04 June 2010). FEX2 argued that 
most female ex-combatants are not well educated.  She was quick to confess that: “In my 
case, I am surviving on the informal knowledge I got from the army, I used to be a political 
commissar, then a quartermaster.  Currently, I am working as volunteer for one 
international organisation in stores. In my community, I was a chairman of the Gacaca local 
courts and leader in women councils.   My wish was for example to have an opportunity to 
study English and do small course in store management in order to formalise what I learnt 
as a quartermaster in the army (FEX, 2KC: 04 June 2010). FEX2 concluded by bemoaning 
her life experiences since leaving the army and her need for psychosocial assistance to 
enable her to better negotiate her way in her new civilian life: “I know that it is difficult to 
survive out of the military.  I have a big family to look after.  I will appreciate if [I] can 
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benefit from guidance and counselling on how to survive in civilian life” (FEX, 2KC: 04 
June 2010)”.  
 
Female ex-combatant number three (FEX3), a captain from Kigali City, was demobilised in 
April 2002 through the RDRP.  As with other demobilised soldiers, she was provided with 
demobilisation and reintegration assistance.  She noted that: “I was a member of the 
Rwanda Patriotic Army.  Before I joined the liberation struggle, I was a nurse and I 
performed the same duty among others [during] my army services” (FEX, 3KC: 10 June 
2010).  FEX3 outlined her experiences after demobilisation: “After my demobilisation I 
continue my occupation as a nurse and I am earning a monthly salary to provide my needs.  
I benefited from a peacekeeping mission where I served as a military observer in United 
Mission in Darfur. I passed the test prior [to] my deployment and I competed along with 
my male counterparts (FEX, 3KC:10 June2010)”.However, she is suffering 
psychologically. She is not married and does not have children.  She said that it is difficult 
to survive out of the army because of the stigma and stereotype. “The society does not 
understand us and sometimes we get frustrated”.  She thought she had emancipated herself 
from the army back to the same life she had left. But this is not easy: “you realize that you 
missed a lot when you meet your former friends who did not joined the army service, 
married and carrying children” (FEX, 3KC: 10 June 2010). 
 
Female ex- combatant number four (FEX4) is a lieutenant from Kigali City. She viewed the 
programme as ineffective in rendering the kind and level of support required by female ex-
combatants.  She noted: “We tried to form an association of female ex-combatants called 
‘Ndabaga’, however it is still weak. We do not have technical support in designing various 
projects.  We do not have donors fund.”  She added that the female ex-combatants want to 
form cooperatives so that they can organise themselves where they are and receive 




The researcher observed that, generally, these women are vulnerable and marginalised in 
both conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. The challenges that women ex-combatants 
have confronted in the reintegration process include an acute shortage of skills to support 
sustainable livelihoods, and the fact that many are not capable of benefiting from the 
opportunities offered in the post-conflict reconstruction period. It was clear that many ex-
combatants have inadequate educational, and few marketable skills; hence their absorption 
into the formal sector, including the civil service, is not possible.   In view of this finding, 
skills development is imperative if women ex-combatants are to achieve economic 
reintegration.  
 
The table below shows views on the demobilization programme. 
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In summary, the views of female ex-combatants on the demobilisation programme are not 
that different from the other respondents. They highlighted that there is no formal education 
to prepare them to reintegrate into civilian life. Some are making a living using the 
informal education they received while in the army. There is little guidance for female ex-
combatants on how to survive in civilian life. They experience stigma and frustration at the 
fact that they come back to very little.  
 
5.4.1.5  Experts on reintegration of ex-combatants 
The researcher interviewed five experts on DDR (EDDR): three males (two working with 
the United Nations as DDR officers and one as a researcher/academician); and two females: 
one researcher and the other a UN DDR staff member. These respondents generally argued 
that, while each country has its own plans and preferences, it is essential that gender 
sensitivity be built into the social fabric of all societies, particularly Rwandan society. One 
UN staff member contextualised the difficulties being experienced by female Rwandan ex-
combatants as follows: “Female ex-combatants lost the opportunity to study because of the 
long time they spent in the military.  They lack formal skills.  They need formal skills, 
training and assistance to start income generating activities. This is due to the fact that there 
was no needs assessment from the first place” (EDDR, 1KC: 03 July 2010).Arguing for a 
more holistic approach to assisting ex-combatants, a researcher on DDR (EDDR2) argued 
that “Informal training gained in the military should be formalised so that female ex-
combatants can be self-employed. Female ex-combatants need assistance to get jobs as it is 
difficult for the community to trust them immediately”.  She added that “the efforts for 
reintegration of special groups of ex-combatants have to be more employment-focused in 
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order to be successful and to ensure real social economic reintegration” (EDDR, 3KC: 13 
July 2010).  
 
According to an expert on DDR, in Southern Sudan, female ex-combatants and other 
female community members were provided with the means to start economic cooperatives, 
adult literacy and numeracy support groups, and livelihood groups such as tailoring, brick 
making, a catering cooperative, and the production of indigenous arts and crafts. This 
model can be applied in Rwanda as it reduces the tension between female ex-combatants 
and their fellow women in the foster community on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it 
empowers women ex-combatants economically (EDDR, 5KC: 15 July 2010).An expert on 
DDR noted that, for most female ex-combatants, demobilisation was a total surprise. The 
Rwandan demobilisation exercise started with the disabled, child soldiers, and women. The 
soldiers had not been adequately prepared (if at all) for the life-altering experience that 
demobilisation represented, and their inputs on how best to proceed with the programme 
were not sought or factored into the planning teams, which had no representatives from 
their groups.  Female ex-combatants who were demobilised are often not only young but 
also uneducated.  As a result, they did not participate in decision-making, had no role in 
planning the demobilisation programme and were rarely consulted (EDDR, 4KC: 15July 
2010).This was emphasised by a female UN DDR officer, who stressed that the DDR 
Programme in Rwanda must prioritise the demobilisation and reintegration of women ex-
combatants generally, with specific attention to special needs women – such as the disabled 
and war wounded, and elderly female ex-combatants. Furthermore, this project should not 
exclude vulnerable civilian women in the foster communities (EDDR, 2KC: 15July 2010). 
While female ex-combatants are still expected to fulfil traditional roles and carry a lot of 
responsibilities, they receive a very small package on demobilisation. There are no effective 
gender-sensitive programmes.  The RDRP should provide referral services, research the 
labour market and link female ex-combatants to it, as well as recommend them as 
employees. As most of the female ex-combatants are facing psychological problems, there 
should be a special socio-psychological centre for them.   At demobilisation and during 
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The views of the experts on reintegration of female ex-fighters are presented as follows: 
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It has been observed that women and girls are too afraid of repercussions from the male 
military or the community to report for DDR, or that they are misinformed about the DDR 
programmes and who benefits.   Consequently, they may not benefit from the DDR 
programmes.  There is a lack of designated funding for female or gender initiatives.  Few 
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programme officers are skilled in gender budgeting.  They might not know how to identify 
women’s specific needs, and they do not know how to plan for gender programmes for 
women associated with the fighting forces and armed groups. 
 
5.5 Potential and risks of demobilization and reintegration programmes 
Effective demobilisation involves a well-structured and well-planned reintegration 
programme. Demobilisation that discounts the social, economic and political factors 
inherent in the reintegration process, risks endangering peace arrangements and can lead to 
renewed fighting with its inevitable humanitarian implications (World Bank., 1995).  Given 
the Rwandan experience, the effectiveness of the DDR programmes in reintegrating ex-
combatants into civilian life depends on three crucial factors:  
• Insightful and comprehensive planning that is based on sound research and analysis 
in order for a realistic strategy to be developed. 
• The requisite political will must exist at all of levels of the implementation strategy 
in order to positively influence the processes.  
• The question of cost or adequate resources to undertake the initiative must be taken 
into account. The DDR programmes are extremely expensive and time-consuming; the 
necessary resources, namely financial, material and technical expertise, need to be secured.  
Contributions and support from outside the country are crucial to the success of the 
programmes (Second Conference on DDR in Africa, DRC: June 2007).Some successes 
have been noted in countries like Mozambique, Burundi and Angola, where protracted 
conflicts were followed by political will at the central government level that led to 
successful DDR programmes. 
 
The longevity of conflicts affects demobilisation and reintegration in different ways.  
Military service socialises ex-combatants in a military culture such as following orders 
without critical reflection.  As civilians they may be reluctant to seek explanations or to 
participate effectively in demobilisation programmes (Mehreteab, 2004:48).  The example 
of Zimbabwe shows that training in participative approaches to planning and decision-
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making may help ex-combatants to overcome this obstacle (ILO, 1995).On the other hand, 
as noted in earlier sections, training and education can serve as remedies and can reduce 
trauma by helping ex-combatants to rebuild their self-confidence.  However, ex-combatants 
must wrestle not only with their material needs but also deal simultaneously with the loss of 
their comrades and their lives as soldiers.  They may feel abandoned if they do not find a 
new economic, social and psychological standing in society (World Bank, 1998).  
Reintegration of ex-combatants may also be affected by how they are received by their 
families and communities as well as the capacity of each individual.  Well-structured and 
well-planned reintegration programmes tend to be more effective than less structured and 
poorly-planned programmes. The reintegration of ex-fighters is rendered more different and 
complex by the scarcity of resources as well as the war-ravaged nature of the post-conflict 
economic environment.   Factors that block effective DDR programmes are a lack of 
political will, culminating in intransigence amongst the former fighters, lack of adequate 
resources and foreigners and outsiders who influence belligerents not to disarm. 
 
However, despite the economic challenges that impede the reintegration process, we cannot 
ignore other social challenges. Some ex-combatants who have learned to use violence 
during conflict do not abandon this pattern of behaviour when they return to their families 
and communities or are integrated into the security sector. Nevertheless, the support and 
acceptance ex-combatants receive from families, community members, and peers are 
critical to their resilience and their successful reintegration. Apart from disciplinary factors, 
a UNDP report (May 2011) indicates that ex-combatants are sometimes implicated in 
violence against community members; ex-combatants (regardless of whether they are men 
or women) therefore become stigmatised or seen as a drain on scarce resources, or are 
perceived as a threat to elders or authorities within the communities to which they return 
(UNDP, May 2011:10).On the other hand, during the reintegration process, both male and 
female ex-combatants often face the expectation that they will return to more narrow or 
restrictive gender roles. They struggle to renegotiate their roles and relationships in the 
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household and the broader community, to gain social acceptance, and to change their 




Statistical analysis of findings and discussion of results 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In order to better understand the life of female ex-combatants after demobilisation, there 
was a need to adopt a comparative view and establish the differences with their male 
counterparts. This helped to understand the effectiveness of their reinsertion and 
reintegration in mainstream life after demobilisation. A structured questionnaire and focus 
group discussions were used to collect data on this issue. The two parts of this chapter 
reflect the results of the survey conducted with the main sample of 50 female ex-
combatants and 50 male ex-combatants. The first part presents the profiles of the 
respondents, and the second discusses the respondents’ views on the current DDR 
programme in Rwanda as well as the programme’s efficiency and role in the demobilisation 
of women ex-combatants. Given the overarching objective of the study, which is to assess 
how effectively female ex-combatants have been reintegrated into the mainstream of 
Rwandan society, this chapter also tracks and evaluates the actual integration of women ex-
fighters into the economic and social life of their communities, compared with men. It 
investigates the extent to which the DDR programme is helping or has helped female ex-
combatants to return meaningfully to civilian life. 
 
6.2 The Impact of Women’s military service experience on the reintegration 
programme 
6.2.1 Introduction 
As noted previously, Rwanda does not have a tradition of preparing and sending females 
into combat.   In the Rwandan culture, when women were engaged in struggle, these 
females were perceived as having unusual courage.  Women played a role during the 
Rwandan liberation war and in liberating their country.  Surprisingly, very little has been 
written about their lives and roles during that period.   The phenomenon of females in the 
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army is not new, as they served in the RPA, in the former FAR and, most recently, in the 
armed rebel groups.   
 
The female ex-combatants who were interviewed for this study argued that their service in 
the army changed them considerably.  They revealed that they gained new skills, 
capabilities and confidence in contrast to other Rwandan women.  They are often so self-
assured that they view themselves as having the capacity to hold any position.  Because of 
these qualities, female ex-combatants are called on as agents of change and positive role 
models for other women, and to lead the way in redressing gender prejudice in the 
community.   During the focus group discussions, one woman ex-combatant revealed that: 
“during the war, our lives even changed in terms of biology; some missed their monthly 
periods for a while” (FGD, 1KC:20July 2012).  Most of the female ex-combatants 
interviewed said that they joined the army to fight injustice, to pursue a military profession 
or were following their friends.   Their services included the following: office work, 
leadership, logistics, health, communications, political education, social affairs, 
intelligence, security and also kitchen work. As one female ex-combatant underscored, 
“Women performed different work such as social work, catering, office work, logistics, 
night patrols and cleaning” (FGD, 3KC: 21 July 2010). Women were rarely deployed to the 
frontline; however, their contributions to the war effort were still considered remarkable by 
some observers.  As noted by one expert, “their [female combatants] contributions to the 
war efforts cannot be judged simply by looking at their marginal presence in the battlefield 
itself but rather by considering the preparatory and supportive roles they played in the war 
effort which was fundamental in the successes of the then rebel forces against a sitting 
government” (EDDR, 4 KC: 6 July 2010).    
 
However, the fact that women did not go to the front line like their male counterparts 
prejudiced their chances for promotion with the net effect of a disproportionate number of 
them languishing as low rank soldiers.  This had significant impact on their demobilisation 
benefits as ex-combatants.  While the frontline females got promoted whether or not they 
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were educated, those who performed non-fighting roles such as administration, logistics, 
and political administration were largely ignored when it came to promotion, especially 
those who were not appropriately educated.  Nonetheless, a large majority of the female ex-
combatants who were interviewed were proud of having participated in the liberation 
struggle.  Furthermore, the majority (70% of the respondents) indicated that they joined the 
army with the consent and support of their families. Nevertheless, as will be explained 
later, many still found reintegration very difficult. By contrast, a relatively small group 
(30% of the respondents) joined the army without telling their families as they knew that 
military service was considered a duty best left to men. Despite their pride in having 
rendered important services to their country, many of the respondents harbour serious 
resentment or reservations about the wisdom of having done so when they reflect on the 
opportunity costs associated with that service.  Many believed that the army had failed to 
reciprocate their devotion and service with demonstrable commitment in taking care of 
them as ex-combatants.  As one female ex-combatant revealed during a focus group 
discussion, “sometimes I regret seeing my friends who did not join the army but instead 
have finished schooling which lead to their better life compared to me”(FEX,2FGDKC:23 
July 2010).Some female ex-combatants attributed some of their life’s misfortunes to their 
exposure to the military. According to another female ex-combatant, “some female ex-
combatants married to soldiers and who are widows believe that if they had not been in the 
military and married to military men, perhaps they would not be widows 
now”(FEX,1FGDKC: 20 July 2010). 
 
Generally, Rwandan society perceives women as a weak and vulnerable group; however, 
the focus group discussions revealed that the female ex-combatants felt strong, and the 
proof is that they endured similar conditions as their male counterparts during the war.  
Female ex-combatants have demystified the notion that women cannot go to war.  
However, although they performed valuable duties based on training received while on the 
job, their lack of formal training and the associated documentation (certificates, diplomas or 
degrees), left them with unmarketable skills. Thus, a critical aspect of the demobilisation 
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and reintegration process has been how to harness and repackage the informal skills they 
gained in the military as the first stage of skills development, which could, with additional 
formal training, be utilised to improve employability and reintegration.  FEX-FGD 
recognised this when she noted that, “without supplementary training to use our skills, it is 
difficult to compete with others in the labour market” (FGD, 4SP:5 October 2010).Fifty 
percent of the female ex-combatants interviewed were young when they joined the army; 
most of them were studying and couldn’t complete their studies.   They cannot compete 
with women who did not join the army. Their friends finished school and can find jobs 
more easily than them.   They expressed frustration at the fact that some people treat them 
as difficult, and that they are not trusted.  Men sometimes refuse to marry female ex-
combatants because they do not trust them.  They are also not trusted by their fellow 
civilian women.  However, they reported that they were treated the same by their fellow 
combatants or officers.  Those who were in RPA were thankful that the hierarchy allowed 
them to participate in areas where they could make progress, such as attending seminars 
and specialised training during the cease-fire periods.  Asked about sexual harassment, 
most of respondents said that they were not pressurised into having sex.  However, some of 
them have children who were conceived during their military service. On the one hand, this 
may be explained by the possibility that females had much more control of their 
environment and may have desired the prospect of motherhood, even in the military. On the 
other hand, the troops may have been sufficiently disciplined to be mindful of such issues. 
 
6.2.2 Summary of findings 
The summaries of the female ex-combatants’ life and experience in military service and its 
impact on their lives, as reported by the respondents in the focus group discussions is 





Figure 6.1 Women’s military service experience 
 
 
Source: Researcher 2011 
 
As Figure 6.1 and the views of the respondents outlined in the previous section show, many 
females who served in the military had the opportunity to gain new skills, capabilities and 
confidence in contrast to other, traditional Rwandan women.  This was despite the fact that, 
for some, the skills acquired were often informal and not marketable in civilian society 
where they had to be reintegrated. Indeed, most of the ex-combatants took great pride in 
their service to their country and what they saw as their contribution to a more just social 
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order in Rwanda.  Respondents argued that women were motivated to join the RPA for 
political reasons such as to fight injustice, whereas a significant number from ex-FAR 
joined the army for professional reasons, and most former members of armed groups were 
conscripted. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of systematic scholarly literature on women 
in the military. Some of the literature that is available actually describes women combatants 
as having been abducted and ‘unusual’ people. An overwhelming majority (85percent) of 
the female respondents highlighted that female ex-combatants were sometimes frustrated 
by the way they were generally treated by people: some regarded them as difficult; men did 
not view or accept them as good marital partners and, sometimes, their fellow women did 
not trust them.  Although Rwandese traditional norms expect a woman to be shy and 
submissive, female ex-combatants posed special challenges to those they rejoined in 
civilian life who found their temperament and carriage contrary to their expectations.  
Perceived by the general society as neither men nor women, many female ex-combatants 
developed psychological problems as they battled their relative isolation and rejection in 
civilian life.   This was recognised by three-quarters (75percent) of both female and male 
respondents who felt that gender prejudice has a palpable impact on the reintegration of 
female ex-combatants. One male ex-combatant from Northern Province stated 
sympathetically: “there is a need for a proper sensitisation programme for families and 
community hosts to address the issue of reintegrating female ex combatants” (MEX, 
7FGDNP: 25 October 2010), 
 
6.3 Demographic profile of the respondents 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The demographic profile of respondents presented here promotes an understanding of the 
context in which individual efforts at demobilisation and reintegration took place.  This 
includes information about the age, marital and educational status, and place of residence, 
category, rank, and number of dependants.  Collectively, these variables are expected to 
reveal important information relating to the socio-economic conditions and wellbeing of 
female ex-combatants after their demobilisation.  As a demographic factor, the age and 
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gender profile of female ex-combatants is a crucial variable for understanding the 
developmental capacity, social and economic opportunities and adaptability of female ex-
combatants in their new civilian lives.  It might also shed light on the nature of their 
experiences within the military if one assumes that younger entrants would have not only 
been less socially experienced, but also more malleable to manipulative and abusive 
activities on the part of male colleagues.  Certainly, age and gender (see appendix one, 
questions 1 and 3) would be a crucial factor for determining or influencing the female ex-
combatants’ ability and opportunities to reintegrate meaningfully and make appropriate 
choices on how best to participate actively in the social, economic and political life of their 
communities during their reintegration process. 
 





Total Female Male 
Count % Count % Count % 
<31 8 16 20 40 28 28 
31-34 13 26 9 18 22 22 
35-39 9 18 21 42 30 30 
>=40 20 40   20 20 
Total  50 100 50 100 100 100 
 
Table 6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Age2 100 24.00 51.00 35.7000 6.2401 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
100     
 
The age of the respondents ranged from 24 to 51. The youngest respondent was 24 years 
old and the oldest was 51. The average age was 35. This means that the respondents fall 
into the most economically active age groups. Female respondents were rather older than 
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male respondents. Only 16 percent of female respondents were 31 years old or less, 
whereas the comparative figure for male respondents stood at 40 percent. On the other 
hand, 40 percent of female respondents were 40 years old or more, and there were no male 
respondents in this age group. The age profile was used to determine how age might 
influence the female ex-combatants’ ability to actively participate socially, economically 
and politically in their communities during the reintegration process.  The significance of 
the age profile of female ex-combatants is multi-pronged. Their relatively older age profile 
compared to their male counterparts suggests that they would have had greater levels of 
maturity and social experience. This would have entailed greater confidence and control in 
their interactions with the males, which, in turn, would have led to the perception that 
female ex-combatants have strong male characteristics and, as such, are undesirable marital 
partners. Nevertheless, from the chronological age perspective, the relatively young profile 
of the female ex-combatants meant that most of them were still strong, in child-bearing age 
brackets, and potentially productive socially and economically.Sixty five percent (65 
percent) of the respondents had served between five and ten years in the army.  For 
effective reintegration, and given their age profile, they needed vocational training and 
marketable skills in order to contribute positively not only to the development of both their 














The researcher deemed it necessary to establish the educational level of the respondents in 
question number 10 from the questionnaire. There were ten possible answers made 
available ranging from no school to vocational. The responses are presented in the Table 
6.2. 
Table 6.2 Educational level of respondents  
   Female Male  Total 
Education No School Count 
 
 
 1 1 
  % within 
gender 
 2.0% 1.0% 
 Some primary 
school 
Count 4 11 15 
  % within 
gender 
8.0% 22% 15.0% 
 Completed primary 
school 
Count 12 14 26 
  % within 
gender 
24.0% 28.0% 26.0% 
 Some secondary 
school 
Count 11 11 22 
  % within 
gender 
22.0% 22.0% 22.0% 
 Completed 
secondary school 
Count 11 8 19 
  % within 
gender 
22.0% 16.0% 19.0% 
 Some university Count 3 2 5 
  % within 
gender 
6.0% 4.0% 5.0% 
 Completed 
university 
Count 9  9 
  % within 
gender 
18.0%  9.0% 
 Completed 
Institute/polytechnic 
Count  3 3 
  % within 
gender 
 6.0% 3.0% 
Total  Count 50 50 100 
  % within 
gender 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 





The Chi-Square test for educational level of the respondents is presented as shown. 
Table 6.2.1 Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) Exact Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
17.094 7 0.017  
Fisher’s Exact Test 17.496   0.007 
 
 
Each stage of education is represented in the study sample. From the figures and the 
statistical value of p (0.017<0.05), there is a correlation between the gender of an ex-
combatant and his/her level of education; indeed, this level is significantly higher for 
female respondents than for male respondents. While slightly more than half of the males 
have not gone beyond primary school (2 percent of them did not go to school, 22 percent of 
them did some primary school and 28 percent completed primary school), 68 percent of 
female respondents have gone beyond primary school; 22 percent had some secondary 
schooling, 22 percent completed secondary school, 6 percent had partially completed 
university studies, and 18 percent had completed university studies. In essence, nearly half 
(46 percent) of the female ex-combatants had at least completed secondary education as 
compared to 23 percent of their male counterparts.  Basically, female ex-combatants had 
collectively achieved a much higher average educational level than their male colleagues at 
the point of demobilisation.  One clear implication is that a better differentiation of needs at 
the point of demobilisation would have been beneficial for all concerned, especially the 
female ex-combatants.  For the RDRP, focussed planning would have meant that they 
would have identified a more appropriate pool of developmental options that could attract 
increased subscription and commitment by the ex-combatants. Furthermore, it would 
appear that (collectively) the male and female ex-combatants came from slightly different 
social backgrounds – a factor that may also serve to explain their highly varied levels of 
work ethic, motivation, and happiness with the RDRP. This is despite some evidence that, 
generally, ex-combatants had opportunities to improve on their formal qualifications or 




However, the focus group discussions revealed that although there were some 
opportunities, only a small number of ex-combatants acquired education during their time 
in the military.  In the main, the vast majority of the female ex-combatants acquired what 
educational qualifications they had before they joined the army rather than while in the 
army.  As one female ex-combatant argued, “when you are an educated man or woman it is 
different, even when you are demobilised you can look after yourself, because there are 
greater opportunities and there is a lot one can do (FEX, 5FGDSP:7 October 2010).After 
the demobilisation, the Commission assisted ex-combatants who wanted to acquire formal 
education or skills by paying their fees from the reintegration grant.  The Commission also 
provided support to some of the institutions willing to admit ex-combatants or to provide 
specialised training for the disabled.  According to the respondents such programmes focus 
on: 
• Professional and vocational training 
• Formal education 
• Employment support, including tool kits or initial financial requirements for 
employment, etcetera. 
 
Life in the military was demanding, hard and mind-numbing. The realities of military life 
meant that there was not much time for formal skills training. It has been observed that 
formal education or skills training may act as a healing measure because it rebuilds hope 
and identity and reduces the trauma caused by the situations that combatants endure during 
their military life. As one female ex-combatant underscored, “I did not realize that it would 
be so hard to live as a civilian.  Suddenly, your life changes so much. No more training, no 
more routines, and you are on your own.  But you know you have to survive.  For me, it 
was a challenge for me to change my life, my thinking. It was difficult to adjust to military 
life but I was too busy and scared to think too much. Now, it was difficult to adjust as a 




Although it has been observed from our sample that as a group female ex-combatant 
respondents have better educational qualifications than their male counterparts, one of the 
challenges that has confronted the reintegration of women ex-combatants has been an acute 
shortage of relevant skills to support sustainable livelihoods whether still in the military or 
in the post-military environment (see appendix one, question number 15). Many female ex-
combatants have limited educational backgrounds with no marketable skills and, 
consequently, their absorption into the formal civilian sectors, including the civil service, 
was either difficult or not feasible at all.  
 




1 19.0% 0.0% 11.4% 
2 14.3% 0.0% 8.6% 
3 40.5% 46.4% 42.9% 
4 7.1% 21.4% 12.9% 
5 19.0% 7.1% 14.3% 
6 0.0% 25.0% 10.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Respondents reported that they are responsible for the maintenance and welfare of between 
one and six people. A significant number of respondents (42.9 percent) support three 
dependants. In line with traditional cultural arrangements, which often require extended 
family responsibilities, male respondents carried greater burdens in their households.  The  
majority (53.5 percent) of men versus 26.1 percent of women support four or more people 
(21.4 percent of men versus 7.1 percent of women support four dependants; 7.1 percent of 
men versus 19 percent of women support five dependants;  and 25 percent of men versus 0 




It is not particularly surprising that males in Rwanda have bigger roles when it comes to 
financial responsibility for household maintenance.  Patriarchal cultural imperatives require 
males to assume responsibilities that often go beyond their immediate family.  However, as 
in other parts of the world, women in Rwanda are heavily burdened with a disproportionate 
portion of household activities and care responsibilities that demand huge amounts of their 
time.  These often mean that they have to structure their employment preferences and 
options differently from men with negative net cost effects with respect to job quality and 
associated income.  As the World Bank (2011:198) underlined in its World Development 
Report 2012, “Far from being a simple decision about whether or not to join the labor 
force, participation in market work involves reallocating time across a variety of activities - 
a process that can be difficult and costly, particularly for women.  And a focus solely on 
participation masks gender differences in the nature and dynamics of work.”  This implies 
that, although female ex-combatants may have fewer people to take care of financially, they 
have far more people to care for not only on the basis of routine daily chores but also in 
terms of family health and welfare.  The net effect is that they require education and 
















In question number five from the questionnaire, the researcher explores the places where 
the respondents were living before the war began in 1994. 
Table 6.4 Place where ex-combatants were living before war 




Count % Count % Count Percent 
 Outside of 
Rwanda  
33 66.0% 9 18.0% 42 42.0% 








9 18.0% 37 74% 46 46.0% 
Total  50 100.0% 50 100.0% 100 100.0% 
 
Given that the majority of the female respondents (66 percent) were living outside of 
Rwanda while most of the male ex-combatants were living in rural areas in Rwanda (where 
more than 90% of the population is based), it would seem logical that the typical urban 
versus rural tendencies observable in population groups around the world would also be 
reflected in the attitudes of the ex-combatants. Di advantaged in terms of the availability of 
educational resources, infrastructure, and job opportunities, rural areas often suffer from 
underdevelopment and poor socio-economic conditions.  Given greater opportunities in 
urban areas, it is not surprising that female ex-combatants (with a largely urban 
background) would have better education and skills when compared to their male 




6.3.2. Categories of demobilized respondents by army 
In question number eight from the questionnaire, the researcher establishes the various 
military groups in Rwanda.  The responses made available ranges from RDF to FDLR. 
Table 6.5 Military groups of the respondents 
 
Respondents were from four military groups, namely RDF (54 percent), RPA (21 percent), 
FAR (11 percent) and FDLR (14 percent). Female respondents served mainly in RDF (46 
percent) and RPA (20 percent), while a few served the FAR group (14 percent). RDF 
presents the high percentages because, while most males served in all four groups, the 
majority were in RDF (62 percent).Most of the female respondents were former RPA and 
RDF soldiers.  This does not suggest, however, that RPA forms the largest category of 
demobilised soldiers, but simply refers to the high percentage in terms of their 
rehabilitation in Kigali province.  
 
Nevertheless, in the focus group discussions, it was said that many armed groups are found 
in the Northern provinces due to its geographical location2, but they don’t want to be 
identified.  Moreover, it was noted during the focus group discussions in the Northern 
Province that females do not like to reveal that they were associated with armed groups to 
the extent that they lacked courage to register with the RDRC in order to benefit from its 
                                                
5The Northern Province is bordered by the Republic Democratic of Congo, where so many armed groups’ 

































programmes. This is due to gender-related issues. For example, existing gender norms may 
prevent women from making themselves known as a member of an armed group due to 
social stigmas and stereotypes (UNDP, 2011). This applies to Rwandan women associated 
with armed groups, as confirmed by a group of experts from the UNDP: “There is an 
inconsistency between numbers of women who participated in armed conflict and those 
who effectively register in DDR programmes. Female ex-combatants and women 
associated with armed groups face complex barriers to formal registry as well as equal 
access to DDR programme benefits and services. This is why a number of women and girls 
self-demobilized” (UNDP, 2012). 
 
6.3.3. Respondents’ profile by rank 
The research study probed the rank of the demobilised sample (see appendix one, question 
number nine) in order to establish which rank was most affected.  Ranks range from other 
rank (named private) to Lt Col, but higher ranks are better represented among female 
respondents with 34 percent (as opposed to 6 percent of males) represented in the ranks of 
commissioned officers. However, most of the respondents (54 percent and 64 percent for 
females and males, respectively) have lower ranks, from “private” to “Corporal”. This 
categorisation was important to the researcher in order to establish whether all the ex-
combatants, irrespective of their job designation, are treated equally or whether their rank 
in the service was given due recognition when they were demobilised.   It was noted that 
the senior officers and junior officers are given extra assistance known as Recognition of 
Service Allowance (RSA), which is different from the allowance given to the lower ranked 
(other rank/NCO).   According to the RDRC officials, this amount is differentiated by rank. 
Ranging from Rwf150,000 (approximately R1,500) for a private to up to Rwf500,000 
(approximately R5,000) for a colonel, the RSA is paid in two instalments.  This is not 
appreciated by all ex-combatants as was revealed by an ex-combatant who prefer to collect 
his allowance in one instalment. A female ex-combatant from the Southern Province stated: 
“the money given is not enough and its distribution in small instalment does not encourage 
us to save, I would rather prefer to have money in one lump sum, with part of it in a 
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revolving fund”. Surprisingly, at the demobilisation stage, female ex-combatants are not 
well-prepared in skills like managing income generating activities and small credits so as to 
use their benefits well and facilitate reintegration.   
 
Table 6.6 Rank of respondents 
 
 
Another issue raised during the discussions was the allowance given to the ex-combatants 
according to their rank. This was explained by a female ex-combatant as follows: 
Women in the army are rarely deployed to the front line. Just very few, the rest are 
deployed in different departments like, welfare, medical, logistics, political administration 
and information, this is alright because it is done in good faith to protect them and deployed 



































































productive, work in departments is more specialised and especially people with education 
are easily promoted.  Soldiers at the frontline are promoted whether educated or not, in 
departments when you are not educated it is difficult to be promoted since duties become 
more specialised. That is why most girls find themselves with low ranks at the end of the 
war. This affects their demobilisation process, they find themselves lost since all they have 
is experience gained informally and their demobilisation benefits is affected, since the 
lower the rank, the less the package (FEX, 8FGDNP :27 October 2012).The views of this 
respondent (FEX 8FGD) present a gloomy picture of the context and experiences of many 
female ex-combatants at the time of demobilisation. Female ex-combatants perceived 
themselves as having been denied equal opportunities to be highly ranked. However, the 
picture of the overall military ranks of our respondents is better for females than for males. 
Questions five and eleven from the questionnaire illustrates that the respondents came from 
different backgrounds when they joined the army. The majority of female ex-combatants 
came from outside the country, where they were generally living in cities and therefore, had 
opportunity to attend formal educational institutions. The men were mostly from rural 
areas, and were characterised by lower levels of literacy or less access to formal education. 
Because of their lower educational achievements, male ex-combatants are also lower 
ranked when compared to their female counterparts.  Indeed, among the demobilised ex-
combatants, females as a group were also significantly more highly ranked than the male 
ex-combatants (as a group). On the other hand, controlling the variable of education, the 
above views of the female respondents suggest that the ranking process may not have been 
gender-sensitive and has consequences for the demobilisation of female ex-combatants, 
especially those with lower educational levels.  
 
6.3.4. Occupation 
As shown by Table 6.7, the respondents pursued different occupations before they joined 
the army, but most were students (56 percent of female and 50 percent of male 
respondents).  Others, to a lesser extent, were farmers, members of the military, traders, 
etcetera (see appendix one, question number eleven). However, after demobilisation, the 
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female ex-combatants found it difficult to go back, for example, to school or into farming 
activities.  
 
Table 6.7 Occupation before the war 
 
 
As Table 6.7 illustrates, after the demobilisation process, the respondents are occupying 
different positions in society (see appendix one, question number twelve). This may be a 
reflection of their greater maturity and the need to take on greater responsibilities as parents 
and contributing members of their households.  Men are mostly farmers (57 percent). In 
fact, the table shows that, in contrast to men, no female respondents are involved in farming 
activities. The data on current employment, education and income suggest that female 
respondents in the sample hold down better positions in terms of income than male 
respondents after demobilisation. This could be the outcome of demobilisation programmes 
such as the DDR or other parameters. Indeed, once they have completed their studies, 





















































divergent occupations.  Female ex- combatants prefer to settle in urban areas such as Kigali 
where they can improve their formal skills and employment opportunities. As one female 
respondent noted during focus group discussions: “There is a problem of poor economic 
conditions in the rural areas in our country and women think that urban areas are centres for 
employment and other survival projects” (FGD,6SP:9 October 2010). 
 
The researcher establishes the occupation of the respondents after demobilisation in 
question number twelve. The possible answers range from farmer to others as it was in the 
previous question number eleven. 
Table 6.8 Occupation after demobilisation 
 
 
This brings into question the relevance and appropriateness of the training options offered 
by the RDRC programme, which should respond to the needs of the demobilised ex-
combatants, bearing in mind their socio-economic and psychosocial requirements and the 
Rwandan developmental context – particularly the inequality in economic conditions and 
opportunities between rural and urban areas. The urban bias in the design of the RDRP 
















































respect to the trainers and relevant infrastructure – as a cost saving measure.  An alternative 
explanation may be that the urban bias might have been intended to maximise the economic 
opportunities available to the ex-combatants at the point of completing their training, 
particularly given the low financial rewards associated with opportunities available in the 
rural setting (as evidenced by the very low earnings of ex-combatants who chose farming 
shown in Table 6.8).  Regardless of the reason, the net effect was that long-term planning 
and the need to create opportunities in the rural areas with an eye to more holistic and 
integrated national economic and social development may have been lost in the short term. 
 
6.3.5. Income of the respondents 
The income levels of the ex-combatants according to occupation group are established in 
question number fourteen and presented in Table 6.9.  The average monthly income ranges 
from Rwf7,231 to Rwf291,111. Farmers have the lowest income and traders have the 
highest average income. The women surveyed are earning much more than men 
(Rwf291,111 per month for women versusRwf41,960 for men). This is because more 
women are engaged in different income generating activities, such as small businesses, 
compared to men. For example, more women than men are street vendors and artisans in 
Rwanda. 




average Female Male 
Farmer - 7 231 7 231 
Trader 600 000 - 600 000 
Civil Servant 400 000 70 000 268 000 
Teacher 250 000 65 000 147 222 
Artisan 35 000 - 35 000 
Other 192 000 98 000 160 667 




Many women ex-combatants, in common with other women in Rwandan society, sell food, 
mostly fruit and vegetables and second-hand clothes. However, in general, both formal and 
non-formal education has allowed women ex-combatants with the necessary skills to 
compete with men for employment. Nonetheless, the Demobilization Commission has 
failed to assist both men and women ex-combatants to obtain the skills to obtain secure and 
well-paid jobs; they have been relegated to subsistence-level activities in the informal 
sector. These findings raise the issue of human security in Rwanda.  Clearly, if men, who 
make up the overwhelming majority of ex-combatants, are rendered jobless and financially 
vulnerable – despite being overburdened with immense familial responsibilities – they may 
be tempted to turn to criminal activities.   
 
Some respondents talked about the option of a vocational training centre before and after 
the demobilization process. One of the major components of the RDRP programme is 
vocational training for female ex-combatants in areas such as plumbing, carpentry, 
computer services, refrigeration, and mechanics. The programme relies on Rwanda’s 
existing vocational training system, using their schools and facilities. This programme can 
assist these schools to hire more qualified teachers, reopen schools by rehiring teachers, 
increase capacity by building annexes and improve equipment and facilities. This can be a 
way of building links between former soldiers and the civilians and a good way to help ex-
combatants reintegrate into society.  
 
6.4 The DDR’s role in the life of ex-combatants 
The role of the DDR programme is evident in the training and material support granted to 
ex-combatants when they are demobilised and reintegrated into mainstream life. This 
section examines the different activities undertaken by the DDR programme to help ex-
combatants return to civilian life. These activities encompass, among others, different types 




6.4.1 Training and financial support 
Training plays a major role in the life of ex-combatants. When they leave the army, they 
have to find other activities to generate an income. Many need to be trained before they can 
integrate into their new economic and social environment. This is the reason why they join 
the DDR programme. At the last stage of their demobilization, the ex-combatants receive a 
cash payment from the RDRC, as established in question seventeen and presented in Table 
6.10 below.  While the large majority (84.4 percent of women and 92 percent of men) of 
the respondents received a cash reinsertion benefit from the DDR programme, some did not 
receive it.  
 
Table 6.10 Cash benefit received from the DDR programme 
 
In Rwanda, the reintegration process involves a mandatory benefit of Rwf100,000 
(equivalent of R7,000) for ex-combatants from the RDF and the AGs, to help them start 
income-generating projects.  The benefit is paid to eligible beneficiaries six months after 
demobilisation in order to allow them time to gain a critical understanding of the local 
socio-economic dynamics and to make informed investment decisions. One wonders if this 
amount is sufficient to enable them to resettle, taking into account that they would have to 
pay rent, school fees, start a business, etcetera.   
 
The focus group discussions revealed that female ex-combatants as well as their male 
counterparts felt that as long as they were involved in military service, they did not have 
time for economic development. During the focus group discussions, 20 female ex-























livelihoods, and invest in income-generating activities or housing and education for their 
children.   However, there were some complaints that the package was insufficient, while 
others explained that they would have preferred a lump sum instead of small amounts paid 
at intervals.  The reinsertion package provided by the RDRC is paid in several instalments; 
some of ex-combatants have no idea how to use their package at demobilisation.  The other 
group of female ex-combatants who were interviewed said that: “a certain agreed 
percentage of our benefits would be kept in a pool where members may have access to it as 
a form of credit” (FGD9, FGD10, FGD11 N P: 28 October 2012).On the other hand, female 
ex-combatants married to their male counterparts proposed that the benefits should be 
given to the family, as some males spend the benefit in bars.  It was observed that most of 
the ex-fighters are demobilised without proper preparation and planning for their new life. 
On demobilisation, ex-fighters lose their only reliable formal income; their salary.  This 
means that they require immediate support to compensate for what they have lost as well as 
to enable them to carry on with their lives as they face new challenges and realities.  
 
Thus, the main objective of reintegration support for female ex-combatants is: 
• to ensure that special needs, including protection, sanitation and counselling of 
female ex-combatants are taken into account in demobilisation centres, 
• to ensure that all benefits for ex-combatants are equal for, and equally accessible to 
men and women, 
• to encourage the implementing partners to ensure that their reintegration support 
activities within the Vulnerability Support Window facilitate the participation of female ex-
combatants, 
• to encourage female ex-combatants to participate in existing women’s associations; 
including partners of ex-combatants and women in communities of return in community-
level counselling activities; 
• to strengthen the gender awareness and capacity of the RDRC staff and CDCS as 




One may well enquire whether these guidelines have been adhered to. The study findings 
revealed that the modalities of giving the benefits are not always accepted by the 
beneficiaries.  Some women indicated that some female ex-combatants did not benefit from 
the VSW because they are married, although not all of their husbands are supporting them.  
During our interviews with ex-combatants, a female ex-combatant stated: “for a better 
reintegration, we must be prepared both physically and psychologically before 
demobilization stage for the forthcoming demobilization” (FGD, 12 KC: 22 October 2012), 
while another stressed: “There is a need to provide counselling to ex-combatants and skills 
to start their new life and confront its challenges” (FGD: 13KC:22 July 2012). It has been 
observed that some married women did not receive the cash payment; their husbands got it.  
According to the RDRC staff from the Northern Province, some females associated with 
armed groups were scared to identify themselves as female ex-combatants, with the 
negative impact of not being able to benefit from the DDR programme. 
 
In question number eighteen of the questionnaire, the researcher explores the rate of ex-
combatants participation in the DDR trainings and presented in the table below. 
Table 6.11 Participation in DDR-funded trainings 
 
Up to 53.3 percent of women and 50 percent of men respondents reported that they had 
participated in DDR-funded training, while 46.7 percent of the female respondents and 50 
percent of male respondents did not participate in these programmes. These statistics show 
that this is a complex issue. Although more female ex-combatants are participating in the 
programmes than their male counterparts, it would be useful to understand the underlying 























beneficiaries to participate. Some of the difficulties raised were the duration of the 
trainings. As a female ex-combatant from the Northern Province explained, “the kind of 
training organised is not convenient for a woman with children/family. How can I attend a 
training of 2-3 consecutive weeks when I have a family behind?” (FEX, 5NP:26 October 
2010)”.  Indeed, the importance of time has been underscored by the World Bank 
(2011:215): “Time is a resource. It can be devoted to productive activities, including 
market work, other (unpaid) work within the household, and child care, or it can be 
invested in personal activities (such as eating and sleeping) and leisure.”  For many of the 
female ex-combatants, vital care-related responsibilities for their families took precedence 
over education and training activities.  The RDRP programme therefore failed to take the 
special needs of women on whom such responsibilities rest, into account.  The female ex-
combatants did not participate as fully as they would have liked to because they thought 
that the programmes would take up too much time and they cannot leave their children and 
go to the training centres.  However, some women have attended certain training courses 
and they appreciated them. The researcher met with a group of women who were attending 
hotel and tourism courses in Kigali City.  One of them complained that: “the course takes a 
whole day and we are given no money for lunch, either the course should end half day or 
lunch be provided because some people have already stopped attending, in fact  most of 
them cannot even afford to pack their own lunch” (FEX,6KC:4 November 2010).Others 
felt that the training venue was too far away. Had these female ex-combatants been told that 
they would be able to collect benefits (such as money or food packages) at the same 
training sites, they might not have stayed away.  Another concern is that women do not live 
in the same areas and it is not easy to measure the distance from different homes to the 
training venue.  While it would be impossible to have training sites near every eligible 
person, one solution would be for participants to stay at the venue for the duration of the 
course, or to be given more money for transport costs.  
 
Many female ex-combatants did not take up the offer of training because they felt it was not 
relevant to the needs. The failure on the part of the DDR programme to establish what 
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kinds of training female ex-combatants want points to limitations of the programme in 
terms of gender sensitivity.  As stated by a DDR expert: “Gender sensitivity is not about 
pitting women against men. On the contrary, education that is gender-sensitive benefits 
members of both genders. It helps them determine which assumptions in matters of gender 
are valid and which are stereotyped generalisations” (EDDR, 4KC:6 July 2010). Gender 
awareness requires not only intellectual effort but also sensitivity and open-mindedness. It 
opens up the widest possible range of life options for both women and men. Thus, the DDR 
programme could consider some sort of affirmative action measures. This should not result 
in unequal or separate standards and should be continued even when the objectives of 
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved (EDDR, 4KC: 6July 2010).  If 
the reintegration process is to be effective, it has to offer training that aligns with the ex-
combatants’ personal goals, choices, and interests. 
 
Table 6.12 Participation in DDR programme and the year of joining the programme 
 
 
Half of the respondents (49 percent) reported that they had participated in DDR-funded 
training. While 73.3 percent of those who joined the programme in 2000 and before 
reported that they have not participated in any training, most of those who joined after 2000 
said that they had the opportunity to participate in such training. As noted in Chapter Five, 






































may explain why ex-combatants started to register for the training programme after 2001 
with approximately half (49 percent) of the targeted group actually participating in the 
programme. Some of the implications of the enrolment figures will be explored in the next 
sections of this chapter. 
 
Perhaps indicative of the thrust of the program design and bias, the least-educated ex-
combatants were the ones who seemed to benefit from the training opportunities.  This is 
illustrated in Table6.13. In all, only about one-third of respondents who had received 
secondary or university education before joining the military, received training. In essence, 
the kinds of training provided by the RDRP are more suitable for less educated people. This 
shows that the RDRC failed to plan and design the DDR training programme properly, as 
the programme is not responding to the preferred needs of many of the ex-combatants. 
 
Table 6.13 Training and education 
 
 
Table 6.13.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 




12 27 7 46
27,9% 65,9% 63,6% 48,4%
31 14 4 49
72,1% 34,1% 36,4% 51,6%
43 41 11 95

















The training programmes received by the ex-combatants are represented as shown in the 
figure below.   
Figure 6.2 Kinds of training 
 
Source: Field work 2010. 
 
The DDR training from which ex-combatants benefited consisted of public works, 
agriculture, vocational skills and, for some, entrepreneurship and apprenticeships. Formal 
education was also offered, mostly to those who had secondary or tertiary qualifications.  If 
the programme is to be effective and the training suitable for the ex-combatants, the RDRP 
should consider including adult education classes. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 6.3 below, the bulk of the training options are aimed at providing ex-
combatants with specific skills, which would enable them to pursue artisan career paths.  
Such professions are largely perceived in Rwanda as more suitable for individuals with low 




























































Figure 6.3 Skills provided by DDR training and education 
 
Source: Field work 2010. 
Some courses, such as carpentry, masonry, tailoring, entrepreneurship and livestock 
farming are accessed by men only, while others are subscribed to by both genders.  It 
should be noted that some female respondents had participated in training activities 
traditionally reserved for men, including auto-mechanics and welding. The issue here is 
why these women would be willing to take up these trades, but baulk at tailoring, 
entrepreneurship or livestock farming. Even when women are trained in male-dominated 
occupations such as auto-repair, they may not get jobs. This was confirmed by a woman 
from the Northern Province during our focus discussions. She complained: “I was trained 
as a mechanic but I cannot get a job anywhere because they think that I will damage their 
vehicles instead of repairing them” (FGD, 8NP:27 October 2012). This leads one to wonder 
whether the RDRC actually reflected on and planned the training options offered to 
demobilised soldiers before rolling out the programme. Did the RDRP not consider that the 
training must enable ex-combatants to use their newfound skills to make a living?  Clearly, 
the RDRP offered no career counselling sessions for the ex-combatants before they chose 







































































effective or optimise its effectiveness when the target group apparently received no 
assistance in planning their future at a time when they were weak and very vulnerable 
(having just been demobilised)? Figure6.3 shows that the participation of women seems to 
be limited to five activities out of the ten options available while male respondents are more 
polyvalent. 
 
The researcher established the duration of DDR training in question number twenty three 
(see appendix one, question number twenty three). 
 
Table 6.14 Duration of the training 
 
 
Table 6.14.1 Descriptive statistics 
Months of training 
N Valid 52 
 Missing 48 
Mean  4.7885 
Median  4.0000 
Mode  6.00 
 
Training can take from less than one month to a year and longer; one respondent talked 
about 36 months of training.  The average time of training is 4.7 months. The length of the 
training depends on the kind of training and may also depend on the availability of the 
beneficiary. A short training suggests that the skills acquired are low-level skills, which 
would explain the fairly low rate of subscription. The link between the duration of training 
and choices of options by the different genders will be discussed in the following sections 
of this study. 
 
Count
5 4 12 2 23
6 1 8 3 8 2 1 29










Thus far, the DDR programme’s activities have consisted of helping ex-combatants reinsert 
and reintegrate in society, by providing them with different types of training and financial 
support. But not all ex-combatants have received, or are receiving this training/financial 
support. While financial support is normally given to many of the respondents, it has been 
demonstrated that training is given to less educated people and is directed at occupations 
that are traditionally reserved for men, rather than for women, such as auto mechanic, 
masonry etcetera. It has been observed that ex-combatants are sometimes not free to choose 
what sort of training they want. Again, this is a matter of programme design. Challenges 
will arise, such as an ex-combatant choosing computer skills when there is no electricity in 
the area of reintegration; this would not help him/her. In a case like this, it is important that, 
while designing and planning a DDR programme, the authorities should also plan for the 
necessary support equipment such as generators in case of power outages, for example. It 
does not make sense to have something on the list of options when it is effectively not 
available to those that might enrol. 
 
6.4.2 Relevance and efficiency of the DDR programme 
In question number twenty-four of the research questionnaire, the researcher explores the 
duration after completing the training programme. On average, the respondents had 
finished training one-and-a-half years previously (mean of 17.4 months). Women had 
finished earlier, with an average of 21.87 months versus 15.21 for men. This demonstrates 
that women are leaving the training before it is completed, or choosing programmes that 
have a short training period. As with other women, for many female ex-combatants, their 
roles in civilian life as pre-dominant caretakers and mothers do not permit them to be 
absent from home for extended periods of time.  Clearly, this not only has implications for 
their choices of training but also may serve to restrict their career opportunities, dedication 




Table 6.15 Time elapsed since the training 
 
 
Table 6.15.1 Descriptive statistics 
Months since training 
N Valid 44 
 Missing 56 
Mean  17.4773 
Median  11.5000 
Mode  0.00 
 
Given the above context, the RDRP needs to come up with flexible and innovative training 
options that would accommodate female ex-combatants’ social and economic realities. At 
the end of training, beneficiaries were supposed to receive a start-up kit from the DDR 
programme.  
 
As a result, the researcher explores the extent to which the Commission adhered to an 
essential aspect of the programme. The Table 6.16 below shows the extent to which 
toolbox or start up kit were received at the end of the training. 
 
Table 6.16 Handing out a toolbox or start-up kit at the end of training 
 
The start-up kit consists of material assets to kick-start the ex-combatants’ chosen career. 
For example, ex-combatants who have trained as farmers received assorted vegetable 





























irrigation equipment such as baskets, pipes, connecting parts; and pesticides and herbicides.  
For livestock/animal husbandry, ex-combatants will receive goats, sheep, cows, poultry 
etcetera. A basic veterinarian kit would include things like medicine, vaccination tools, 
supplementary feed, and a shelter or construction materials. For a fishery, they will receive 
a fishing net, boat/canoe, and other equipment such as paddles, hooks, floats weights 
etcetera.  For a tea/ coffee shops, ex-combatants will get tools for tea/coffee making such as 
heating equipment, glasses, tray, kettle, and jerry cans for water, and start-up consumables 
such as coffee, tea, sugar, and milk powder. They will also get appropriate furniture such as 
tables, chairs, and a tea/coffee stand. For hair dressing, the ex-combatants are supposed to 
receive hairdressing equipment such as chemicals, weaves, driers, trimmers/cutters, as well 
as styling equipment. They will get furniture such as rinsing sink, mirrors, tables and 
chairs. The RDRP also encourages partnerships in the form of collectively-owned 
businesses. For example, those intending to open a bar would be eligible to receive 
appropriate bar equipment, furniture, and start-up consumables such as beer, soda, and 
water. They will also get electrical equipment such as a generator and wiring accessories as 
well as material for constructing a bar.   
 
Table 6.16 reveals that very few respondents (15.7 percent) confirmed that they had 
received the toolbox or start-up kit for their new profession. Although the differences 
between men and women are small, slightly more men than women reported receiving 
these kits. The reasons for the respondents not receiving the tool kits could be that they are 
expensive and the RDRP could be facing financial constraints. However, the failure to 
honour this obligation compromises the effectiveness of the training and prevents ex-
combatants from embarking on successful careers.  
 
As Table 6.17 illustrates, male ex-combatants were more optimistic that they would receive 
the tool kits (see appendix one, question number twenty-five); this might be because, given 
their lower educational status, they chose more simple professions to be trained in than the 




Table 6.17 Expectation of receiving a toolbox or a start-up kit 
 
Forty-seven percent of the respondents were expecting to receive a toolbox or a start-up kit 
from the DDR programme, while the majority (52.1 percent) were not. As noted above, 
fewer female (44.8 percent) than male (50.0 percent) respondents expected that they would 
receive a start-up kit. This attitude is linked to certain opinions that female and male ex-
combatants may hold about DDR programme. It was a bit difficult for the researcher to get 
more information about the kits delivered by the RDRC. While the Commission officially 
confirmed that ex-combatants received tool kits on completion of their training to enable 
them to re-adjust to civilian life, this was not easy to verify with the ex-combatants, as the 
research study took place several years after the completion of the training. 
 
Table 6.18 Abandonment of training 
 
 
At the time of the interviews, 44.4 percent of the respondents had completed DDR training, 
and 55.6 percent had not was no significant difference between male and female 
respondents as established in research question number twenty-one  Aside from those who 
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The different reasons for not completing the training are explored in question number 
twenty-two and presented in the table below: 
Table 6.19 Reason for not finishing training or formal education 
 
The reasons for not finishing the training or formal education differ from individual 
irrespective of the gender. Apart from those who are still undergoing the training, 63.6 
percent of the female and 45.0 percent of the male respondents abandoned training for 
reasons they did not want to discuss. Others lost their DDR cards or stopped because the 
programme was no longer giving them support.  As previously explained, this could be 
linked to the issues of family responsibility and programme design. Clearly, training and 
skills development should ideally be linked with support for job placement.  The RDRP 
should seek to create sustainable income-generation opportunities that are appropriate for 
male and female ex-combatants. The RDRC should look at providing counseling and life 
skills training, alongside vocational skills in order to address the needs of ex-combatants. 
 
The overall observation is that the ability of the DDR programme to produce results is still 
lacking. Of the 50 respondents who did not finish the training (see Table 6.19), only four 
were still undergoing training and the rest had abandoned it for different reasons. One of 
the key reasons is that the trainees realise that even after the training, it is still difficult to 
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that only 15.7 percent of the respondents had received a start-up kit at the time of the 
research study made it even more difficult for the ex-combatants to become self-sufficient.  
 
The most effective way to establish the efficiency of the DDR programme is to examine 
both the opinions of respondents about its different activities and tangible achievements in 
the field. The data from the fieldwork reveal that, despite the demobilisation of many ex-
combatants in Rwanda, whether female or male, and various reforms to strengthen 
democratic institutions in the post-1994 war and genocide period, the Rwandan 
reintegration experience has been less than satisfactory. The following lessons can be 
drawn from this experience: 
1) Reintegration plan: a framework for reintegration is necessary and should best be 
coordinated at the central level. In Rwanda, where this was not the case, there were several 
delays due to fears on the part of combatants that they would not be provided with adequate 
reintegration assistance. 
2) Encouragement, incentives and participation: female ex-combatants need to be 
made aware of the benefits due to them for disarming in addition to the benefits to be 
derived from a reintegration programme. Although the data reveal that the females appear 
to be more involved in the programmes than males, this does not hold true for all female 
ex-combatants in Rwanda. As the previous sections show, some female ex-combatants said 
that they were not informed about the DDR programme, while others maintained that the 
training sites were too far away to enable them to attend to their children while engaging in 
training. They need to be informed about potential benefits from the programme and given 
space to participate in its design. 
3) Education and training: in order to reintegrate successfully, it is necessary that 
female ex-combatants acquire skills that will make them marketable candidates for work as 
civilians. This is very difficult in economies with high unemployment rates and in a post-




The above three observations are the cornerstones for a successful and efficient 
mobilisation programme. 
 
6.4.3 Ex-combatants opinions regarding the DDR programme 
An assessment of the significance of DDR programme rests on the extent to which it helped 
ex-combatants to reintegrate economically, socially and psychologically into civilian life. 
In terms of its formal design, the role of the DDR programme in the economic integration 
of ex-combatants included equipping them with relevant education and skills to enter a 
competitive labour market.  
 
The respondents were asked whether the training they received provided them with such 
skills. Please see appendix one question number twenty-eight. The responses are presented 
as shown below.   
Table 6.20 Capacity of DDR programme training to prepare beneficiaries for work 
 
 
Table 6.20.1 Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) Exact Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.800 2 0.020 0.23 
Fisher’s Exact Test 7.584   0.24 
 
The data from Table 6.20 illustrates that 35.2 percent of the respondents agreed that 
training prepared them for the world of work, while 31 percent disagreed and 33.8 percent 
































difference between the opinion of male and female respondents, at the significance level of 
0.024 (0.024<0.05).Women are less appreciative of the quality of the training they received 
with only 25.8 percent agreeing that DDR training prepared them adequately, versus 42.5 
percent of men. On the other hand, more women (51.6 percent) than men (20 percent) were 
neutral about the usefulness of the training. This could be explained by the fact the 
programme may offer training according to its means rather than the personal choice or 
interests of the beneficiaries.  If the training is not generally appreciated, one wonders if the 
skills it imparts are marketable in the reintegration environment of the ex-combatants. The 
negative perceptions of female ex-combatants could also be linked to other issues such as 
the limited choice of career paths, some of which for example, mechanics, society does not 
perceive as women’s work. Again, the RDRC needs to allow the beneficiaries of the 
programme to choose what they wish to be trained in, even if such career is not on the 
RDRC’s current list.  
 
Support for income generating activities is crucial. As one female ex-combatant noted 
during a focus group discussion, “an advisory committee to help orient female ex 
combatants is convenient. This advisory group should not be too big but should include 
people from different experiences, even men who are gender sensitive” (FGD, 2KC: 19 
October 2010).The fact that 51.6 percent of women ex-combatants expressed neutral 
opinions (versus 20 percent of men) shows that women are more doubtful about the 
effectiveness of the training.  This is a significant indictment of the programme design and 
effectiveness – especially with respect to the needs of female ex-combatants. The problem 
is exacerbated when one adds the 22.6 percent of the women who disagreed that the 
programme was useful.  In effect, 74.2 percent or about three-quarters of the female ex-
combatants did not feel that the programme was an effective instrument for resettling 
women back into their civilian lives.  Another way of looking at this is that, if we add the 
25.8 percent of female ex-combatants that felt the programme was useful to the 51.6 
percent that were neutral, it could be argued that 77.4 percent of the female ex-combatants 
found some merit in the programme structure, design and effectiveness.  However, this 
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argument is belied by the reality that the continued presence of the women in the 
programme would suggest that their options were already so extremely limited that many 
would continue to find a measure of value in what RDRP offered them monthly.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher explores the need for the skills in question number twenty-nine 
from the questionnaire. 
Table 6.21 Need for skills learnt in the immediate environment of the trainees 
 
 
Table 6.21.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.317 2 0.000 
N of valid cases 68   
 
The data from Table 6.21 reveals that the majority of the respondents (42.6 percent) agree 
that the skills learnt in the programme are needed by employers in the immediate 
environment where they live; however, more than half of the respondents are not convinced 
about the marketability of the training in their current environment. Once again, there are 
gender discrepancies, with 62.2 percent of the male respondents agreeing that the skills 
provided by the training are needed in the area, but only 19.4 percent of the female 
respondents. Just over half of the female respondents (51.6 percent) are neutral versus 13.5 
percent of the men. In addition, 26.5 percent of all the respondents (29 percent of women 

































The above findings suggest that the type of training provided by the DDR programme is not 
likely to assist all the ex-combatants to fend for themselves. Female ex-combatants, in 
particular, do not feel that they are being provided with skills that are needed by employers 
in the area where they live. As noted earlier, the fact that many ex-combatants drop out of 
the programme, and that some are not participating in it, suggests that many ex-combatants 
may not be interested in the options offered by the RDRC. Clearly, most of the options 
available to the women were not in line with their needs or preferences.  
 
Informal discussion with an RDRC staff member revealed that some female ex-combatants 
prefer to start small businesses such as selling fruits, vegetables, or clothes. A female ex-
combatant from Kigali revealed during our discussion that: Some of us are not well 
educated. For example, “I survive on the informal knowledge I got from the army, I used to 
be a political commissar, then a quarter master, today I work as a volunteer for the Rwanda 
Red Cross in stores, I also participate in the community as the chairman of the Gacaca local 
courts and leader in women councils, given an opportunity I would for example study more 
English and do a small course in store management to formalise what I learnt as a quarter 
master in the army” (FEX,10KC:2 October 2010).Respondents rated not only the training, 
but also the training material, the trainers and finally the DDR programme as a whole. This 
is the subject of the following three tables. 
 




8 14 2 7 31
25,8% 45,2% 6,5% 22,6% 100,0%
8 15 3 8 34
23,5% 44,1% 8,8% 23,5% 100,0%
8 23 17 2 15 65











Excellent Good OK Poor Very poor






The test of statistical correlation is presented in the table below.  
Table 6.22.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.217 4 0.001 
N of valid cases 65   
 
There is positive appreciation of the training material, particularly on the part of male 
respondents. As the female ex-combatants are less optimistic about the type of training as a 
whole, they are equally less satisfied with the material. Indeed, none of them rated the 
material as excellent (versus 23.5 percent of men) and only one out of four (versus 44.1 
percent of men) rated them as good. Men and women’s points of view are significantly 
different (level of significance of 0.001<0.05). 
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The test of significance for the relationships between the variables is presented as shown 
below. 
Table 6.23.1 Chi Square Tests 
Gender  Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Female Pearson Chi-Square  26.658 4 0.000 
Male Pearson Chi-Square 15.234 1 0.000 
 
Differences in educational levels resulted in different levels of appreciation of the trainers 
(significance level of 0.000 for both male and female). All the respondents (100 percent) 
with a level of education up to primary school, rate the trainers as “good”, while the rating 
becomes worse and worse at subsequent higher levels of education (see appendix one, 
question number thirty-three). In essence, this is a case of the lower the education, the 
higher the appreciation. One reason for this could be that the training focuses on manual 
trades, rather than intellectual careers. Given this context, a pertinent question that emerges 
is: How has the DDR programme fared so far? Please see question number thirty-four.  
 
Table 6.24 Rating the DDR programme 
 
 
Table 6.24.1 Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Degree of Freedom Assumption Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.268 4 0.036 
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Respondents view the DDR programme as generally good. Some men even find it excellent 
(16.3 percent). However, it should be noted that male informants are more appreciative of 
the programme than women. There is a significant difference between the two groups 
(0.036<0.05). The respondents have a better opinion of the DDR programme than the 
trainers and the training material. The idea of the programme is overwhelmingly 
appreciated by both the female (93.5%) and male (95.3%) ex-combatants. Clearly, the 
programme serves a useful purpose in the lives of the ex-combatants by providing monthly 
stipends as well as new professional options that otherwise might not have been there. 
However, there was unhappiness with programme design and implementation. The 
programme is good per se, but the process does not really make the beneficiaries 
enthusiastic, particularly women. 
 
To sum up, the opinions of respondents regarding the DDR programme and its capacity to 
deliver marketable skills leaves much to be desired, especially with regard to females who 
demobilised. It was noted earlier in Table 6.20 that a very few women (25.8 percent) agreed 
that the DDR programme prepared them to get a job, compared with 22.6 percent who felt 
that it did not do so.  This suggest that the issue of effectiveness may be somewhat 
nuanced. Women feel that the skills they receive are not marketable in their economic 
environment; the material is better rated by men than by women, and the trainers are rated 
very poorly by women and more educated respondents. Opinions about the DDR 
programme are one thing; another is what outcomes it has led to in the lives of the ex-
combatants. How has the programme helped the ex-combatants, particularly women, to 
effectively reinsert into civilian life? As highlighted in the previous section, the root of the 
inefficiency of the demobilisation programme seems to lie elsewhere. Skills training 
development has not only been undermined by the loss of this capacity within Rwanda, but 
also by a lack of data on the needs of the labour market. The Mobilisation Commission 
should target the informal sectors through apprenticeship schemes, along with selected in-
centre formal skills training. Female ex-combatants need to acquire skills through 
apprenticeships and vocational training. Some could be placed in informal businesses, 
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while others would benefit from skills training such as carpentry, car mechanics, building, 
plumbing, and metal work; tool kits for trades such as carpentry, plumbing, and bicycle 
repairs should be provided after the apprenticeship or training scheme is completed. Ex-
combatants with recognised formal sector employment skills should be provided with 
incentive skills to help them gain employment, while also receiving support should they 
wish to continue with their formal education. In addition, the DDR programme should 
provide counselling on job-seeking strategies, training and employment opportunities, and 
should refer ex-combatants to labour intensive public works, or development projects 
implemented by other parallel programmes. 
 
6.5 Effective re-integration of ex-combatants 
Experience over the years has indicated that (long-term) reintegration of demobilised ex-
combatants remains a challenge. Reintegration depends largely on two factors. The first is 
the trust of ex-combatants in the (political) process. The DDR cannot develop the political 
process, it needs to follow it. Secondly, the presence of economic alternatives is critical. 
The DDR is fundamentally political in character and should be seen as part of a broader 
integrated approach to reconstruction processes, including security, governance, and 
political and developmental aspects, requiring integrated context analyses and subsequent 
comprehensive strategy development. 
 
As noted in Chapter two, the key concern of this study was to assess the effectiveness of 
the reintegration of female ex-combatants into Rwandan society.  The concept 
‘effectiveness’ is subjective as its understanding varies from person to person in such a way 
that it may not be measurable with any degree of absolute precision.   However, by 
examining policy objectives and assessing the degree to which they were achieved, one can 
deduce policy effectiveness.  The researcher applies the concept of ‘effectiveness’ in 
relation to ‘reintegration’ of female ex-combatants into Rwandan society.  The study 
examines whether the re-integration programme has been effective or not.  As effectiveness 
measures the extent to which the programme has been successful in achieving its key 
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objectives, this study assessed the success (if any) of the RDRC in demobilising and re-
integrating female ex-combatants. Relevant major indicators for measuring ‘effectiveness’ 
would include employment, ‘good’ social behaviour of ex-combatants, the interaction 
between ex-combatants and the societies that receive them, personal development, degree 
of societal acceptance, if ex-combatants are facing adjustment problems with their families, 
and/or whether female ex-combatants are treated as inferior or the same as male ex-
combatant returnees, participation in community activities, and their decision-making role 
in the community. The findings in this section illustrate the extent to which the RDRC has 
been effective (or not) in achieving its key objectives.   
 
The RDRC is charged with the responsibility of organising programmes linked to the 
national development strategy and working to improve the livelihoods of the ex-combatants 
as they seek to fully reintegrate into civilian life. As the activities of the RDRC focus on the 
reintegration of ex-combatants, this study seeks to evaluate how effectively female ex-
combatants are reintegrated into the social and economic networks of a civilian society. In 
general, the programme provides economic reintegration assistance and access to 
employment through job counselling and referral services, skills development, micro-
enterprise support schemes, rural development activities and employment promotion 
activities. For the purposes of this study and the RDRC objectives, four issue areas are 
discussed in the following section: economic reintegration, social and psychological 
reintegration, the quality of the relationship between ex-combatants and their host 
community; and the empowerment of female ex-combatants. The effectiveness of the 
programme will be discussed in sub-sections accordingly. 
 
6.5.1 Economic reintegration 
The capacity to find a job or to be self-employed is one of the criteria on which the success 
of the economic integration of ex-combatants rests. If the DDR programme is to be 
effective, it must provide beneficiaries with this capacity and, because they have undergone 
training, ensure their competitiveness.  In order to establish whether this is the case with the 
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DDR, this sub-section evaluates the ability of ex-combatants to get a job and what role the 
DDR programme plays in this process.  This point is underscored by the RDRC when it 
states categorically that, “Economic re-integration implies the financial independence of an 
ex-combatant’s household through productive and gainful employment” (RDRC, 2005:62). 
The successful long-term socio-economic reintegration of an ex-combatant inevitably 
requires gaining employment and thereby securing a livelihood. Employment is thus one of 
the most crucial aspects of the reintegration phase. The RDRC uses a range of measures to 
facilitate ex-combatants’ entry into the job market in Rwanda.  The training and education 
processes of the DDR programme aim to give beneficiaries the capacity to find a job or be 
self-employed, generate income and face other financial responsibilities in their daily lives. 
 
Few respondents (38.5 percent) reported that they had found a job after receiving training 
(see appendix one, question number thirty-one). There is no significant difference between 
men and women (level of significance: 0.326>0.05). Both female and male ex-combatants 
are facing problems of unemployment as the public sector is saturated and the government 
is downsizing the public service.  While the private sector is becoming the main source of 
jobs, the economy of the country is still evolving.  National unemployment levels stand at 
around 70 percent, and the insufficiency of land in some parts of the country is a big 
problem for the Rwandan population in general, particularly ex-combatants. This makes 
difficult to find land for shelter or agriculture. Although ex-combatants achieve the same 
average standard of living as that of the community members where they settle, some 




The data relating to finding a job after the training is presented in the table below. 
Table 6.25 Getting a job 
 
Table 6.25.1 Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Degree of Freedom Assumption Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.964 1 0.326 
 
As explained earlier, the training may provide self-employment opportunities; however, 
this possibility is reduced if start-up kits and post training support are not provided.  It was 
observed during the field work that a large number of female ex-combatants have some 
form of employment upon which their livelihoods are constructed.  
 
However, during the focus group discussions, female ex-combatants revealed that what 
they call ‘employment’ means working mainly for other people in different activities such 
as on a farm, in people’s houses, in security companies, and in small businesses and 
secretarial services, among others.  As one female ex-combatant indicated during a focus 
group discussion session, the idea of finding employment does not necessarily correlate 
with the notion of appropriate employment that is based on formal training: “I just work in 
the house of people to get something little to feed my family, just to survive. I consider this 
as employment because I am not just seated at home or in bars busy drinking. What can I 
do? I am struggling!” (FGD, 3KC:21 July 2010).Female ex-combatants working in security 
companies said that they are trying to adjust to civilian life.  Some of them have been 
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work that ex-combatants are often involved in more than one income-generating activity. 
While some female ex-combatants are involved in some kind of employment, many are 
earning less than a dollar per day.  Surprisingly, female ex-combatants acknowledged that 
the reason for their unemployment is not necessarily the fact that they are ex-combatants 
but rather that unemployment is a challenge facing the general population within the 
Rwandan political economy.  In fact, it has been observed that being an ex-combatant may 
be an advantage when it comes to getting a job in some enterprises. A military background 
is an advantage for many ex-combatants who gained jobs in the private security sector as 
security guards. Getting a job is a long process that takes time and adaptation. 
 
The researcher explored the length of time after completing of the training and getting a job 
and presented as follows: 
Table 6.26 Time elapsed before getting a job 
 
Respondents who were working took between one and twenty-four(24) months to gain 
employment.  The time taken could depend on their education levels, skills or trends in the 


























Whatever the parameters contributing to the length of time after completing the training 
and getting of job, it appears that men have a slight advantage, as illustrated in the table. 
Table 6.27 Time elapsed between training and getting a job
 
Six out of ten women (as against no men) waited 24 months before getting a job whereas 
eight out of 13 men did not wait more than three months to get a job. This may illustrate 
that the programme is not really gender-sensitive; or, that females are not effectively 
trained compared to their male counterparts. On the other hand, females may not be 
motivated as the programme is not responding to their personal choices or interests. As 
previously noted, female ex-combatants revealed during the focus groups discussions that 
some of the training programmes were mostly in male-related domains like welding, 
carpentry, auto repairs, among others. One female was trained as a mechanic but cannot 
find a job because people refuse to trust her with their vehicles; they think that she would 
damage them instead of repairing them because she is a woman.  Gender bias exists and the 
community at large needs to sensitise on gender issues in order to address such prejudices.  
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The relationship between variables is tested and presented in the table below. 
Table 6.28.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.742 2 0.419 0.448 
Fisher’s Exact Test 1.726   0.424 
N of valid cases 71    
 
An average of 47.9 percent of the respondents (52.5 percent of male and 41.9 percent of 
female) stated that training played a role in their getting jobs. However, the utility of the 
training should not be overestimated, as the table reveals that 52 percent of respondents do 
not really agree that the training was responsible for their getting jobs (36.6 percent 
disagree, and 15.4 percent neither agree nor disagree). There is no significant difference 
between the views of male and female respondents (at the significance level of 0.448 
>0.05). Although 47.9 percent of respondents recognise that there is a link between the 
training received and the jobs they got, on the other hand, a surprising 52 percent 
completely disagree or feel that the jobs they have only had an insignificant link with their 
training. Insertion into the economic system is also measured by the ability to get jobs or to 
be self-employed. 
 
In question number thirty-seven, the researcher explores the possibility of the respondents 
being self employed or being employed by someone. The data is presented as shown below.    


























The table below shows the correlation between the variables. 
Table 6.29.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Exact Sig. (2 –sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Fisher’s Exact Test 1.000 0.576 
 
Perhaps due to the difficult economic climate and high unemployment levels within the 
Rwandan political economy, the respondents seem to have a high level of ability to create 
their own jobs with 62.9 percent (both men and women) having worked for themselves. 
The gender of an ex-combatant seems not to have influenced their chances of being self-
employed. 
 
The duration of the employment is explored in question number thirty-eight and presented 
as follows: 
Table 6.30 How long did you do this job? 
 
The jobs lasted from one month to seven years and the jobs of female respondents lasted 
longer than those of men. The duration of a job may be influenced by the ability of the 
worker to maintain good productivity levels. Has training enhanced those skills that are 
useful in the current jobs? To answer this question, one has to establish whether the job 
requirements have meaningful relationships with the skills of the respondents. 
 
Table 6.31 shows that 44.2 percent of the respondents reported that their current occupation 
is directly linked to the skills learnt in DDR training. A quarter (25 percent) said that their 
job is indirectly related to the skills received. Indeed, the data showed that about 47 percent 
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of the respondents found jobs thanks to the training received. The more a job is related to 
the skills received from training, the more an ex-combatant is likely to be working for 
him/herself.  This is an indication of the DDR programme’s capacity to help beneficiaries 
to create their own jobs.  
 
Table 6.31 Relationship between employment and skills from training 
 
 
The data from Table 6.32 shows that female respondents still gain fewer advantages from 
training. Only 23.8 percent of them claimed that their jobs are related to the skills learnt 
from the DDR programme, compared to 54.5 percent of male respondents. For seven out 
ten women, their jobs are either indirectly related (47.6 percent) or not related (28.6 
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In question number thirty-nine, the researcher explores the relationship between the 
respondents’ work and training skills acquired and presented as shown below: 




Table 6.32.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.993 2.000 0.004 
 
It has been noted that the DDR training structure and options are not gender-sensitive as 
they are focused mainly on activities reputed to be masculine and reserved for men. The 
consequence is that many female ex-combatants are not endowed with enough skills to 
create their own jobs or be employed.  If they do get a job, it is not because of the DDR 
programme training. This led the researcher to explore if the relationship between finding a 
job and training affect the respondents’ income? 
 
Table 6.33 Relationship between skills learnt and the monthly income 
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The data show that getting a job directly related to the skills provided by DDR training 
does not necessarily lead to an increase in income. Men who got jobs related to their skills 
are earning much less than those who say their jobs are not related to the skills received 
from training. The income levels of female respondents do not really show any such 
relationship. Entry positions for low level jobs are often fairly comparable in terms of the 
benefits that may be accruable when compared to non-skilled jobs.  But these job 
incumbents often have much higher chances of increasing their levels of income with 
experience. While gaining skills does not necessarily lead to a higher income, other social 
dynamics seem to come into play. After the genocide, the role of women in the economy 
and in the political arena changed significantly.  In fact, Rwanda’s new constitution 
stipulates that women must constitute 30 percent of decision-making structures of 
government.   Rwanda is leading the world in terms of the number of women in its 
parliament as a result of the 2008 parliamentary elections.  Since 2009, women have held a 
third of all Cabinet positions.  Rwanda became the first country in the world to have 
women in the majority in government; 56 percent in the Chamber of Deputies and 34 
percent in the Senate.  The current Speaker’s chair is held by a woman. This arose as a 
result of specific mechanisms to increase women’s political participation and 
empowerment, among them a constitutional guarantee, a quota system and innovative 
electoral structures. 
 
In Rwanda, both male and female ex-combatants faced the expectation that they would 
return to their traditional roles in civilian life. Female ex-combatants are often expected to 
return to domestic responsibilities and caretaking roles, or to employment in sectors that are 
traditionally acceptable for women, while male ex-combatants often struggle to fulfill their 
expected roles as providers, or to find employment or livelihood options that give them a 
sense of self-respect. However, in post-genocide Rwanda, women took on work that was 
traditionally done by men such as working on construction sites, driving taxis, etcetera. 
Economically, the country has a new persuasive economic force: women. Women are 
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building their own homes, they are investing in their families, increasing savings, and they 
are paying school fees for their children. While there has been remarkable progress at the 
political level, this does not translate automatically to substantive gains for females. 
According to a UNDP report on Rwanda, over 60% of individuals live in poverty and 42% 
in absolute poverty. Using the household as a unit, 57% live below the poverty line. 
Rwanda has a high female population (53%), of whom large proportions are widows and/or 
single women. Nearly one-third, or 32.1%, of Rwandan households are headed by women. 
In terms of poverty gender disparities, 62% of female-headed households lie below the 
poverty line compared to 54% of male-headed households. The incidence of poverty is 
much higher in rural areas (66%) than in urban areas (12% in Kigali and 19% in other 
towns). Inequality runs deep, with the richest 10% of the population holding approximately 
50% of the national wealth compared with 50% of the population sharing just 10% of the 
wealth (UNDP, 2010).A Rwandan government official stressed: “in general in the whole 
country women have a long way to go as far as poverty reduction is concerned, they are 
very poor. Women councils help them to get some level of confidence, but at the rural level 
we will continue to work harder to improve their lives” (GO, 1KC23 October 2010). 
 
As women, female ex-combatants are called upon to compete for leadership positions 
within the community and run income generating projects under the umbrella of the 
women’s empowerment process that is underway in Rwanda. The demobilisation 
programme is not the last chance for women ex-combatants.  
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Some of the reasons for not finding a job is explored (see appendix one, question number 
forty) and presented as follows: 
Table 6.34 Cause of not finding a job 
 
Female respondents report more varied reasons for not finding a job. The majority (52 
percent) cited “Other reasons”. In contrast, men are more specific about these reasons; 35.0 
percent of male respondents argued that, as ex-combatants, their abilities are misjudged, or 
that they do not have enough skills (24 percent). Social stereotypes about ex-combatants 
may play a role in their chances of getting a job; this is more the case for men than for 
women.  More male respondents (35 percent versus 16 percent of women) affirm that they 
have had problems in getting a job because some people do not trust ex-combatants. They 
need to be helped to get jobs because it is not easy for the society to trust them 
immediately.   
 
During focus group discussions, participants talked about the scarcity of jobs in the formal 
sector in Rwanda.  Regardless of their skills, the chances of not finding jobs would be high 
in a country with a 70 percent unemployment rate. Nevertheless, there are other reasons for 
not finding jobs. For example, the benefits of newly acquired vocational skills or micro-
enterprise schemes created as part of reintegration can only be realised if there is sufficient 
demand and absorptive capacity in the economy. Corruption, economic insecurity and 
infrastructural challenges in the financial system can also undermine the utility of certain 
types of reinsertion, reintegration assistance and finding jobs. Therefore, it is essential to 
consider macro-economic indicators and issues of poverty in planning DDR responses. 
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Another crucial issue with the reintegration process is that of beneficiaries. There is a 
mistaken tendency to regard the caseload of ex-combatants as homogenous, overlooking 
significant variations based on gender, age, disability, ethnicity, military ranking, education 
and vocational skills which even small case studies encompass. The range of needs, 
capacities and expectations of ex-combatants tends to be wide, depending on these 
specificities/characteristics. 
 
The researcher explored the need for using the skills acquired in the future in question 
number forty-one and the data are presented in the table below. 
Table 6.35 Need for learning skills in the future 
 
 
Table 6.35.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.396 2.000 0.183 
 
Opinions on the need for skills in the future are not clear, or negative. About 60 percent of 
the respondents either do not know (37.5 percent) or think it is not likely (22.2 percent) that 
their skills will be needed in the future. There is no significant difference in points of view 
between women and men (p=0.183>0.05).Few of the respondents find jobs immediately; 
most wait for a long time before getting jobs after their training; even though this training 
seems to play little or no role in getting jobs for at least half of the respondents. The 
majority of the female respondents are self-employed, but their occupation is rarely related 
to the skills received from the training supplied for women. Why are the choices for 
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females so few and limited?  Although they are small in number, and the RDRC cannot 
ensure that all female ex-combatants become economically active or that they are able to 
subsist, the programme needs to promote the inclusion of females in the economic activities 
of the country. This would entail an advocacy approach and networking with various 
women groups in the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, to include female 
ex-combatants in the business sector as well as community and government development 
projects. Again, the RDRC needs to revise its training programme to enable female 
participation in the programmes that are attractive, such as entrepreneurship and not only 
focus on male domains. 
 
The main points that arise concerning economic integration are the low quality of the skills 
provided by the training and the lack of gender sensitivity. It has been shown that the skills 
given to ex-combatants are not necessarily making a difference to their income. Those who 
have jobs related to the skills provided are earning much less than those who occupy jobs 
not related to the skills.  The DDR training seems to provide some skills, but not enough to 
guarantee sufficient income. As a consequence, female ex-combatants who are 
disadvantaged with regards to the type of training provided are paradoxically doing much 
better than their male counterparts. Only 40 percent of the respondents said that the skills 
they received would be of no use in the future. This is the reason why they provided 
suggestions to improve the programme as a whole. However, while advancing the idea of 
reinforcing the programme, other measures are needed.  Social dimensions, that is, the 
interplay between a community’s physical and social capital, and the ex-combatant’s 
financial and human capital, ultimately determine the ease and success of reintegration. 
Efforts to strengthen social capital - for example, using existing community organisations 
and channels of communication - enable communities to take development into their own 
hands and facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. Hence, informal networks of ex-
combatants - discussion groups, veterans’ associations, and joint economic ventures - are 
key elements for successful economic and social reintegration. Such associations can be 
extremely helpful when social capital has been depleted. In other words, a community 
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which is receiving ex-combatants has a significant role to play in assisting them. 
Community sensitisation and political awareness are paramount in this effort. Care should 
be taken that ex-combatants are not stigmatised as unfit for military service or as conveyors 
of disease, violence, and misbehaviour. 
 
On the economic dimension, one can say that the peace dividend needs to be understood in 
social and economic, as well as financial terms. The reinvestment of some savings from 
military downsizing into the development of a disciplined, high-quality defence force can 
itself produce a peace dividend by increasing security, building confidence, and reducing 
public fear. It is useful to link a country’s overall macro-economic reform programme, 
especially as it concerns the public expenditure mix, to the planned reintegration 
programme. Furthermore, jump-starting the economy by rehabilitating critical 
infrastructure can also be linked to reintegration programmes that involve training and 
employment schemes for both reconstructing material assets and building human and social 
capital. On the other hand, continental demilitarisation is a precondition for reviving civil 
society, reducing poverty, and sustaining development in Africa. The realisation of this 
objective hinges on disarmament, the demobilisation of forces, and the reduction of the 
flow of arms into the continent, on one hand, and on the reintegration of ex-combatants into 





In question number forty-two from the questionnaire, the researcher deemed it necessary to 
establish the need for improvement of the DDR programme. The data is presented as shown 
below.  
Table 6.36 Suggestions for improvement of the DDR programme 
 
 
Respondents made a number of suggestions. The most important are: “to make allowances 
larger”, affirmed by 29.7 percent of women and 34.0 percent of men; and “provide more 
support in finding jobs afterwards”, affirmed by 21.6 percent of women and 14 percent of 
men. Minor differences appear for some suggested items. For example, women emphasise 
that the DDR programme should help them find jobs, but more men suggest that it should 
provide larger allowances. To sum up the role of DDR in the economic life of the 
respondents, it can be said that this role is somewhat present at a rate of 40 percent to 50 
percent. It appears that male ex-combatants are getting more from the DDR programme 
than their female counterparts. Furthermore, this programme is somewhat well-rated by 
male respondents, but the female ex-combatants interviewed are not very appreciative of it, 

































How can DDR program be improved?
Make training longer
Make allowances larger
Provide more support in finding jobs
afterwards
Provide more support in setting up new
business afterwards
Better treatment by DDR staff
Give training with something else
Must be gender sensitive and provide







better in the programme than the males. This is despite the fact that the programme is not 
really tailored for them. In spite of the advantages on the side of male respondents, women 
are more successful in their economic lives.  The demobilisation process does not only 
involve the integration of the ex-combatants into economic life; it also prepares them to be 
part of social life.  
 
In conclusion, from the above discussions and Table 6.36, some implications can be drawn 
about the effectiveness of the demobilisation programme in enabling the reintegration of 
female ex-combatants. The Table 6.36 illustrates women ex-combatants’ views on whether 
it is necessary to make training longer; 16.2 percent of women and 12 percent of men 
respondents agreed while 29.7 percent of women and 34 percent of men respondents felt 
that the allowances should be increased. When it came to providing training in other areas, 
18.9 percent of women and only 10 percent of men agreed. The starting point is that 
assistance programmes must be aware that female ex-soldiers do exist, and then seek them 
out. To help these women on their way towards reintegration, if not within their original 
community, then somewhere else of their choice, is a great challenge. Reintegration 
planners must also pay special attention to disabled women (and girl) veterans. It cannot be 
denied that directing support to ex-soldiers is a complex process. Programmes designed to 
benefit ex-combatants may work against the overall goal of integrating that particular group 
into civil society.  
 
From the previous tables, one can state that reintegrating female ex-combatants requires a 
holistic approach that is mindful of their actual social and economic needs, especially with 
respect to care and time use issues. They frequently lack education and training and these 
should be offered through assistance programmes. Childcare facilities are very important 
for the employment prospects of female ex-soldiers. A range of skills should be 
encouraged, not only typical female skills. Some of the knowledge acquired by ex-soldiers 
through politicisation programmes within revolutionary groups should be acknowledged as 
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being of value. In addition, ex-soldiers are experts on their own situation and can be used to 
train other ex-soldiers in dealing with returning to society. 
 
6.5.2 Social and psychological reintegration 
Psychosocial issues are receiving increased attention in Rwanda; this is reflected, for 
example, in the establishment of the national psychosocial centre in Kigali. This is also 
mirrored in the RDRC’s efforts to design a programme for dealing with ex-combatants with 
more serious psychosocial problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). To 
varying degrees, ex-combatants suffer from psychosocial problems that inhibit their ability 
to reintegrate properly into civilian life. A minority suffers from the more serious PTSD, 
but more suffer from milder forms of this condition, with typical symptoms such as 
nightmares and flashbacks, difficulty sleeping, and a lack of concentration and listening 
skills, as well as problems with temper, and nervousness. This will sometimes lead to 
conflict with other people.  It is not only psychological problems that lead to conflicts 
between ex-combatants and other people. As noted earlier, a range of other challenges 
facing ex-combatants in the reintegration phase may lead to conflict. Even though female 
ex-combatants have left the military life behind, some members of the civilian community 
seem to regard them as government spies. Ex-combatants often have difficulties finding a 
job and securing a livelihood, and may find it difficult to adjust to the demands of civilian 
life and a new social environment. Furthermore, ex-combatants are often reinserted into 
already poverty-stricken communities where they will have to compete with other 
community members for meagre resources.  
 
Many ex-combatants, who have spent a significant part of their lives in the army or in 
armed groups, need support to learn basic social skills such as how to manage stress, 
alcohol, drug abuse, depression, anger and social relationships in a non-violent manner.  
Respondents alluded to their traumatic experiences during the interviews. Witnessing as 
well as experiencing events that are potentially life threatening to one or others activates 
extreme fear, shock and/or feelings of helplessness and puts individuals, particularly female 
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ex-combatants at risk of post-traumatic stress. The researcher asked respondents what type 
of traumatic events they had experienced in life, including the time of genocide and war in 
Rwanda. The reported experiences varied widely among individuals. Some women were 
sexually assaulted by their fellow men soldiers, mostly their superiors in the army. Four 
respondents said that they had attempted suicide on at least one occasion. The main reasons 
for doing so were twofold. Firstly, the hardship of their current life circumstances, 
especially poverty. Secondly, medical concerns and pain. One respondent reported during 
the interview that he wanted to commit ‘extended’ suicide, he wanted to kill members of 
the community first and thereafter himself. Providing a package of kitchen materials, seed 
for farming and some money is not enough. Psychosocial support is also essential. Clinical 
assessments should be an integral part of DDR. One respondent reported that they used to 
use marijuana, but had stopped; another person reported that they had frequently taken 
anxiolytic (a medication to reduce feelings of fear) when going into combat, but had also 
stopped. No use of local drugs was identified among female ex-combatants during the 
interviews, except for chewing tobacco. Nicotine use was frequent. 
 
Finally, even though the researcher did not establish alcohol addiction in any of the 
interview respondents, alcohol abuse was established in two cases. Both women and men 
reported that they frequently drink too much even though they know that this will have 
adverse physical effects or will put them in situations where either they or others are at risk 
(for example domestic violence). However, alcohol intake followed an irregular pattern in 
ex-combatants, and respondents stated that they did not experience physical or 
psychological problems if alcohol was not accessible to them. This is an overall pattern that 
seems to be characteristic of the sample group (especially male respondents): If alcohol is 
available (and/or affordable) large amounts of alcohol are consumed at one time; at other 
times it is not consumed due to a lack of money or inaccessibility. Increased accessibility of 
alcohol (for example cheaper prices or even increased income) could lead to greater 
consumption and also to higher rates of substance abuse disorders. In a programme that 
focuses on the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants this component should be 
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monitored carefully, so that negative effects can be prevented in the long run. It should be 
noted that the frequent use of alcohol was reported to have lowered the threshold for using 
violence – against one’s own family or against others. In most post-conflict societies, social 
reintegration starts with the re-establishment of contact between ex-combatants and their 
families, as well as their host community.  The effective social reintegration of female ex-
combatants is based upon their ability to adjust once back in the community.  
 
In the context of Rwanda, this depends on the individual’s ability to reintegrate into her 
family on the one hand, and how her family treats her on the other.  Acceptance, trust, 
social cohesion and inclusion in the community are crucial for the social reintegration of 
female ex-combatants. 
 
6.5.2.1  The DDR programme and the social integration of demobilised women 
One can assume that female combatants are more likely to suffer from social prejudices and 
stereotypes than males. This sub-section will discuss the extent to which this is true and the 
role of the DDR programme in helping them to get back into mainstream life, both 
psychologically and socially. The positive role of DDR training in social reintegration is 
undeniable. A total of 66.2 percent of the respondents agreed with this statement. This is 
particularly true for men, 80 percent of whom agreed. There is a highly significant 
difference of points of view depending on whether a respondent is a man or a women 
(p=0.000<0.05).  
































The correlation between variables is tested in the table below. 
Table 6.37.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.381 2 0.000 0.000 
Fisher’s Exact Test 15.728    
N of valid cases  71    
 
Female respondents said that DDR training is of less use in their social integration; while 
80 percent of male respondents agree that training helped them in social integration; only 
48.5 percent of women shared this view; on the other hand, 38.7 percent of female 
respondents (versus 2.5 percent of men) disagree with the assertion that “they are better 
socially because of the training they received”.  This raises the question of the treatment of 
women by the programme, and the necessity of setting up a specific programme for female 
ex-combatants (see appendix one, question forty-nine).  
 




Table 6.38.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.596 1.000 0.440 
 
Most of the respondents (83.0 percent) confirmed that women and men are treated equally, 
while 17 percent think that they are treated differently. If the programme does not make a 















Do you find that female
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group. Indeed, a number of factors suggest that the gender aspect is overlooked by the 
current DDR programme. It has been noted that at the demobilisation centre, females are 
only provided with information on the programme benefits; there was no special session 
related to gender awareness and other issues specific to women. Many of these issues, such 
as rape, periods ceasing because of the life women lived during the struggle and which 
could negatively affect their social reintegration, might best be discussed in women-only 
groups. Although the RDRC is planning to strengthen the gender awareness and capacity of 
the Commission staff, it has been observed that there are only a small number of women in 
the structures of the Commission and there is no gender-awareness programme for the staff. 
Females are not represented at higher levels of the Commission. They are not included in 
decision-making and are not involved in planning the demobilisation programme. Another 
issue observed on the ground is that there is an absence of programme officers who are 
skilled in gender-budgeting issues so that they can identify women’s specific needs, or raise 
funds to give to female ex-combatants when they begin a new life. They are also not well 
informed on issues related to gender relations in communities. 
 
Table 6.39 Opinion on the necessity of a special programme for female ex-combatants 
 
A total of 55.1 percent of the respondents felt that such a special programme was necessary, 
while 44.9 percent did not. Another variable would help to establish more clearly who feels 
that a specific programme is necessary. 
 
This is established in question fifty (see appendix one) where the researcher asked the 
respondents to indicate whether female ex-combatants deserve a special programme. In 
























DDR programme. The responses to both questions are presented as shown in the table 
below. 
 
Table 6.40 Opinion on the necessity of a special programme for female ex-combatants (by 
year of joining DDR programme) 
 
 
Table 6.40.1 Chi-Square Test 






12.249 2 0.002 0.001 
 Fisher’s Exact 
Test 
11.849    
Male Pearson Chi-
Square 
20.097 3 0.000 0.000 
 Fisher’s Exact 
Test 
19.811    
 
Table 6.40 shows that the year in which ex-combatants joined the DDR programme 
introduces different points of view on the necessity of setting up a specific programme for 
female ex-combatants. In the two groups (female and male), most of the respondents who 
11 5 20 
73.3% 25.0% 51.3%
4 15 19 
26.7% 75.0% 48.7%
15 20 39 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
13 4 11 29 
86.7% 23.5% 84.6% 58.0%
2 13 2 21 
13.3% 76.5% 15.4% 42.0%
15 17 13 50 









































joined the programme in 2000 and before (73.3 percent for women and 86.7 percent of 
men) felt that it was necessary to set up a specific programme for female ex-combatants. 
Those who joined the programme from 2001 to 2005 have an opposite view: the majority 
feels that a specific programme is not necessary. On the other hand, the majority of 
respondents propose changes to make the programme more gender sensitive. How does the 
inadequacy of training impact on the social integration of female ex-combatants?  
 
6.5.3 Quality of relationships between an ex-combatant and the host community 
The quality of relationships between the ex-combatant and her/his family or community is a 
sign of social and psychological integration. It can be seen by the way demobilised women 
are accepted by their biological or marital family, neighbours and the host community as a 
whole, and the role they are playing in the reconstruction of this community. This is 
affirmed in question number forty three.   
 
Table 6.41 Acceptance of the respondents by the family 
 
Table 6.41.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.244 2.0 0.537 0.556 
Fisher’s Exact Test 1.302   0.183 
 
 
The first level of social re-integration is the family. The level of integration seems good, 
































true for 54.1 percent of women and 65.3 percent of male respondents. However, the 
situation seems better for men; 18.9 percent of women reported big problems in their 
family versus 12.2 percent of men reporting the same problems. However, the difference 
between male and female respondents is not statistically significant. 
 
During the focus group discussions, some women said that their families/relatives still 
consider their action ‘unusual’ and feel that they should have stayed at home and taken care 
of their families instead of doing ‘men’s’ work. The fact that around 40 percent of 
respondents reported having some or big problems being accepted in their family, leads to 
the conclusion that ex-combatants may suffer discrimination in the social context, even 
within their family.  Furthermore, female ex-combatants may be subjected to gender 
discrimination. This requires further analysis. On the understanding that education can 
influence the way someone is considered in society, the researcher decided to measure 
whether it makes a difference in the stereotyping of ex-combatants, particularly women. 
 




The table below presents the relationship between variables from Table 6.42  
Table 6.42.1 Chi Square Tests 
Gender  Value Exact Sig. (2-sided) 
Female Fisher’s Exact Test   7.631 0.075 






40.0% 47.6% 100.0% 54.1%
60.7% 68.4% 100.0% 65.3%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%


























The results from Table 6.42 show that the higher the level of education of an ex-combatant, 
the fewer the problems he/she experiences in acceptance by the family. All of the 
respondents that had a certain level of university education said that they do not have 
problems; the percentages drop as education levels drop.  The table shows that at the lowest 
level of education, fewer female respondents report no problems (40 percent versus 60 
percent of males,), but more women report big problems with acceptance (40 percent 
versus 10 percent of males). Even though the level of education seems to play a significant 
role in the acceptance of female/male ex-combatants by their family, the statistical test does 
not show significant difference.  
 
The following table illustrates whether similar trends are evident in acceptance by 
neighbours. 
Table 6.43 Acceptance by neighbours 
 
 
Table 6.43.1 Chi Square Tests 






4.165 2.000 0.125  
 
Acceptance by neighbours is equally distributed for men and women. The majority (61.2 
percent) had no problems. Nevertheless, almost four out of ten respondents had some 
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groups is not significant (0.125>0.05), even though more women (69.2 percent) admit to 
not having problems being accepted by neighbours. If we introduce another variable, 
differences become apparent. The gap between the males and females with respect to the 
degree of acceptance could be psychosocial, with male and females adjusting differently in 
their search for social acceptance. It is possible that males are seen by neighbours as more 
threatening than the females and, as such, would face more challenges. However, as 
mentioned earlier, although females seem to have encountered fewer problems, they felt 
less accepted in terms of access to marital partners from within civilian society. Female ex-
combatants may face rejection or stigma within communities due to their role in combat, or 
to their informal relationships with men.  On the one hand, marriage may be seen as the 
only way to gain acceptance; on the other hand, they may find it difficult to marry due to 
their past experiences or activities in the military. 
 
Table 6.44 Acceptance by the neighbours (by education and sex) 
 
 
Table 6.44.1 Chi Square Tests 
Gender  Value Exact Sig. (2-sided) 
Female Fisher’s Exact  Test 9.504 0.027 
Male Fisher’s Exact Test 4.128 0.385 
 
When female ex-combatants left the army, they had more problems being accepted by their 
neighbours if their educational levels were low, but fewer problems if their educational 






33.3% 81.0% 100.0% 69.2%
60.7% 37.5% 100.0% 54.3%
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0.027<0.05). Education does not exert a real influence on men’s acceptance (significance 
level: 0.385>0.05); higher percentages of men with primary levels of education were in a 
much better situation: 60.7 percent of men with primary level education had no problems 
versus 37.5 percent with secondary level education; 18.8 percent of men with secondary 
level education had big problems, versus 7.1 percent of men with primary level education. 
This suggests that education is of greater importance in increasing the acceptance of 
women ex-combatants in the society than it is for men. Perhaps the issue is attitudinal; men 
with primary education may have been seen by their neighbours as “knowing their place” 
while those with secondary education may have been less willing to accept poor treatment 
or negative attitudes from their neighbours.  Again, it is entirely possible that the 
neighbours were simple less willing to accept men with military backgrounds who are 
assertive. 
 
The focus group discussions corroborated these findings. The participants perceived the 
female ex-combatants as Rwandans who deserve special consideration because of the 
sacrifices they made during the liberation struggle. They feel uncomfortable or bad when 
they see ex-combatants suffering.  However, this has not always been the case; some 
female ex-combatants reported that they had problems integrating, as society regarded them 
with suspicion. Demobilized women felt that demobilization and reintegration were proof 
that they were unworthy to serve, and therefore a testimony to their character and 
personality. People use to call us ‘demob’ and this appears to have negative connotations 
and is often resented by the ex-combatants.  In fact, most of demobilized soldiers get out of 
the army because of bad behaviour, medical or other reasons.   But women get out of the 
army service because they are women.  We are heroes; we want to be recognised as 
veterans not as ‘demobs’ (FGD, 6SP:9 October 2010). During the discussions, it was noted 
that there is a lack of psychological preparation and counselling of female ex-combatants 
before reintegration into civilian life.  Most female ex-combatants said that after 
demobilisation, they were disappointed as they found life very difficult.  Indeed, as noted 
above, they often join communities that do not understand them and the DDR programme 
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is not designed to help them address such issues. There are people who think that we are a 
no-nonsense group. Civilian men are undecided to propose marriage to us, that we are 
difficult people, we are neither men nor women – unacceptable among men, and yet we are 
not trusted among fellow women. People always say, “be careful she was in the army” 
(FGD, 1KC:20 July 2010).To sum up, the majority of ex-combatants were accepted by 
society, but female respondents with lower educational levels were generally not accepted 
by their family and neighbours. Education significantly improves their image in society; 
more than it does for men. This gives them more freedom than uneducated women.  The 
situation did improve from the time of demobilisation to the time of the research. 
 
Table 6.45 Evolution of the acceptance of ex-combatants by their family 
  









the army 2009 
Have big problems 18.9% 5.1% 12.2% 0.0% 15.6% 2.6% 
Have some problems 27.0% 23.1% 22.4% 42.0% 24.7% 32.6% 
No problems 54.1% 71.8% 65.3% 58.0% 59.7% 64.9% 
 
As Table 6.45 and Figure 6.4 illustrate, there is an overall improvement in the acceptance 
of ex-combatants by their families. The respondents who had “big problems” just after 
leaving the army decreased from 15.1% to 2.2%, whereas 60.0% of respondents had “no 
problems”. Women noted a greater improvement than men. The majority of women (71.8 
percent) had no problem being accepted by their family once they were back home (versus 
54.1 percent of when they left the army) whereas 58 percent of men are in the same 
situation (versus 65.3 percent when they left the army). The other figures in Table 58 
support this observation. The integration of female ex-combatants improves at a faster rate 
than that of their male counterparts. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Evolution of the acceptance of ex
Source: Field work 2010.
 
The pattern of integration of the ex
same as integration into the family. There is a minor evolution in the acceptance of ex
combatants by their neighbours. The group of female ex
had big problems at the time of de
unchanged over time This may be explained by the behaviour of the ex
their demobilization. As a female explained during our discussion on the behaviour of male 
ex-combatants, “the reintegration package for male ex
families because some men are behaving badly, are drunk and misuse it. I myself, I got my 
reintegration package and I invested it. This is not always the case for males” (FEX, 5 KC: 
23 July 2010). The researcher experienced the case of two families whereby the wives 
benefited from their husbands’ reintegration package because of their behaviour
to the mayor of the District, the two demobilised males were irresponsible and were not 
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-combatants into the local community is not quite the 
-combatants (15.4 percent) who 
mobilization disappeared, while that of men remained 









taking care of their families.  After receiving information that the wives are trying to subsist 
in small business, and with the agreement of the RDRC, the two men’s reintegration 
packages were given to their wives.  However, this does not mean that females are always 
better integrated into their community than males. It depends on the efforts that are made to 
reintegrate into civilian life. 
 
Table 6.46 Evolution of the acceptance of ex-combatants by their neighbours 
 





the army In 2009 
After 
leaving the 
army In 2009 
After 
leaving the 
army In 2009 
Yes big 
problems 15.4% 0.0% 10.9% 10.5% 12.9% 6.1% 
Some problems 15.4% 28.6% 34.8% 26.3% 25.9% 27.3% 
No problems 69.2% 71.4% 54.3% 63.2% 61.2% 66.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The data from Table 6.46 is presented as shown in the figure below.
Figure 6.5 Evolution of the acceptance of ex
Source: Field work 2010.
During focus group discussions, ex
relationship between them and the community. The majority said that the relationship is 
improving.  Community and social networks have welcomed them.   A small minority 
reported that their poor relationship with their neighbours is caused by issues such a
financial problems, different opinions and gender disparities. Female ex
served with armed groups found that there is a poor relationship between them and society; 
this situation was improved by the Gacaca court. In general, the majority of 
reported that their relationship with the receiving community is improving because of the 
increased level of trust in them and the improvement in their behaviour.
paragraphs affirm that the quality of the relationship between ex
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-combatants by their neighbours
 
-combatants were asked how they feel about the








 The above 
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community does not only depend on the demobilised, but also on the community in which 
she/he is living. This is illustrated in Tables 6.47 and 6.48. 
Table 6.47 Current community of the respondent 
 
 
About two-thirds of all informants are living in the community they lived in prior to joining 
the armed forces and one-third is living in a different community. New host communities 
may be a challenge for ex-combatants and hinder better integration. The following table 
shows how community can have an impact on the way ex-combatants are accepted. 
 
Table 6.48 Acceptance by neighbours and the host community of the ex-combatants 
 
 
Table 6.48.1 Chi Square Tests 
Gender  Value Exact Sig. (2-sided) 
Female Fisher’s Exact  Test  0.015 
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The host community seems to have a significant impact on the acceptance of female ex-
combatants, but no impact on male ex-combatants. As shown in the Table 6.48, all female 
respondents who are living in the community they lived in before they joined the army have 
no problems, while two-thirds (66.6 percent) of those who are living in a new community 
have some problems. Indeed, there is a statistical significance between the host community 
and being accepted by neighbours in the group of female ex-combatants (p=0.015<0.05).  
Returning to the same community plays a big part in the acceptance of female ex-
combatants and this may be the basis for the acceptance of females as compared to males 
who are perceived as far more dangerous and threatening to the welfare of neighbours than 
females, given their capacity for greater aggression and violence. Eighty percent (80%) of 
the male respondents who resettled in the same community that they lived in before their 
military life reported no problems with acceptance. This contrasts significantly with the 61 
percent of those who chose to resettle in a new community. However, the statistical test 
does not support a significant difference (p=1>0.05) in this group of male respondents. 
 
The way the female ex-combatants are accepted by the host community may determine 
their role in current social issues such as unity and reconciliation. Social relations in 
Rwanda have been affected by genocide and war.  This also applies to female ex-
combatants. Participants in the focus group discussions said that the receiving communities 
treat them with suspicion and do not trust them.  Because of this stereotype, demobilised 
women try to be nice to everybody.  Female ex-combatants tend to be distressed. They face 
difficult situations in being widows, when they are ill, or if they are not able to send their 
children to school.   Some women revealed that sometimes they feel inferior when they 
meet their civilian friends who have made progress in their lives and then they think that 
they made a mistake when they joined the army. The most important element in effective 
reintegration is to establish whether the community trusts these female ex-combatants, and 
also if the ex-combatants trust the receiving community.  It was observed during the FGDs 
that female ex-combatants did not trust the population at the beginning.  Some of them 
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believe that society does not trust demobilised people.  However, the majority of the female 
ex-combatants interviewed demonstrated a level of trust in the receiving community.  Most 
also trust their families, government officials, the army and the police. 
 
Female ex-combatants were asked how they feel about the neighbourhood where they live 
and their activities in the community.   They were also asked how they are treated by the 
receiving communities and how they evaluate the relationship with their neighbours. It was 
observed that the majority of the respondents were actively involved in community 
projects.   There is a clear indication that the social cohesion and inclusion between the 
receiving community and ex-combatants is remarkable; this is facilitating the social 
reintegration process. This is illustrated by the case of the female ex-combatant in Kigali 
who received a cow from the government. There is a policy in Rwanda known as, “one 
family, one cow”. The government gave a cow to the poorest families.  Ex-combatants also 
received cows. In the Rwandan culture, if someone gives you a cow, it means a lot. The 
researcher met a female ex-combatant who received a cow from the government. She said: 
“from one cow, I gained four and I give two cows to my neighbours” (FEX, 14 KC: 5 
November 2010).  She is well-perceived by her community and is contributing to the 




The researcher explores how ex-combatants share their quality time in question number 
forty-eight. 
 




Table 6.49.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.867 4.0 0.760  
Fisher’s Exact Test 2.076   0.788 
 
Female as well as male ex-combatants spend most of their spare time with their family. A 
few spend their free time with friends, dating from before, during or after the war. The 
difference between the two groups (male/female) is not statistically significant (0.7>0.05). 
The fact that most of the ex-combatants stay with their families may have a negative impact 
on their reintegration process, in terms of getting information on available resources within 
the broader society. The content of reintegration programmes varies from the provision of 
access to land and education to vocational training and micro-enterprise development 
projects. Former combatants tend to have limited information about their society and the 
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attention during the demobilisation phase, then information, counselling and referral 
services should be established in order to provide the vital link between former combatants 
and the services planned for them. The reintegration of former combatants, whether in a 
rural or urban areas, would first of all need to consider a number of basic needs such as 
housing, infrastructure and services. However, the most important consideration in the 
reintegration of former combatants in rural areas is access to land (Lis Bruthus, 2004).  
 
Data from Table 6.49 illustrates that a large majority of the respondents said that they were 
warmly received when they joined their communities. It should be noted that male 
respondents seem much happier regarding their welcome than the female respondents; 56.4 
percent of female and 70 percent of male respondents rated their welcome as ‘nice’.   
Reservations are evident in the small percentage (3.4 percent) who said that female ex-
combatants were warmly received. The support and acceptance ex-combatants receive from 
families and community members are crucial to their successful reintegration. On the one 
hand, some communities will see ex-combatants as freedom fighters or heroes, while on the 
other, ex-combatants may be stigmatised or perceived as a threat to the communities to 
which they return.   
 
During focus group discussions, a female ex-combatant stated that some families or 
communities treated female ex combatants as “unusual people”. She was sometimes 
blamed by her family: “what you did was wrong”; “why did you not stay at home, get 
married and bear children?”; “you have chosen to perform men’s work” (FXE,6SP:9 
October 2010). The above findings confirm the problems the female ex-combatants might 
face when they rejoin their community or family (see Table 6.41 through to Table 6.48) due 







The following table shows what ex-combatants think about societal attitudes. 




There is a discrepancy between the points of view of male and female respondents. Even 
though three-quarters of interviewees overall, feel that female ex-combatants are treated 
equally to their male counterparts, opinions differ according to the gender of the 
respondents (significance level: 0.001<0.05). Female respondents are less convinced that 
they are treated equally with men. Some 59 percent think that they are treated equally, 30.8 
percent think they are treated as inferiors and 10.3 percent felt that they are treated better.  
In contrast, most of the men (89.6 percent) said that female ex-combatants are treated equal 
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The researcher explores the opinion of societal attitudes towards female ex-combatants in 
question fifty-two from the questionnaire. 




Table 6.51.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.142 2 0.002  
Fisher’s Exact Test 11.692   0.001 
 
Both male and female ex-combatants are confronted with the expectation that they will 
return to gender-stereotyped roles once back in civilian life. They may struggle to 
renegotiate their roles and relationships within the community, to gain social acceptance, 
and to transform their wartime identities and form a new civilian identity. Female ex- 
combatants may face rejection and stigma within the receiving communities due to their 
past role in the army and this may affect their reintegration into society.  
 
During a focus group discussion, one ex-combatant stated: “People always say, be careful 
she was in the army. Some people still think military life has changed us. Sometimes we 
regret when we are facing problems such medical issue, school fees for our children, or 
when we see our former civilian friends who did not joined the army and are doing well. 
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the army” (FGD, 3KC:21 July 2010).One should not only consider the attitudes of the ex-
combatants and their families, but also the community’s perceptions of the female ex-
combatants. Measures to support reconciliation and strengthen social cohesion and address 
stigma at the community level are often required as well as good behaviour on the part of 
ex-combatants, as they have a crucial role to play in their successful demobilisation and 
reintegration effort. 
 
In question fifty-three, the researcher investigates the relationship between the ex-
combatants and the host community. The data is presented in the table below. 




Table 6.52.1 Chi Square Tests 
 Value Exact Sig. (2-sided) 
Fisher’s Exact Test 0.973 1.000 
 
Almost all the male and female respondents (95.5 percent) confirmed that the quality of 
their relationships with their host community is good. However, only 3.4 percent described 
them as excellent. There is no difference in the assessment of the quality of the relationship 
between the two groups (p=1>0.05). Where they described the relationship as good, the 
respondents gave reasons. Thus the reasons for the good relationship between the ex-






























Table 6.53 Reasons for the good quality of the relationship between ex-combatants and 
their host community 
 
 
Different reasons were given by the respondents. The main reasons put forward by female 
respondents was the relationship with their family (50 percent), and the role they played in 
bringing peace to the country (40 percent). Men pinpointed more varied reasons including 
the help they bring to their family, relations with their family and their role in bringing 
peace to the country. However, when considering the reasons for the good quality of 
relationships between ex-combatants and their host community, one must view the 
reintegration of ex-combatants into the community not as one general process but rather as 
thousands of micro-stories, with individual and group efforts and setbacks and successes. 
Furthermore, before the reintegration, the community is aware that the ex-combatants are 
newcomers in the community, and according to Rwandan culture, they must be welcomed 
with dignity. The objective of social reintegration is to create an environment in which 
former combatants and their families feel part of, and are accepted by, the community. On 
the other hand, political reintegration is the process through which they become a full part 
of decision-making processes, while economic reintegration enables them to build their 
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employment (Kingma, 2000:28). Indeed, the long-term objective of reintegration is to 
enhance economic and human development and to foster and sustain political stability, 
security and peace. It is also crucial that the reintegration process recognises and reinforces 
local reconciliation processes, since reintegrating former combatants in society can 
contribute in the long term to the overall strengthening of peace and to reconciliation 
through growing interaction not only between the community and the newcomers (ex-
combatants), but also between different groups and former warring factions. In other words, 
successful reintegration helps to build mutual confidence among the former combatants 
who are at the same time former belligerent groups, thereby reducing the risk of renewed 
hostilities which can affect the community that hosts them (Kees, Kingma and Sayers, 
1994).  
 
6.5.4 Empowerment of female ex-combatants 
While a woman can suffer from having been in the army, she can also gain some prestige 
from having done so. The focus group discussions confirmed this. According to the 
participants, female ex-combatants have the power to make decisions in their daily 
activities and this has an impact on them in terms of self-confidence.   They stated that the 
community and the local government value their concerns and that they are listened to by 
local leaders.   This enables female ex-combatants to achieve a certain standard of living as 
well as to contribute meaningfully to national development and sustainable peace. The 
interviews with local leaders revealed that female ex-combatants participate in various 
activities, such as “Umuganda” which is community work on the last Saturday of each 
month, “Gacaca”  (local courts), and in local leadership.   This is an opportunity for women 
ex-combatants to improve their lives and play a vital role in national peace-building and the 
development of their communities. Most ex-combatants state that they have the power to 
make important decisions in their lives, that their opinions are considered by the local 
leadership and that, in general, they feel valued by the society. More and more ex-
combatants are rapidly building social capital and significant advancements have been 
made in the past two years. Society views female ex-combatants as brave, courageous and 
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strong. This leads to them receiving work and respect.  Because of their military 
experience, people think that female ex-combatants can manage anything. 
 
To summarise, the role of DDR training in the social integration of female ex-combatants 
leaves much to be desired. Only 48.4 percent of the female respondents felt that the DDR 
had played a positive role, in contrast to the views of men (p=0.000).  Some female ex-
combatants had problems being accepted by their family, like their male counterparts 
(p=0.537) and by neighbours. Integration problems decreased over time, faster than was the 
case for men. However, education played a more significant role in increasing the level of 
integration of demobilised women than it did for men (p=0.027 for women, p=0.385 for 
men). It has been noted that when the host community is different from the former 
community of the female ex-combatant, integration is slower. The newness of the host 
community has a negative impact on the social integration of female ex-combatants 
(p=0.015), which is the opposite for men (p=1).It has been noted that some female ex-
combatants suffer from stigma for having served in the army, a job normally reserved for 
men. A number reported that were treated as inferior to men; but on the other hand, a large 
number admitted to being treated equally to men and even felt that they have been 




The role of the DDR programme in the integration of female ex-combatants was 
demonstrated at four levels: services provided by the programme, that is, training and 
financial support; relevance and efficiency of the programme; appreciation of the 
programme; and effective integration. The DDR programme’s activities consist of helping 
ex-combatants reinsert and reintegrate in society, by providing them with different services. 
These services relate mainly to training and financial support. Not all ex-combatants 
received or are receiving this training/financial support. The training is given to less-
educated people and is known to be reserved for men, rather than women. Female ex-
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combatants do not find the training that is offered suitable for their needs and some have to 
make do with ‘masculine’ training. This leads to the question of the efficiency and 
relevance of the service. It has been noted that the ability of the DDR programme to 
produce results is still lacking. Among the 50 respondents who did not finish the training, 
only four were still undergoing training and the rest had abandoned it for different reasons. 
Even after training, there remains the problem of getting a job; women wait longer (21.87 
months) than men (15.21 months) before they get a job. Upon demobilisation, few ex-
combatants received a start-up kit.  Only 15.7 percent of the respondents had received a kit 
at the time of the interview and 47.9 percent were expecting to receive it. Female 
respondents were more pessimistic about receiving it (44.8 percent versus 50.7 percent of 
male respondents). 
 
The findings show that, in general, the respondents had good opinions about the 
programme per se, but the process does not really make the beneficiaries enthusiastic, 
particularly women. Female respondents felt that the programme failed to provide them 
with adequate skills that can be useful in their future life. Very few women (25.8 percent) 
agreed that the DDR programme prepared them to get a job. Women feel that the skills they 
receive are not marketable in their economic environment; the material is better rated by 
men than by women, and the trainers are rated very poorly by women and more educated 
respondents. As a consequence, male ex-combatants are getting more from the DDR 
programme than their female counterparts. That is why the female ex-combatants who were 
interviewed do not appreciate what it is doing to prepare them for economic reintegration. 
In spite of the advantages enjoyed by male respondents, women are more successful in their 
economic life. Their higher education may be among the reasons for this. Only 48.4 percent 
of the women respondents felt that the DDR programme is playing a role in their social 
integration, while the male respondents have a different opinion (p=0.000). Women have 
more problems being accepted by their family and by neighbours, compared to men. But 
this situation gets much better over time, faster than is the case for men. Education plays a 
more significant role in increasing the level of integration of demobilised women than it 
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does for men (p=0.027 for women, p=0.385 for men). It has been noted that when the host 
community is different from the former community of the female ex-combatant before she 
joined the army, integration is slower. Thus, the newness of the host community has a 
negative impact on the social integration of female ex-combatants. 
 
In spite of some social and psychological problems linked to gender-based prejudice, a 
number of demobilised women admitted to being treated as equal to men and feel that they 
have been empowered and that society considers them as courageous and brave and accords 
them respect. Furthermore, it has been shown that the benefits of newly-gained vocational 
skills or micro-enterprise schemes created as part of reintegration could only be realised if 
there is sufficient demand and absorptive capacity in the economy. The issues of 
corruption, economic insecurity and infrastructural challenges in the financial system may 
also undermine the utility of certain types of reinsertion and reintegration assistance. 
 
Therefore, it is essential to consider macro-economic indicators and issues of poverty in 
planning DDR responses. Another crucial issue with the reintegration process is that of 
beneficiaries. There is a mistaken tendency to regard the caseload of former combatants as 
homogenous, overlooking the significant variations based on gender, age, disability, 







Conclusion and Recommendation 
7.1  Introduction 
Before presenting the findings of the research, the researcher presented the profile of the 
respondents. These are mainly adult people, women and men, holding different 
responsibilities. Women are older and more educated than men. Respondents were living in 
different places before the war, but most women (66 percent) were living outside the 
country, in contrast to male ex-combatants, most of who were living in Rwanda. They 
served in different military groups and are likely to have had different life and military 
experiences.  
 
7.2  Conclusion 
Demobilisation can be challenging for a former fighter who is obliged to work to earn 
money in a competitive environment. Female ex-combatants are believed to be more 
subject to problems of adaptation and integration, when they return to civilian life. The 
DDR programme is necessary to facilitate the demobilisation process, and its role is a 
determinant in the success of female ex-combatants’ demobilisation. This study assessed 
the role of the DDR programme in the reintegration of female ex-combatants. This was 
done at four levels: services provided by the programme, that is, training and financial 
support; the relevance and efficiency of the programme; appreciation of the programme; 
and, finally, effective reintegration of female ex-combatants.  
 
As reintegration cannot be effective if the DDR programme is not gender sensitive, this 
study adopted a comparative approach to gauge whether it is taking into account the 
specific needs of female ex-combatants. Concerning the services provided, the DDR 
programme’s activities consist of helping ex-combatants reinsert and reintegrate in society, 
by providing them with different services. These services are mainly training and financial 
support. However, not all ex-combatants have received or are receiving this 
training/financial support. The training is given to less educated people and is known to be 
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reserved for men, rather than women. Female ex-combatants do not find that the training 
meets their needs and some of them have to be content with ‘masculine’ training. This 
reality of poor fit for female ex-combatants leads to the questions regarding the efficiency 
and relevance of the services. It has been noted that the ability of the DDR programme to 
produce results is lacking. Among the 50 respondents who did not finish training, only four 
were still undergoing it and all the rest had abandoned it for different reasons. Even after 
the training, there remains the problem of getting a job; women wait longer (21.87 months) 
than men (15.21 months) before they could get a job. This was quite aside from the fact that 
women were collectively better qualified than the men.  Perhaps, the longer time spent 
finding jobs may be explained by the fact that some of the women chose professional 
training in areas traditionally considered male domains. Beyond the choice of professional 
training, there is also the fact that upon completion of training, many ex-combatants do not 
receive the range of equipment promised by the RDRP at the time of commencing the 
training.  As Table 6.16 underscores, only 15.7 percent of the respondents had received 
their tool-kit at the time of the interview and 47.9 percent were still expecting to receive it. 
Female respondents were more pessimistic about receiving it (44.8 percent versus 50.7 
percent of male respondents). 
 
While the findings showed that opinion about the programme per se is generally good, the 
process does not really make the beneficiaries, particularly the women, enthusiastic. Female 
respondents exposed weaknesses in the programme in terms of giving them adequate skills 
that can be useful in their future life. Very few women (25.8 percent) agree that the DDR 
programme prepared them to get a job. Women feel that the skills they receive are not 
marketable in their economic environment; the material is better rated by men than by 
women, and the trainers are rated very poorly by women and the more educated 
respondents. As a consequence, male ex-combatants are getting more from the DDR 
programme than their female counterparts. That is why female ex-combatants interviewed 
do not appreciate what it is being done to prepare them for economic integration. In spite of 
the advantages on the part of male respondents, women are more successful in their 
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economic life. Their higher levels of education may be among the reasons for this. Only 
48.4 percent of the women respondents felt that the DDR programme is playing a role in 
social integration, while the male respondents have a different opinion (p=0.000). Women 
have more problems being accepted by their family and neighbours, compared to the men. 
However, this situation gets much better over time, faster than is the case for men. 
Education plays a more significant role in increasing the level of integration of demobilized 
women than it does for men (p=0.027 for women, p=0.385 for men). It has been noted that 
when the host community is different from the community of the female ex-combatant 
before joining the army, the integration is slower. Thus, the newness of the host community 
has a negative impact on the social integration of female ex-combatants. 
 
In spite of some social and psychological problems linked to gender-based prejudices, a 
number of demobilised women confirmed that they were treated as equal to men and feel 
that they have been empowered and that society considers them courageous and brave and 
accords them respect. The initial study hypothesis was that female ex-combatants will not 
re-adjust successfully into civilian life if their demobilisation and re-integration programme 
is ineffective. This has been partially confirmed by the survey and focus group discussions. 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the DDR programme is not gender-sensitive. 
The training provided to ex-combatants is mainly ‘masculine’, and does not take into 
account the specific needs of demobilised women. This results in a lack of skills among 
women and inadequate acceptance of female ex-combatants by the host community. 
Demobilised women have more problems regarding social integration than men. However, 
the weakness of the DDR programme is compensated for by other social dynamics. Current 
trends in the political and economic spheres foster women’s empowerment and female ex-
combatants are reintegrated faster than men. While a woman can suffer from having been 
in the army, she can also gain some prestige from having done so. This was confirmed by 
most of female ex combatants during the focus group discussions. Female ex-combatants 
have the power to make decisions in their daily activities and this has an impact on them in 
terms of self-confidence. They have the power to make important decisions in their lives, 
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that their opinions are considered by the local leadership and that, in general, they feel 
valued by the society. Because of their military experience, people think that female ex-
combatants can manage anything. Although women are victims of conflicts, it was 
observed that they are agents for peace, and they are playing important roles as community 
builders in their communities. In post genocide Rwanda, Rwandan women took work 
which was traditionally done by men such as working on construction sites, driving taxi 
and trucks, etcetera.  Female ex combatants gained power, control, self-confidence, and the 
feeling of belonging in their reintegration into society. As was stated by interviewed former 
women combatants, their service in the army changed them considerably. They revealed 
that they gained news skills, capabilities and confidence in contrast to other women. They 
called on as agents of change and positive role models for other women and to lead the way 
in redressing gender prejudice in the community both politically and economically. While 
the reintegration of female ex-combatants is real, the role of DDR programme in this 
process remains minimal.   
 
Finally, reintegration activities in urban areas, according to one source, need to be more 
diverse and of longer duration (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996a: 58). In the 
Ethiopian reintegration experience, it was found that .the urban target group was more 
complex and difficult than that of the rural ex-combatants because of the diverse social and 
economic backgrounds of the ex-combatants, and the tightness of the urban labour market. 
 
7.3 Recommendations 
The main recommendations arising from this study are summarised below. They clearly 
have a number of implications for how DDR programmes are structured, coordinated, 
funded and implemented, and how they can underpin broader reintegration processes: 
1)  Reintegration is a complex and drawn out process. The way in which ex-
combatants are introduced to reintegration programmes needs a more human sensitive and 
human security approach.  Ex-combatants cannot be deprogrammed in a mechanistic mode 
to be civilians; rather, the social bonding elements of community based reintegration can 
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help heal the wounds of conflict. Reinsertion packages can facilitate the initiation of this 
process, by reintroducing the basic semblance of civilian existence through its effects on 
the well-being and economic sustainability of ex-combatants in the post-discharge period. 
2) It needs to be acknowledged that a combatant-focused approach can easily create 
resentment and dissatisfaction among the civilian population and consequently, targeting 
decisions and the question of who the beneficiaries of DDR should be will be a point for 
debate. This study adopts the position that community-based approaches are best for long-
term reintegration support, and calls for a reinsertion assistance approach that prioritises the 
return and immediate resettlement needs of ex-combatants. 
3) A change in DDR programme policies is needed in order to allow female ex-
combatants to better integrate economically, socially and psychologically.  There should be 
special programmes for women ex-combatants because of their unusual situation related to 
their gender.  At the very outset, demobilisation and reintegration programmes should have 
been designed in such a way that they could provide for women’s special needs and women 
themselves should be involved in planning.  However, it has been observed that women 
were given the same package as men. While a special programme for women may be 
necessary, the existing programme also needs to be more gender sensitive. 
4) The DDR programme should integrate women in its decision-making structures in 
order to understand the specific needs of female ex-combatants. The RDRP should be 
gender-sensitive as female ex-combatants have said that they have special problems which 
are different from those of their male counterparts. Power relations, identity crises, 
vulnerability and co-operating with the community through intra-house and social relations 
are all factors affecting women differently from men as they rejoin civilian life. 
5) Training material and contents should be revised and more women should be 
integrated in the group of trainers to meet the needs of women ex-combatants. Education is 
a major factor in the integration of women. This should be a great focus in the 
demobilisation of the female ex-combatants. 
6) The host community of the demobilised women should be sensitised, particularly if 
it is different from the one the demobilised women lived in before. In order to help female 
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ex-combatants to regain their self-confidence and feel appreciated for all they did during 
the liberation struggle a lot has to be done by the communities and female ex-combatants 
themselves with support from the RDRC.  For example, special events to express 
appreciation of female ex-combatants should be organised and they should be recognised 
on national days. 
7) Attention should be paid to uneducated women when they are demobilised and 
formal structures should be set up to help them progress in civilian life. Psychological and 
social problems need to be dealt with.  Again, at demobilisation, in addition to existing 
orientations, women should have an extra women’s session exclusive to them. Psychosocial 
preparation at a designated centre when the programme nears completion would also be an 
advantage; because they already see the Commission as a parent; when the programme 
closes they may be displaced again.  
8) From this study, it has been observed that the community is the main resource for 
rehabilitation and the successful outcome of the reintegration process.  As the former 
fighters successfully adjust to civilian community life, it is important for the RDRC to 
maintain good working relations with the communities who host female ex-combatants.  
Effective monitoring and evaluation of the process is vital to determine how it is faring.    
As stated in the focus group discussions, there is insufficient monitoring of the female 
reintegration process and insensitivity to their specific gender situations.  It would be 
advisable for the RDRC to review and strengthen its activities locally; by visiting female 
ex-combatants in their reintegration communities in order to understand their problems and 
personal situations.  
9) The entitlement or inducement debate in DDR is probably one of the most 
controversial issues that planners and practitioners need to bear in mind. Reinsertion 
benefits should be viewed outside of this framework as a demobilised combatant returning 
home empty-handed could easily become a potential security risk; the period immediately 
after demobilisation is particularly critical in their transformation in identity from a 
combatant to civilian. Their potential involvement in crime for example, could easily 
worsen the social reintegration prospects in later stages of DDR. Therefore, although this 
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study advocates a human resource development perspective in the reintegration phase 
which would be expected to address the challenges regarding the receiving communities’ 
absorption capacities as much as possible; for reinsertion assistance to be effective it needs 
to target ex-combatants first in their transition from demobilisation to reintegration. 
10) In order for financial reinsertion assistance to make a real difference it is necessary 
to identify the specific needs of each target group within the broader ex-combatant 
caseload. This requires careful planning, adequate monitoring and sufficient funding to 
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Questionnaire  for Ex-combatants   
 
0 1 Questionnaire number ___________ 
Background Information 
Q 1 Enter the respondent’s sex     Male       Female 
Q 2 Enter the respondent’s coded initials (optional) 
 
Q 3 What year were you born?   19…..           or years    
Q 4 Where were you born in? 
  Rwanda   Burundi  Uganda  DRC   Kenya  Tanzania  
 Other 
Q 5 Where were you living before the war began in 1994? 
  1 Kigali  2 Other town in Rwanda  3 Small urban village in Rwanda 
 4 Rural settlement in Rwanda 
Q 6 What is your marital status? 
 1 Single, never married  2 divorced/ separated  3 Widowed  4 Married, 
monogamous  5 Married, polygamous 
Q 7 What is your religion?  
None Adventist Catholics   Muslim  Protestants  Other 
Q 8 What military group were you in before your demobilisation? 
1 RDF 2 RPA 3 FAR 4 Armed group  5  FDLR 
Q 9 Please state what rank you had at demobilisation 
1 Col 2 LtCol 3 Major 4 Captain 5 Lt   6 2Lt 7 WOI  
8 WOII 9 SM 10 S/SG  11 SGT 12 CPL 13 L/ CPL 14 Private 
Q 10 What is your highest level of education?  
 1 No school  
 2 Some primary school  
3 Completed primary school 
 4 Some secondary school  
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 5 Completed secondary  school 
 6 Some university  
 7 Completed university    
 8 Some Institute/ Polytechnic 
 9 Completed Institute/ Polytechnic  
 10 Vocational 
Q 11 What was your main occupation before the war? (Choose one) 
  1 Farmer   2 Trader   3 State functionary ( Civil servant)   4 Soldier   5 
Teacher        6 Medical worker   7 Artisan   8 Work in someone else’s home               
 9 Housewife   10 Student   11Odd=jobs/ Part time    12 No employment 
 13 Other  Specify ____________________ 
Q 12 What is your occupation today? Profession: ……… (Enter code from last question 
or) 
 13 Other Specify: _____________________ 
Q 14 If you are comfortable telling us, what is your monthly income?  
(Include only cash income) _____________Enter Income in Rwandese francs 
Q 15 How many people do you support with this income? ___________ (Enter number) 
Q 16 When did you join the DDR programme? Month ….. Year….. 
Q 17 Did you receive a DDR cash re-insertion benefit?   1 Yes   2 No  
Q 18 Did you participate in DDR funded training or educational training?   
1 Yes                2 No  
  If YES, answer the next two questions; if NO mark NA for Q 19 and Q 20
Q 19 
 
In which DDR funded training programme did you or are you participating in? 
(Mark as many as apply)  
 1 Public works  
 2 Agricultural 
 3 Apprenticeship   
 4 Vocational/skills training  
 Formal education   
 6 Other…. 
Q 20 What DDR funded training did or are you participating in? 
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  1 auto mechanic  2 bicycle repair  3 carpentry  4 computer studies  
 5 electrical installations  6 hairdressing  7 masonry  8 plumbing 
 9 radio mechanic  10 tailoring  11 welding  12 building 
 13 formal education  14 Other specify …… 
Q 21 Have you completed your DDR funded training or educational programme?  
1 Yes  2 No  
 If NO, answer the next question  
Q 22 Why did you not complete your training?  
1 I am currently in training   
2 I lost my DDR card  
3 DDR stopped my benefits   
4 other…… 
 If YES, answer the following questions  
Q 23 How many months did your training last?   ……number of months 
Q 24 How many months since you completed your training? …..number of months 
Q 25 Did you expect to receive a toolbox or start up kit?  
1  Yes 2 No 
Q 26 Did you receive a toolbox or start up kit? 1  Yes 2  No  
Q 27 Are you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
Q 28 The training I received has prepared me well for my work  
1 agree 2  disagree 3 neither 
Q 29 The skills I learnt are needed by employers in this area
1 agree 2 disagree 3 neither  
Q 30 I am better socially because of the training I received  
1 agree 2 disagree 3 neither 
Q 31 The training I received was responsible for the job I received  
1 agree 2 disagree 3 neither 
Q32 In general, how would you rate the materials and content of the training course?   
1 Excellent 2 Good 3 OK 4 Poor 5 Very Poor  
Q 33 How would you rate the trainers?  
1 Excellent 2 Good 3 OK 4 Poor 5 Very Poor 
Q 34 Overall, how would you rate the DDR Programme?   
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1 Excellent  
2 Good 
3 OK  
4 Poor 
5 Very Poor 
Q 35 Since completing the training programme, have you had a job?  
1 Yes 2 No 
If YES answer the following questions 
Q 36 After finishing the training programme, how long was it before you started working? 
……number of months 
Q 37 Have you worked, either for somebody else or yourself?  
1 For somebody else  
2 For myself  
Q 38 How long did you / have you been doing this work?  
Q 39 Did / does your work, relate directly, indirectly or not at all to your training skills?   
1 directly related  
2 indirectly related   
3 not related 
 If NO, answer the following questions  
Q 40 Which of the following statements best describes why you have not found a job?  
(Choose two max)  
 When employers find out that I am an ex combatant, they do not want to hire me 
because they think that I am a bad worker  
 I do not like any of the jobs that I have found  
 I do not have good skills  
 I do not know where to find employers that need people to work for them 
 5 Other 
Q 41 Do you think that the skills that you have learnt will ever be used for work sometime 
in the future?  
 Yes   Not likely   Do not know 
Q 42 Of the following list choose the two most important improvements that should be 
made to the DDR Programme 
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 Make training longer    
  Make allowances larger   
 Provide more support in finding jobs afterwards    
 Provide more support in setting up new business afterwards  
 5 Better treatment by DDR staff  
 Give training is something else (What?) …………  
  Must be gender sensitive and provide more attention to vulnerable group  
Other……… 
Q 43 After leaving the army, did you face problems in gaining acceptance from your 
family?  
 Yes big problems   Some problems   No problems 
Q 44 After you left the army, did you face problems in gaining acceptance from your 
neighbours?  
  Yes big problems  
  Some problems  
  No problems 
Q 45 Today, do you face problems gaining acceptance from your family?   
 Yes big problems  
  Some problems   
 No problems 
Q 46 Today, do you face problems gaining acceptance from your neighbours?  
 Yes big problems  
  some problems  
  No problems 
Q 47 Are you living in the same community as you were before you joined the army?   
 1 Yes   2 No 
Q 48 With whom do you spend most of your free time?  (Choose one) 
 1 On my own  
 2 Family 
 3 Friends from before the war  
 3 New friends that I met after the war  
 4 Friends I met in the army during the war  
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 5 Other friends that I met during the war 
 Please answer the following questions 
Q 49 Do you find that female ex-combatants are treated in the same way like male ex-
combatants in regard to DDR Programme?  
 1 Treated the same  
 2 treated differently 
Q 50 Do you think that female ex-combatants deserve a special programme?   
 1 Yes 
 2 No 
Q 51 Do you think that male ex-combatants are better received by the communities than 
the female counterparts when they returned?  
 1 Very warm received  
 2 Nicely 
 3 female are received with suspicion  
 4 not well received  
 5 no response 
Q 52 Since demobilisation, do you think that female ex-combatants are treated inferior, 
superior or as equal as their male counterparts?   
1 treated equal   
2 treated inferior  
3 treated superior  
Q 53 As a demobilised combatant, how do you qualify your relationship with your h st 
community?   
1 Excellent   
2 Good  
3 Bad  
4 Not sure 
 If your response is excellent, it is because  
 1 we are their sons, daughters  
2 They respect our contribution towards peace and stability  
3 Because we brought peace to the country  




 If  your response is bad, the main reason is because   
 1 I fought on the wrong side  
2 I returned to share the meager resource  
3 Because my livelihood depends on them  
4 Perceptions/ Attitude towards female ex-combatants is negative  
5 Other 
 
 
 
